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Martin's silver scrap book

St. Louis

[1896?]

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⌙ Type:  a     ELvl:  K     Srce:  d     Audn:        Ctrl:        Lang:  eng
  BLvl:  m     Form:  a     Conf:  0     Biog:        MRec:        Ctry:  mou
               Cont:        GPub:        Fict:  0     Indx:  0
  Desc:  a     Ills:  cf    Fest:  0     DtSt:  s     Dates: 1896,     ↔
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question clearly analyzed ... ↔
⌙   7  260     St. Louis : ▾b Ennis Stationery, ▾c [1896?] ↔
⌙   8  300     128 p., [1] leaf of plates : ▾b port. ; ▾c 23 cm. ↔
⌙   9  500     Cover title. ↔
⌙  10  533     Microfilm. ▾b New York, N.Y. : ▾c Columbia University Libraries,
▾d to be filmed in 1997. ▾e 1 microfilm reel ; 35 mm. ↔
⌙  11  583     Filmed; ▾f NEH Project (FMEST); ▾c 1997 ↔
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TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA

FILM SIZE: 35mm REDUCTION RATIO: 12:1 IMAGE PLACEMENT: IA (IIA) IB IIB

DATE FILMED: 2/11/98 INITIALS: F.C.

TRACKING # : 29678

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Martin's Silver Scrap Book

The Money Question Clearly Analyzed.

Selections from the Speeches and Writings of Leading Men.

ENNIS STATIONERY CO., ST. LOUIS

WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN.

WILLIAM J. BRYAN

Sketch of the Democratic Presidential Candidate

CHICAGO, ILL., July 10.—Mr. Bryan was born March 19, 1860, in Salem, Ill. He was taught under his mother's care until he was 10 years old, when he went to the public school in Salem, which he attended for five years. At the age of 15 he went to the Whipple Academy, in Jacksonville, Ill., which is the preparatory department of the Illinois College, located at the same place. He spent two years in the academy and four years in the college, taking a classical course. He represented his college in the interstate oratorical contest in 1880, and was class orator and valedictorian in 1881. He then went to the Union College of Law in Chicago, and while in attendance there he was in the office of Lyman Trumbull.

He left the law school in June, 1883, and went to Jacksonville to practice law, remaining at Jacksonville till October, 1887, when he removed to Lincoln, Neb., going into partnership with A. R. Talbot, a class-mate of the law school.

He had taken part in political campaigns since 1880, and made a number of speeches. He took part in the campaign of 1888 in Nebraska, and was nominated to represent the First District in Congress in 1890. He was elected by the majority of 6,713, although the district was thought to be certainly Republican. He supported Springer for Speaker in the Fifty-second Congress, from which district in Illinois he came originally. This led to his being put on the Ways and Means Committee in Congress, of which Springer was Chairman, and on March 16, 1892, he made a tariff speech that was the sensation of the day, and was liberally distributed as campaign literature.

He was re-elected in 1892, and in the Fifty-third Congress he helped to frame the Wilson bill, being a member of the Ways and Means Committee, and took an especially active part in the income tax provisions. At the close of the debate on the income tax in Congress, replying to Bourke Cockran, August 16, 1893, at the special session, he delivered a three hours' speech against the repeal of the Sherman law, this speech being more largely circulated than the tariff speech had been. He also spoke in favor of the bill to coin the seignorage, and spoke against Carlisle's currency policy, and also against Cleveland's gold contract. In 1894 he became a candidate for the United States Senate, and announced that he would not be a candidate for the lower house of Congress.

SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN.

He was nominated for United States Senator in the Democratic Convention, and the Populist candidate in his district was indorsed by the Democrats for the House of Representatives. The ensuing State Legislature being Republican, John M. Thurston was sent to the Senate.

After his retirement from Congress he took up the practice of law in Lincoln again, but at the silver campaign opening he found that the calls upon him for speeches and campaign work were so frequent that he was forced to give up his law practice. In September, 1894, he became the editor-in-chief of the Omaha "World-Herald," and had control of its editorial policy on State and national questions.

Mr. Bryan is a man of small means. He was married October 1, 1884, to Mary Baird, of Perry, Ill., who attended the Female Academy in Jacksonville when he was in the other school at the same place, and who graduated the same week that he did, and was also the valedictorian of her class. She studied law and was admitted to the bar, without any idea of practicing, but simply to be more thoroughly companionable to him. She

s a year or two younger than he. Three children have been born to them, Ruth, 10 years old; William J., Jr., about 7, and Grace, 5 years old. Mr. Bryan is a Presbyterian, having joined the Cumberland Presbyterian Church at the age of 14. He is now a member of the First Presbyterian Church at Lincoln. His father was Silas L. Bryan, who was a Circuit Judge at the time of his son's birth, and served in that capacity from 1860 to 1872, on the bench of Illinois. Judge Bryan moved on a farm a short distance from Salem when his son was six years old, and from that time till he was 23 years old Bryan spent his summers on the farm. In 1872 his father ran for Congress on the Greeley ticket, and was defeated by 240 votes. His family comes from Virginia. His father was born in Culpepper Court House in that State, and died in Salem, Ill., in 1880. His mother, whose name was Maria Elizabeth Jennings, was born in Marion County, Ill., and died in Salem a week ago last Saturday, after a protracted illness. In appearance, Mr. Bryan is impressive, his face indicating intellectuality and power, as well as good nature. There is a notable absence of the boyishness seen in the pictures and lithographs of him which have been circulated. He is affable and kindly in manner, easily approached, and does not lack dignity. In appearance he is an illustration of the fact that some men are never accorded justice by a picture, which in his case does not prepare one for the expression of keenness shown in his face.

Mr. Bryan lives well, in a commodious dwelling in the fashionable part of Lincoln. The study, in which both Mr. and Mrs. Bryan have desks, is a very attractive room. It is filled with books, statuary and mementos of campaigns. There are busts and portraits of notable men, and there are two butcher-knives which Mr. Bryan used in the campaign with Judge Field to refute the latter's boasts of the effects of high protection. Last year Mr. Bryan was asked if he had any aspirations looking to the White House, and he answered:

"No, I have no wish to be a presidential candidate, neither now or for the years to come. My whole thought now is centered on my family and my profession, so far as my own personal desires go. I was brought up in the country, and I wish my children to have some of the rearing. They are now at the age when they need a father's care, and I wish to get into practice again, for I very much enjoy the law, which has been necessarily abandoned during my four years in Washington."

Mrs. Bryan has a great liking for politics, and accompanies her husband on many of his Nebraska jaunts. Her tastes are essentially literary, and she has written much on various causes. She is a charming woman, and is as great a favorite in Lincoln as her husband. She was one of the organizers of the Sorosis, the leading woman's club of Lincoln, and is also a leader of the W. C. T. U. and other societies. Mr. Bryan says she is invaluable to him in suggestions and the preparation of material, and in advice as to points and methods. The children are very bright and very pretty and well bred.

RICHLY ENDOWED.

Bryan neither smokes, nor chews, swears nor drinks, and his language is pure. He is the picture of health, mental, moral and physical. He stands about 5 feet 10 inches, weighs about 170 pounds, is a pronounced brunette, has a massive head, a clean-shaven face, an acquiline nose, large under jaw, square chin, a broad chest, large, lustrous dark eyes, and a mouth extending almost from ear to ear. Beneath his eyes is the protuberant flesh which physiognomists say is indicative of fluency, and which was one of the striking features in the face of James G. Blaine.

Bryan neglects none of the accessories of oratory. Nature richly endowed him with rare grace. He is happy in attitude and pose. Mellifluous is the one word that most appropriately describes his voice. It is strong enough to be heard by thousands. It is so modulated as not to vex the ear with monotony, and can be stern and pathetic, fierce or gentle, serious or humorous, with the varying emotions of its master.

WM. J. BRYAN'S GREAT SPEECH.

Which Gave Him a Boom for the Presidency.

CHICAGO, July 10.—William Jennings Bryan of Nebraska just about immortalized himself by a remarkable speech at Thursday afternoon's session of the National Democratic Convention. He was speaking on the adoption of the platform. His speech in full follows:

Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen of this Convention: I would be presumptious, indeed, to present myself against the distinguished gentlemen to whom you have listened, if this were but a measuring of ability, but this is not a contest among persons. The humblest citizen in all the land when clad in the armor of a righteous cause is stronger than all the hosts of error that they can bring. I come to speak to you in defense of a cause as holy as the cause of liberty, the the cause of humanity. (Loud applause.)

When this debate is concluded, a motion will be made to lay upon the table the resolution offered in commendation of the Administration. I shall object to bringing this question down to a level of persons. The individual is but an atom; he is born, he acts, he dies, but principles are eternal, and this has been a contest of principle. Never before in the history of American politics has a great issue been fought out, as this issue has been, by the voters themselves.

On the 4th of March, 1895, a few Democrats, most of them members of Congress, issued an address to the Democrats of the nation asserting that the money question was the paramount issue of the hour; asserting also the right of a majority of the Democratic party to control the position of the party on this paramount issue, concluding with the request that all believers in free coinage of silver in the Democratic party should organize and take charge of and control the policy of the Democratic party. Three months later, at Memphis, an organization was perfected and the silver Democrats went forth openly and boldly and courageously proclaiming their belief and declaring that if they succeeded they would crystalize in a platform the declaration which they had made; and then began the conflict with a zeal approaching the zeal which inspired the crusaders who followed Peter the Hermit. Our silver Democrats went forth from victory unto victory until they are assembled now, not to discuss, not to debate, but to enter up the judgment rendered by the plain people of this country. (Applause.) In this contest, brother has been arrayed against brother and father against son. The warmest ties of love and acquaintance and association have been disregarded. Old leaders have been cast aside when they refused to give expression to the sentiments of those whom they would lead, and new leaders have sprung up to give direction to this cause of truth. (Cheers.) Thus has the contest been waged, and we have assembled here under as binding and solemn instructions as were ever fastened upon the representatives of a people.

We do not come as individuals. Why, as individuals, we might have been glad to compliment the gentleman from New York (Senator Hill), but we know that the people for whom we speak would never be willing to put him in a position where he could thwart the will of the Democratic party. (Cheers.) I say it was not a question of persons; it was a question of principle, and it is not with gladness, my friends, that we find ourselves brought into conflict with those who are arrayed on the other side. The gentleman who just preceded me (Gov. Russell) spoke of the old State of Massachusetts. Let me assure him that not one person in all this convention entertains the least hostility to the people of the State of Massachusetts (Applause), but we stand here representing people who are the equals before the law of the largest citizens of the State of Massachusetts. (Applause.)

When you come before us you tell us that we shall disturb your business in this; we reply that you have disturbed our business by your course. (Great applause and cheering.) We say to you

that you have made too limited in its application the definition of the business man. The man who is employed for wages is as much a business man as his employer. (Continued cheering.) The attorney in a country town is as much a business man as the corporation counsel in a great metropolis. The merchant at the cross-roads is as much a business man as the merchant of New York. The farmer who goes forth in the morning and toils all day, begins in the spring and toils all summer, and by the application of brain and muscle to the natural resources of this country, creates wealth, is as much of a business man as the man who goes upon the Board of Trade and bets upon the price of grain. The miners who go a thousand feet into the earth, or climb 2,000 feet upon the cliffs and bring forth from their hiding places the precious metals to be poured in the channels of trade, are as much business men as the few financial magnates who, in a back room, corner the money of the world.

We come to speak for this broader class of business men. Ah, my friends, we say not one word against those who live upon the Atlantic coast, but those hardy pioneers who braved all the dangers of the wilderness, who have made the desert to blossom as the rose, those pioneers away out there, rearing their children near to nature's heart, where they can mingle their voices with the voices of the birds; out there where they have erected school-houses for the education of their young, and churches where they praise their Creator, and cemeteries where sleep the ashes of their dead—are as deserving of the consideration of this party as any people in this country. (Applause.)

It is for these we speak. We do not come as aggressors. Our war is not a war of conquest. We are fighting in the defense of our homes, our families and posterity. (Loud applause.)

We have petitioned and our entreaties have been disregarded. We have begged and they have mocked, and our calamity came.

We beg no longer; we entreat no more; we petition no more; we defy them. (Great applause, and confusion of the silver delegations.)

The gentleman from Wisconsin has said that he fears a Robespierre. My friend, in this land of the free, you need fear no tyrant who will spring up from among the people. What we need is an Andrew Jackson, to stand as Jackson stood, against the encroachments of aggrandized wealth. (Great applause.)

They tell us that this platform is made to catch votes. We reply to them that changing conditions make new issues; that the principles upon which rest Democracy are as everlasting as the hills, but that they must be applied to new conditions as they arise. Conditions have arisen, and we are attempting to meet those conditions. They tell us that the income tax ought not to be brought in here; that it is a new idea. They criticise us for our criticisms of the Supreme Court of the United States. My friends, we have not criticised; we have simply called attention to what you know. If you want criticisms read the dissenting opinions of the court, that will give you criticisms. (Applause.) They say we passed an unconstitutional law. I deny it. The income tax was not unconstitutional when it was passed. It was not unconstitutional when it went before the Supreme Court for the first time.

It did not become unconstitutional until one Judge changed his mind, and we can not be expected to know when a Judge will change his mind. (Applause and a voice, "Hit 'em again.") The income tax is a just law. It simply intends to put the burden of Government justly upon the backs of the people. I am in favor of an income tax. (Applause.)

When I find a man who is not willing to pay his share of the burden of the Government which protects him, I find a man who is unworthy to enjoy the blessings of a Government like ours. (Applause.)

He says that we are opposing the national bank currency. It is true. If you will read what Thomas Benton said you will find that he said that insearching history he could find but one parallel

to Andrew Jackson. That was Cicero, who destroyed the conspiracy of Catiline, and saved Rome. He did for Rome what Jackson did when he destroyed the bank conspiracy and saved America. (Applause.)

We say in our platform that we believe that the right to coin money and issue money is a function of government. We believe it. We believe it is a part of the sovereignty, and can no more with safety be delegated to private individuals than we could afford to delegate to private individuals the power to make penal statutes, or levy laws for taxation. (Applause.)

Mr. Jefferson, who was once regarded as good Democratic authority, seems to have a different opinion from the gentlemen who have addressed us on the part of the minority. Those who are opposed to this proposition tell us that the issue of paper money is a function of the bank, and that the Government ought to go out of the banking business. I stand with Jefferson, rather than with them, and tell them, as he did, that the issue of money is a function of the Government, and that the banks ought to go out of the Government business.

They complain about that plank which declares against the life tenure in office. They have tried to strain it to mean that which it does not mean. What we oppose in that plank is the life tenure that is being built up at Washington which excludes from participation in its benefits the humbler members of our society. I can not dwell long in my limited time. (Cries of "Go on, go on.")

Let me call attention to two or three great things. The gentleman from New York says that he will propose an amendment providing that this change in our law shall not affect contracts already made. Let me remind him that there is no intention of affecting those contracts which, according to the present laws, are made payable in gold. But, if he means to say that we cannot change our monctary system without protecting those who have loaned money before the change was made, I want to ask him where in law or in morals he can find authority for not protecting the debtors when the act of 1873 was passed, but now insist that we must protect the creditor. He says he also wants to amend this law and provide that if we fail to maintain a parity within a year we will then suspend the coinage of silver.

We reply that when we advocate a thing which we believe will be successful, we are not compelled to raise a doubt as to our sincerity by trying to show what we will do if we can. I ask him if he will apply his logic to us why does he not apply it to himself? He says that he wants this country to try to secure an international agreement. Why doesn't he tell us what he is going to do if they fail to secure an international agreement? There is more reason for him to do that than us to fail to maintain the parity. They have tried for thirty years—for thirty years—to secure an international agreement, and they are waiting for it most patiently and don't want it at all. (Cheers and laughter, long continued.)

Now, my friends, let me come to the great paramount issue. If they ask us here why it is that we say more on the money question than we say upon the tariff question, I reply that if protection has slain its thousands, the gold standard has slain its tens of thousands. If they ask us why we did not embody all these things in our platform which we believe, we reply to them that when we have restored the money of the Constitution all other necessary reforms will be possible, and that until that is done there is no reform that can be accomplished. (Cheering.)

Why is it that within three months such a change has come over the sentiment of this country? Three months ago, when it was confidently asserted that those who believed in the gold standard would frame our platform and nominate our candidate, even the advocates of the gold standard did not think that we could elect a president, but they had good reason for the suspicion, because there is scarcely a State here to-day asking for the gold standard that is not within the absolute control of the Republican party. (Loud cheering.)

But note the change. Mr. McKinley was nominated at St. Louis upon a platform that declared for the maintenance of the gold standard until it should be changed into bimetallism by an international agreement. Mr. McKinley was the most popular man among the Republican party, and everybody three months ago in the Republican party prophesied his election. How is it to-day? Why, that man who used to boast that he looked like Napoleon (laughter and cheers), that man shudders to-day when he thinks that he was nominated on the anniversary of the battle of Waterloo.

(At the suggestion of a coincidence between McKinley's nomination and the date of Napoleon at Waterloo the silver men showed their appreciation of the point by a yell and an uproar which for twenty or thirty seconds prevented the speaker from proceeding. At length, when things calmed down a trifle, he resumed as follows:)

Not only that, but as he listens he can hear with ever-increasing distinctness the sound of the waves as they beat upon the lonely shores of St. Helena. (Cheers.)

Why this change? Ah, my friends, is not the change evident to any one who will look at the matter? It is no private character, however pure, no personal popularity, however great, that can protect from the avenging wrath of an indignant people the man who will never declare that he is in favor of fastening the gold standard upon this people, or who is willing to surrender the right of self-government, and place legislative control in the hands of the foreign potentates and powers. (Cheers.)

We go North confident that we shall win. Why? Because upon the paramount issue of this campaign there is not a spot of ground upon which the enemy will dare to challenge battle. Why, if they tell us the gold standard is a good thing, we point to their platform and tell them that their platform pledges the party to get rid of a gold standard and substitute bimetallism. (Applause.) If the gold standard is a good thing, why try to get rid of it? (Laughter and continued applause.)

If the gold standard—and I might call your attention to the fact that some of the very people who are in this convention to-day, and who tell you that we ought to declare in favor of international bimetallism, and thereby declare that the gold standard is wrong, and that the principal of bimetallism is better, these very people four months ago were open and avowed advocates of the gold standard, and telling us that we could not legislate two metals together, even with all the world. (Renewed applause and cheers.) I want to suggest this truth, that if the gold standard is a good thing, we ought to declare in favor of its retention, and if the gold standard is a bad thing, why should we wait until some other nations are willing to help us to let go? (Applause.)

Here is the line of battle. We care not upon which issue they force the fight. We are prepared to meet them on either issue or on both. If they tell us that the gold standard is the standard of civilization, we reply to that that this, the most enlightened of all the nations of the earth, has never declared for a gold standard, and both the parties this year are declaring against it. (Applause.) If the gold standard is the standard of civilization, why, my friends, should we not have it? So, if they come to meet us on that we can present the history of our nation. More than that, we can tell them this, that they will search the pages of history in vain to find a single instance in which the common people of any land have ever declared themselves in favor of a gold standard. (Applause.)

They can find where the holders of fixed investments have. Mr. Carlisle said in 1878 that this was a struggle between the idle holders of idle capital and the struggling masses who produce the wealth and pay the taxes of the country, and, my friends, it is simply a question that we shall decide upon which side shall the Democratic party fight. Upon the side of idle holders of idle capital or upon the side of the struggling masses? That is the question that the party must answer first, and then it must be answered by each individual hereafter. The sympathies of the Democratic party as described by the platform are on the side of the struggling masses, who have ever been the foundation of the Democratic party. (Applause.)

There are two ideas of government. There are those who believe that if you just legislate to make the well-to-do prosperous that their prosperity will leak on those below. The Democratic idea has been to legislate to make the masses prosperous; their prosperity will find their way up and through every class and rest upon it. (Applause).

You come to us and tell us that the great cities are in favor of the gold standard. I tell you that the great cities rest upon these broad and fertile prairies. Burn down your cities and leave our farms, and your cities will spring up again as if by magic. But destroy our farms and the grass will grow in the streets of every city in this country. (Loud applause.)

My friends, we shall declare that this nation is able to legislate for its own people on every question, without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation on earth. (Applause.) And upon that issue we expect to carry every single State in the Union. (Applause.) I shall not slander the fair State of Massachusetts, nor the State of New York by saying that when its citizens are confronted with the proposition—I will not slander either one by saying that the people of those States will declare our helpless impotency as a nation to attend to our own business. It is the issue of 1776 over again—our ancestors, when the 300,000 had the courage to declare their political independence of every other nation upon the earth. Shall we, their descendants, when we have grown to 70,000,000, declare that we are less independent than our forefathers? No, my friends, it will never be the judgment of the people.

Therefore, we care not upon what lines the battle is fought. If they say bimetallism is good, but we can not have it until some nation helps us, we reply that instead of having a gold standard because England has, we shall restore bimetallism, and then let England have bimetallism because the United States has. (Applause.) If they dare to come out and in the open defend the gold standard as a good thing, we shall fight to the uttermost, having behind us the producing masses of this nation and the world. Having behind us the commercial interests and the laboring interests, and all the toiling masses, we shall answer their demands for a gold standard by saying to them you shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns. You shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold. (Great applause.)

The conclusion of Mr. Bryan's speech was marked by the most enthusiastic demonstration of the convention up to that time. The whole convention sprang to its feet and 20,000 throats roared, while twice 40,000 arms waved frantically. Handkerchiefs and flags flew wildly. Hats were hurled aloft. Umbrellas were waved; men shouted like maniacs. From every quarter of the hall came the hoarse roar.

Suddenly a member of the Texas delegation uprooted the banner of the Lone Star State and carried it to where stood the standard of Nebraska. Above the roar rose piercing shrieks which sounded like a volley of siege guns above the continuous rattle of 10,000 small arms. Other delegates grasped the staffs of their delegations and pushed their way to the Nebraska delegation. Soon the staffs of two-thirds of the States were grouped about the purple standard of Bryan's State. Only the standard of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Vermont, South Dakota, Rhode Island and Pennsylvania were left standing when the demonstration was at its height.

Meantime the awful roar from the galleries continued. The band played, but the music could not be heard above the Niagara-like tumult of sound. Like an angry ocean it swept on, breaking, receding, falling back, only to rise again.

Delegates fairly jumped for joy. Some of them took possession of the aisles and marched. Suddenly the State standards clustered at Nebraska were borne away in single file through the aisles of the pit. After fifteen minutes of this disturbance the delegates and crowds sank back exhausted.

When all were seated Delegate Salsbury of Delaware climbed back on his chair. He and his three silver colleagues in that State gave three cheers for Bryan, which were answered with a shout from the gallery of "What's the matter with Bryan for President?"

The recipient of all this honor made his way with difficulty from the stage. For ten minutes his friends had fairly smothered him with congratulations. When at last he reached his chair on the floor he leaned back, seemingly completely exhausted. One of his colleagues fanned him while the others of the delegation hung affectionately over him and wrung his hand.

CONGRESSMAN BRYAN.

Free Silver Coinage Without Consent of Any Other Nation on Earth.

Congressman William J. Bryan of Nebraska, in a 30 minutes' speech championed the free and unlimited coinage of the white metal at the ratio of 16 to 1. His friends on the floor of the house regretted that he was not given as much time as the gentlemen who preceded him. They showed their dissatisfaction with the distribution of the time by almost demanding that he continue after his thirty minutes had been consumed, but he refused to do so.

When Mr. Bryan arose to deliver his address he was received in the most enthusiastic manner. Apparently everyone in the hall knew his reputation as an orator. His speech was extemporaneous.

"In one-half hour," said he, "I am expected to say what is to be said here to-night in behalf of the silver cause. I am glad this meeting is held in St. Louis, the great metropolis of the transmissisippi. Since coming here my attention has been drawn to the fact that it was

here that the transfer of the Louisiana purchase was consummated, which gave to us what afterwards developed into some of the States now represented by this congress."

Mr. Bryan then referred to the address of Mr. Leighton. "The gentleman who preceded me," said he, "has done for the cause of silver a great favor. He has boldly advocated what few of his class will admit to be their purpose. Heretofore our difficulty has been that we have had to face the foe in the dark and behind barriers of clouds. I now rejoice that we have heard from an opponent of silver money who holds before you the hope of a single gold standard. That is the issue, my friends. It is the issue that is ranging men on this question either by a single or double standard of currency."

Mr. Bryan then called the attention of the audience to the fact that there was a difference in the interest of men on the money question. He asked who were these unselfish men who wanted to teach us what an honest dollar consisted of and what a sound currency implied. He read extracts from the speeches of James G. Blaine, which were to the effect that the destruction of silver as money would naturally have a ruinous effect on everything except investments whose values were fixed.

"A moneyed man," said Mr. Bryan, "is as good as anybody else, but I dare any man to tell me that he is not as selfish as anyone else. Do you believe these men who are trying to destroy silver as a money are doing it in the interest of the people. John Sherman tells us that to everyone except to the capitalist out of debt the contraction of the currency is ruinous. Carlisle has said that the conspiracy to destroy from three-sevenths to one-half of the currency of the country is the most gigantic crime of the age.

"My friends, the issue has been distinctly made, and now we are in a condition to fight as we have never fought before. We have been told that it is but natural that silver be eliminated. Why, my friends, we are only seeking the application of natural laws to the currency question. The man who would take away your food and leave your appetite, who would take the water of the spring and leave your thirst, is no worse than the man who wants to destroy one-half of the metallic currency. He who preaches a gold standard turns history back 6,000 years. For that length of time he must acknowledge that man has been laboring in the dark.

"The other side of this question has told you that banking is safer than it used to be."

Mr. Bryan then devoted some time in referring to recent national bank failures in a humorous strain. He could not see that banking was made safer on account of the present system.

"The same principle that actuated Jesse James in holding up trains," said he, "actuated the man who favors a bank of issue. I don't mean to compare the banker to Jesse James, but just want to show you that while James wanted money, the banker wants profits." Mr. Bryan told a story. "When I was a boy," said he, "they used to put rings in the noses of hogs. It was not to keep them from getting fat, but to keep them from destroying more property than they were worth. One of the duties of this Government is to put rings in the noses of the hogs. The men who have been making the financial legislation of this country for years are the men who have reaped where they did now sow."

"You might just as well try to feed an adult upon the food necessary for an infant as to feed a great nation on the currency that is only sufficient for an insignificant portion of the population. Provision must be made for the increase in population." This argument reminded Mr. Bryan of what his father-in-law had said to him upon the day of his marriage. "William," said the old gentleman, "while I have, we will not both want."

"There are but three propositions in this question of free coinage," said Mr. Bryan. "If we have free coinage of silver, what ratio? Sixteen to 1? You have got to have it. Will you have free and unlimited, or limited coinage? You can't have it any way but unlimited. There is no prominent bimetallist in the country advocating limited coinage. Those who do are great destructionists, but no constructionists. Most of our enemies today are international bimetallists. Those who are waiting for an international bimetallic conference are those who do not want it.

"The Western people are all ready to declare now that they want free and unlimited coinage without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation on the face of the earth. They are tired waiting for something that is not coming. They want relief from some source. That source they honestly believe lies in the free and unlimited coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1."

At the close of Mr. Bryan's speech there were cries for him to "go on." He had spoken less than 30 minutes and was just warming to his subject. However, he refused to take any more time than the committees had allowed to him. He will probably talk again when the Committee on Resolutions makes its report.

THE MONEY QUESTION

CLEARLY ANALYZED.

NO. 1—WHY THE QUESTION?

For the first time in their history the people of the United States find themselves absorbed in the discussion of the money question—not greenbacks, nor bank notes, nor any other form of representative money—but real money, primary money, and money of redemption, silver and gold.

It is a complex question, having to do with ratios, parity, units, standards, grains, decimals and other features new and strange to the popular mind, and it is not surprising that the popular mind is confused and bewildered by a subject of which bankers, capitalists, money dealers and financiers assume to be the sole custodians and interpreters. But the matter is one of the profoundest popular concern, for it is a matter of dollars—and this involves all contracts, the values of all kinds of property, all debts, credits, obligations and dues, all stocks, bonds, notes and accounts—all inheritances, taxes, damages, fees, commissions, penalties, prices and wages. It is not, therefore, a question for bankers and money dealers alone, since it affects the daily interests of every family and every individual in the land.

And besides, the people have no confidence in the disposition of the moneyed interests to deal fairly with the subject. It was the moneyed interests that unsettled the subject in 1873, when it was at rest, by dropping silver dollars out of the coinage, thus virtually demonetizing a metal that had served as money among all nations from the beginning of their history. Gold and silver are the money of the constitution—not made money by the constitution, for they were used as money before the constitution—but recognized by that instrument, just as life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are recognized by it as fundamental human rights.

The coinage act of 1873 took from silver the ancient right of free coinage and thereby took from the people, without their consent and without their knowledge, one-half their future supply of metal money. When the people discovered what had been done they began to demand the restoration of their ancient and constitutional money, and it is because their demand has been again and again disregarded that they are now repeating it with stern emphasis and bidding all other questions to wait until this one is settled.

NO. 2.—PLENTY OF MONEY A GOOD THING.

Of course, we mean real money, primary money, metal money, gold and silver. Observe—not gold or silver, but gold and silver. It takes both to make a plenty.

Every man in the United States will admit that a plenty of money is a good thing for himself. Every business firm will admit that a plenty of money is a good thing for itself. And every bank will admit the same thing. In sort, every fair-minded and level-headed man instinctively recognizes that a plenty of money is good for an individual, a family, a business firm, a corporation, a community, a State and the country.

The whole population of the United States is furnishing a demonstration of this economic truth every day, for we are all striving to increase our stock of money. The man who hasn't a dollar is trying to get one. The man who has one is working for another. The man who has a hundred is trying to double it. So is the man who has a thousand. So is the man who has a million. The man who has more money this year than he had last year is called prosperous. The industrial community that is increasing the stock of money at its command is called prosperous. And when the country is increasing the stock of money, through the product of its mines or importations from abroad, even President Cleveland, Secretary Carlisle, Senator Sherman, ex-President Harrison, the bankers, capitalists, money lenders, and all the opponents of free silver between the two oceans unite in calling it a sure sign of national prosperity.

And everybody knows that the converse of this is equally true, viz.: that a scarcity of money is an evil thing—whether to an individual, a family, a community, a State or a country. It is always an inconvenience and disadvantage and sometimes a calamity.

The great influx of gold and silver into Europe that followed the discov-

ery of America by Columbus did more for commerce, letters, art and human rights than all other agencies acting together for the 800 years preceding. And it is well known that the marvelous age in which he lives owes its prodigious achievements in discovery invention, exploration, colonization, settlement of wildernesses, migration of peoples, founding of States, industrial production, distribution and intercourse, to the great increase which California, Nevada, and Australia contributed to the world's stock of money since 1850.

In the face of these truths, enforced by history, political economy and the common sense of mankind, what are we to think of the statesmanship which deliberately deprives the people of the United States of two-thirds of what ought to be their annual increase of metal money by debarring silver from its ancient right of coinage?

NO. III.—GOLD IS DEAR—WHY?

It is a distortion of facts to say that silver has become too cheap for money and ought, therefore, to be set aside; that the one dollar silver coin is a dishonest coin because it contains only 60 cents worth of metal; that it is a "50-cent dollar," the coinage of which would be a gross injustice to creditors.

If this were true, it would exhibit a curious spectacle to the world, the like of which was never seen before—a precious metal that has served the human race as money for 6,000 years, losing its value for money purposes, since John Sherman of Ohio, still living, was chosen to the United States Senate.

Silver is not cheap, except when measured in gold—a measure which makes cotton cheap, wheat cheap, and nearly all other commodities cheap, except gold. It is gold that is dear—not silver that is cheap. And there are two reasons for the increased and still increasing value of gold.

First, the debarring of silver from coinage, which imposes on one metal the duties formerly performed by two. Gold has become scarce, and is daily becoming scarcer—that is, inadequate to the volume of business it must transact. The result is the fierce and constant scramble for it between the great nations of the earth that causes so much anxiety and distress at times in the debtor countries, ours among them.

A striking exhibition of this was furnished in the last loan of $62,000,000 made by our Government. The loan was made to replenish the $100,000,000 gold fund kept as security for greenbacks. So great was the danger that as fast as the gold came into the treasury on one side it would be taken out on the other that the Secretary had to bind the European syndicate that took the bonds to protect the fund from being drawn upon. It would be difficult to present a more significant illustration of the evil policy of the exclusive gold advocates than this ludicrous, labored device of the Treasury Department to keep its gold from slipping through its fingers.

The second reason for the increasing scarcity of gold is the large consumption of the metal in the industrial arts. In the year 1893 the amount thus consumed was $13,425,901; in 1892, $10,320,074; in 1891, $19,686,916; in 1890, $17,655,960—for the four years over $70,000,000, or more than half the product of our mines for the period. In the same four years we lost by exportation $190,000,000, in gold. This sum, added to the $70,000,000 consumed in the arts, makes a total loss of $260,000,000, or $120,000,000 more than the total product of our mines. So that in the four years from 1890 to 1893 inclusive, we used up and lost all the gold product of our mines, and $120,000,000 besides.

Is it not most unwise to limit our money system to a single metal, which is becoming more precious every day, because more and more scarce in proportion to the business of the country?

NO. IV.—INFLATION NONSENSE.

Of all the absurdities exhibited by the opponents of free silver coinage, their inflation cry is the most ridiculous. Inflation applies to representative money—never to real money; to bank notes, treasury notes, warrants, script and other forms of paper currency which may be redeemable in coin, and may not be—never to gold or silver.

The world's record of these two metals goes back to the time of Abraham; but never in any country, or any age, was silver inflation heard of, except in the United States, and about twenty years ago.

Inflation means an excess of paper promises to pay money. It does not and cannot mean an excess of real money, for the simple reason that such a thing cannot be. History records many strange and interesting facts about nations, peoples and countries, but it does not mention a single case of a nation or a country that suffered

from an excessive supply of either gold or silver money. For ages and ages, peoples and nations labored to increase their stock of metal money, silver as well as gold, without ever suspecting that they might overdo the business. It was reserved for certain "financiers" in the United States of America in the nineteenth century of the Christian era to make the amazing discovery. It is mentioned as one of the tokens of prosperity and splendor of Solomon's reign over Israel that "the King made silver in Jerusalem as stones"—without exposing himself to the charge of being an inflationist.

There never was too much silver money in any country, nor in the pockets of any people—and there never will be. For ages past it has been considered that every addition to the stock of silver money in a country, no matter how large—the larger the better—was an advantage. And this is as true to-day as it was in the days of Solomon.

Silver is not a thing to be redeemed in something else. It is itself ultimate or redemption money. If our mints were to begin to-morrow coining silver to their full capacity, and keep it up indefinitely, every field of enterprise, every department of production and consumption, and every effort for the comfort of the people would instantly and permanently reveal the benign effects of the policy.

NO. V.—PAYING TWO DOLLARS FOR ONE.

No treatment of the coinage question is fair and sufficient that leaves out the matter of debt.

Gold and silver are the constitutional money of this country, and the people have the right to pay their debts in either or both at their option. When gold is cheaper than silver, they have the right to pay in gold. When silver is the cheaper, then in silver. If, when silver is the cheaper, the Government debars them from the advantage by refusing to coin silver for them, thus compelling them to pay in the dearer metal, it is an injustice and oppression.

And yet, this is the very thing the Government is doing to-day. It forces the people to discharge their debts in gold or at a gold standard—which is paying two for one—since a gold dollar is worth twice as much as a silver dollar.

To state the matter in another way, it takes twice as much product of labor or sweat to pay a debt under the gold standard of values as it would take under a silver standard—so that the Government is forcing the people to pay $2 worth of sweat for every dollar of funded debt they owe.

And the funded debts of the country make an enormous aggregate. The railroad bonds alone amount to $5,000,000,000—five billion dollars; and the National, State, city, county, town and school district debts, together with the debts of other public and semi-public corporations, are as much more. This makes a total of $10,000,000,000—ten billion dollars, with an annual interest charge of $500,000,000, which has to come out of the sweat of the people.

But it is being paid in gold, or at a gold standard—and it has been so paid ever since 1873; and as the commercial value of the gold dollar is twice as great as that of the silver dollar, the people are really discharging the enormous funded obligation at the rate of 2 for 1. That is, they are paying $1,000,000,000 worth of sweat a year in interest and twenty billions worth of sweat to discharge the principal.

In 1873, when silver was dropped from the coinage, the National debt was $1,710,000,000.

The price of wheat in 1873 was $1.31 per bushel—in 1894 it was only 67 cents a bushel—a falling off of about one-half.

The price of cotton in 1873 was 20 cents a pound—and in 1874 it was 7 cents a pound—a falling off of nearly two-thirds.

It would have taken about twice as much Western wheat and nearly three times as much Southern cotton to pay this debt in 1894 as in 1873.

That is, it would have taken only 1,315,000,000 bushels of wheat in 1873; in 1894 it would have taken 2,552,000,000 bushels.

The debt could have been paid with 17,000,000 bales of cotton in 1873; it would have taken 48,000,000 bales in 1894.

Since 1873 there has been paid on the National debt in principal and interest over two billion dollars—$2,223,000,000; and yet it would take more cotton to pay the balance in 1895 than it would have required to pay the whole of it in 1873.

NO. VI.—DUMPING SILVER ON US.

It is said that if we open our mints to the free coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1—16 ounces of silver to one of gold—all the silver in the world will come to our mints and we shall be overwhelmed with it. If this were

true, it would be the first example in the history of the world of a country being overwhelmed with good money. There never was a nation yet that was overwhelmed with silver-money. There never was a nation that had more silver money than it had good use for, and there never will be.

The world would not pour silver upon us. The metal would be as high in price in other countries as here, so that there would be no profit in sending it here. On the contrary, there would be a loss, for silver is valued higher in comparison with gold in all other countries than in ours. In our country the ratio is 16 to 1—that is, 16 ounces of silver to 1 of gold. In France, Belgium, Mexico, China and the Central and South American tSates it is 15½ to 1—that is, 15½ ounces of silver to 1 of gold. There would be a loss of half an ounce on every pound of silver brought here.

Besides, the other countries have no silver to spare. The whole world's product of silver in 1893 was $209,-165,000—and nearly two-thirds of this, $135,389,763, was coined into money and a large part of the balance went into the industrial arts. In the year 1892 nearly four-fifths of the entire world's product of silver was coined. In the year 1891, out of a total world's product of $177,352,300 of silver, $138,294,367 was coined into money in the countries of the earth, and the industrial arts consumed a large proportion of the balance, if not all of it. Even if our mines had been open to the free coinage of silver in the three years named, the other nations would have left to us only $74,000,000 in 1893, $42,000,000 in 1892, and $39,000,-000 in 1891—an allowance which would have fallen far short of overwhelming us; indeed, it would have fallen short of satisfying our wants.

It is a mistake to suppose that the world is gorged with cheap silver for which there is little or no use and that the throwing open of our mints would attract it. Every nation on the globe needs more and more silver every year, and there is not enough produced to satisfy them. Mexico coined in 1893 $28,000,000 silver; Austro-Hungary, $18,000,000; Japan, $12,000,000, and other nations smaller amounts. Even gold-standard Great Britain coined over $7,000,000 silver for small change; and it is certain that if we should adopt the policy of free silver coinage at 16 to 1 the other nations would never allow us to have enough of the annual product of the metal to hurt us.

VII.—TWO LEGS BETTER THAN ONE.

It is better to have two kinds of precious metal money than only one. The world could get along with one, but it is better to have two. Mankind recognized this at the beginning and has maintained the recognition through all civilizations and eras, and this long experience of the race is better than any theory of any class.

A man can stand on one leg at a time, and many persons have the habit of resting themselves in this way. But it would be a great hardship to confine a man in resting to his right leg, and forbid him to stand on the left. He needs both, even in the matter of resting—the right as an alternative to the left, and the left as an alternative to the right—and because he may be in the habit of resting on the right is no reason for denying him the privilege of using the other.

When one is cheaper, people will use it, until the other becomes the cheaper, and, then, they will use it.

Perfect parity will not always exist between the two. Indeed, it will very rarely exist. But it is not necessary that it should. The people will always adjust themselves to the disparity by making the cheaper—never the dearer—metal the standard of values. This option has always been their right, and the act of 1873 which took it from them and forced them to pay their debts in the dearer money was a great wrong.

It is said in defense of the act of 1873, which dropped the silver dollar from the coinage, that at that time gold was the standard of values, and had been for many years. This is true. Gold had been made the standard because it was the cheaper, and for no other reason.

Our ratio of the two metals is 16 to 1—that is, it takes 16 ounces of silver to be worth 1 ounce of gold—and the record for a hundred years back shows that it is fair and safe, since the two metals, when left free to be coined, vary little from this ratio.

The two metals are better than either one for another reason. They afford twice as much money; and it needs no argument to prove that a plenty of money is better than a scarcity. There is estimated to be about eight thousand million dollars worth of gold and silver in the world—four thousand millions of each. To demonetize either metal imposes a double task on the other, diminishes the supply of money one-half, reduces all property values one-half and makes it easy for combinations of capitalists to produce artificial panics.

NO. VIII.—HOW TO MAINTAIN PARITY.

In coining gold and silver into money, their relative value ought to be carefully determined—that is, it ought to be ascertained how much an ounce or a pound of one metal is worth in the other. This is called the ratio, and when it is ascertained and fixed by law, it ought to be adhered to, and the parity thus established carefully maintained.

There will occur slight variations in the ratio, as the mines of the world produce more of first, one metal, and then, of the other; but these slight variations will be of little concern, if both metals are given equal freedom to assert their value.

If both were accorded the right of free and unlimited coinage, the parity may be left to take care of itself.

On the contrary, if the co-equality of coinage rights of the two metals is destroyed; if one is deprived of this coinage right, the parity is unsettled.

This is the very situation we see, at present, in this country. The parity between the two metals has been unsettled—wantonly and deliberately unsettled by the government itself. The government has degraded its own money, by taking away from silver its ancient right of coinage. Gold is still coined freely, and without limit, but silver is not.

The chief use of silver is for money, and when it is forbidden to be coined into money, is it strange that it should lose half its value? Any other commodity would meet the same fate if treated in the same way. The chief use of wheat is for bread, and of cotton for clothing. Suppose wheat was forbidden to be ground into flour, and cotton to be woven into cloth, would not these two great staples of our agriculture lose half, or three-fourths of their value?

And the most ludicrous feature of the matter is that those who deride silver as cheap and degraded, are the very persons who persuaded the government to impair its value and rob it of its dignity. They debar it from the mints—and refuse it the ancient right of being coined into money, and then sneer at it because it is cheap.

The true remedy for the present disparity between the two metals is to remove the stigma from silver, and give it a chance. We can "maintain the parity," as it is called, by making silver money redeemable in gold; but this would be unjust and preposterous—unjust, because forcing the people to keep on paying their public bonded debts at a gold standard of $2 for $1; preposterous, because it would be redeeming that which, itself, is redeemable money.

The only dollars in the country are silver dollars—and they bear, on their face, this superscription:

"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ONE DOLLAR."

These are redeemable dollars—the only dollars known to the American people; and to redeem them in something else, or, even to admit that they need to be redeemed, would be as absurd as to measure an official stamped standard yardstick by some other yardstick, instead of measuring all other yardsticks by it.

Give silver back its right; restore to it the privilege of free and unlimited coinage at the lawful ratio of 16 to 1, and the question of maintaining the parity can be considered afterwards if there be such a question left.

No. IX.—SILVER IS HONEST.

In demanding the free coinage of silver at 16 to 1 we are not asking for a strange or new thing. We are simply asking for the restoration of an old right. The mints were open to the free coinage of silver from the beginning of the government down to 1873. It was the closing of them against it that was new, strange and violent.

Neither do the people demand a new and unjust ratio. They demand the long-established ratio of 16 to 1. The demand, therefore, is strictly within the limits of law, justice, reason and public policy.

It is said that to reopen the mints to the free coinage of silver would enable the people to pay the national debt, the municipal debts, the railroad bonded debts and other public and quasi-public funded debts in silver dollars worth only 50 cents on the dollar, and this would be dishonest.

This brings us face to face with the question of honesty, and we boldly assert that silver payment of these vast debts is the only honest way of meeting them, and that to compel the payment of them in the one of our two money metals that has ever been made artificially dearer is oppressive, unjust and dishonest.

The present silver dollar is not "worth only 50 cents." It is worth exactly 100 cents. It was worth 100 cents when it was established nearly a hundred years ago, and it contains as much silver now as it did then.

This silver dollar was made the unit and measure of value at the beginning of the government, and it was both revolutionary and unjust to set it aside for a gold standard of higher value, which increased all debts by reducing the value of all products of labor.

All debts, contracts and obligations are expressed in "dollars." All debts, contracts and obligations are dischargeable in dollars—and payment in them fulfills all the conditions of commercial honor.

It is not dishonest in the people to demand the right of paying their vast public bonded indebtedness in the cheaper of the two lawful money metals. That has always been the option of debtors. The dishonesty really attaches to the creditor class, who double the value of their claims on the people by stopping the coinage of silver, thus reducing the supply of redemption money one-half.

The case is precisely as if a farmer should borrow $1,000 from a money lender to pay for his farm, with the privilege of paying in wheat and corn—wheat at $1 a bushel and corn at 50 cents. The debt has ten years to run, and the interest is 8 per cent—$80 a year. At first the farmer pays in wheat, because it is cheaper; but after a while corn becomes the cheaper, and he desires to avail himself of his privilege and pay in it. But the creditor denies him this plain right and insists that as he began to pay in wheat, when it was the cheaper, he shall continue to pay in wheat after it has become the dearer. Is not this both dishonest and unjust?

NO. X.—MONEY AND SOVEREIGNTY.

The coining of money is and always has been a function of sovereignty. Cæsar's image and superscription on the Roman penny clearly denoted Cæsar's supremacy; and the eagle or goddess of liberty, with the words, "United States of America," on our coins, not only makes them lawful money of the country, but guarantees their weight and fineness.

But the issue of representative paper money is a function of sovereignty also, and banking corporations and individuals are not allowed to issue such money without an act of Congress or the State Legislature.

Our experience shows that the entrusting of this vastly important right to private individuals and corporations is unwise, for the individuals and corporations too often abuse the authority committed to them. It is a part of the sovereignty, and they sometimes employ it against the public good; as when, under President Arthur's administration, the Eastern national banks attempted to defeat and did defeat the Carlisle 3 per cent bond bill by suddenly contracting the currency volume, to the serious injury of the country.

The government should furnish all the money of the country. It alone coins metal money and it alone should issue representative paper money. Not that it should go into banking. It should simply receive deposits of metal money and keep them safe in its strong vaults and issue paper money notes against them. The banks should receive deposits and make discounts.

The people grow more and more averse every year to handling large sums of hard money. They prefer good paper currency based on deposits of hard money and redeemable in hard money on demand.

At present we have five kinds of paper money, viz.: Greenbacks or treasury notes; gold certificates, payable in gold; silver certificates, payable in silver; currency certificates, and national bank notes. Under a wise system based on the free coinage of both silver and gold, there would need to be only one kind—coin certificates issued against and redeemable in gold and silver money.

NO. XI.—THE PUBLIC CREDIT.

It is said that the free and unlimited coinage of silver would impair the public credit and be a dishonor to the country. If this be true we should not adopt it, for neither a nation nor an individual can afford to gain temporary relief in the payment of debt at the cost of honor.

It is not proposed to make new dollars lighter or less fine than the original ones, but to resume the coinage of the old dollars with the same weight of metal in them, having the same degree of fineness, exactly as valuable as the old ones and exactly like them. In short, they are to be lawful United States dollars, worth 100 cents each—no more, no less.

Where is the dishonor in this? How

can the public credit be impaired by paying the debts of the Government in these coins? All our national debts are expressed, not in eagles, or half eagles, or quarter eagles, or double eagles, which are gold coins, but in dollars, which are silver coins; and nearly the whole of our funded national debt was contracted at a time when the free and unlimited coinage of silver was a right; that is, before it was taken away by the act of 1873.

The bonds of the Government are payable on their face in gold and silver. The right is with the Government of choosing which of the two it will pay in; and although, at the time, gold was the cheaper money and the Government was paying in gold, the purchaser took the bonds with the full knowledge of the Government's right to pay in silver should it become the cheaper metal.

Suppose the act of 1873 suspending the free coinage of silver dollars had not been passed and we had gone on coining them without limit and paying our national debts in them. No one will pretend that there would have been any dishonor in that. Then, how can it be dishonest to begin doing now what we have had a right to do all the time?

The people have never given up their right to use silver as money. Gold and silver are the constitutional money of the country, just as truly and lawfully to-day as they were before 1873; for the act of that year did not and could not destroy the money function of either of them. The great wrong it did to the people was that it suspended the coinage of one of their two money metals, thereby doubling the value of the other and making it twice as hard to get.

All the conditions of national honor are fulfilled when we pay our national debt at 100 cents to the dollar, and the United States standard silver dollars are and always have been worth just that much.

NO. XII.—SHRINKAGE IN VALUE.

The suspension of the coinage of silver in 1873 was a double enormity. It not only deprived the people of one-half of their supply of constitutional money, but it virtually doubled their funded debts by reducing the value of the commodities they had to pay with.

If a Missouri farmer who owes $1,000 has 1,000 bushels of wheat in his barn worth $1 a bushel he is even with his creditor, for he has only to sell the wheat and pay the debt with the proceeds. But suppose the price of wheat falls to 50 cents a bushel; then his debt is virtually doubled, for it takes double the quantity of wheat to pay it.

This is the way in which the suspension of silver coinage affected our people, for ours is a debtor country and all its bonded obligations rest on the people at last. It did not change the face value of the debts, but it halved the value of what they had to pay with. Take our two great export staples, wheat and cotton, whose price in gold is fixed at Liverpool, and which we send abroad to pay the interest on our bonds. In 1873 the average farm price of wheat was $1.15 a bushel; in 1894, only 49 cents—a decline of 66 cents a bushel—more than one-half.

If we take one-half this falling off, 33 cents, as the average for the period and estimate it on the aggregate wheat crops for the period—7,770 million bushels—it shows a decline in the debt-paying value of this one crop alone of $2,590,000,000.

Then, as to cotton. The price in 1873 was 20 cents a pound; in 1894 it was 7 cents—a decline of 13 cents—nearly two-thirds. It is not claimed that the whole of this was due to legislation against silver; but if only one-fourth of it be attributed to that cause, the loss estimated on the aggregate crops for the period—100 million bales—reaches the enormous sum of 1,625 million dollars.

The decline in the value of horses per head has been from $76 in 1873 to $36 in 1894—$40 a head—or more than one-half—which, estimated on the whole number of horses in the country in 1894—16,000,000—shows a loss of $640,000,000.

The decline in the value of mules has been from $95 to $62 a head—$33; of cattle from $20 to $14.50 a head—$5.50; of milch cows from $29 to $23 a head; and of sheep from $3 to $2 a head; and these declines, estimated respectively upon the number of each class of animals in 1894, show an aggregate loss of over 1,000 million dollars.

It takes, therefore, three times as many bales of cotton to pay a debt now as it took in 1873; it takes twice as much wheat; more than twice as many horses—and more farm animals of every kind but swine.

The figures are enormous; and yet they probably fall short of exhibiting the full measure of the loss inflicted on the farming interest of the country by the suspension of silver coinage in 1873.

Whatever the loss, carefully estimated on the basis of these figures, might appear to be, whether four, five, six or seven thousand million dollars, this much is next to demonstrably certain—that, if the coinage of silver had not been suspended in 1873, but had been continued under the old policy, the farming class would be this day that many millions better off than it is—for the prices of cotton, grain, wool and all farm animals would be at least twice as high as they are at present.

THE PRESSURE FOR SILVER.

President J. J. Hill of the Great Northern Railroad, whose ability as a financier is unquestioned, brings back from a recent European trip additional evidence of the growing sentiment in England in favor of bimetallism.

Mr. Hill says both the manufacturing and agricultural interests of England charge the greater part of the depression from which they are suffering to the demonetization of silver, and are exerting strong pressure on the British Government to join in the effort to rehabilitate it as a money metal. They are beginning to realize, he says, that Great Britain is being outstripped and deprived of her trade by silver-using countries and hence bringing silver up to an equality in the mints with gold is a necessary act of self defense.

As to the ratio to be maintained Mr. Hill has a clear and decided opinion. He says the ratio of gold and silver taken for one thousand years, as long as we have history on the subject, has remained practically the same. It may change for short periods, but for long periods it sticks surprisingly close to 15½ or 16 to 1. If the metals have been interchangeable for so many hundred years at this ratio he does not see any difficulty in making them interchangeable at this ratio now, provided the leading nations are willing to accept it.

When the leading nations agree that silver must be remonetized there will be no difficulty about the ratio, which will adjust itself, and the pressure for silver remonetization is so rapidly increasing that even the grasp which the money-lenders have on the throat of Great Britain cannot long withstand it.

It ought to be no hardship for the Missouri goldbugs to be quiet now. The fight against them has been fair, and they have been outnumbered. They ought to be thankful that their good old State has not been Kentuckyized.

The South and West should move together this year if they are ever to co-operate at all.

Silver, instead of waning, is winning.

"EAST AGAINST WEST."

The Keynote of a Struggle for the Control of the Nation's Policy.

Senator Sherman, of Ohio, declares in an interview that "when it comes to an issue in regard to money the East will be against the West, irrespective of party."

I.

The Ohio Senator understands American politics better than most men, and he knows the temper of the moneyed communities of the East on the money question. It has been often asserted in the West and as often denied in the East that the demonetization of silver was an Eastern and foreign creditor trick against the debtor West; that its purpose was not to secure a "sound money" system—for when the act of 1873 was passed silver was sounder, or more valuable under the ratio than gold—but to double the value of debts by halving the volume of metal money they were payable in; and that the effect of the measure would be to enormously enrich the moneyed creditor section of the country at the expense of the debtor sections.

It was further asserted in the West that the East would forget and forego all party differences when the money question was involved and support or oppose Presidential candidates on the coinage issue alone. In plain words, that Eastern Democrats would vote for a Republican rather than for a Democrat who is in favor of undoing the wrong of 1873, and that Eastern Republicans would deal similiarly with a Republican candidate.

Senator Sherman now admits that all this was and is true. If the supreme question in the contest of next year is to be the money question, Eastern Democrats and Republicans will be found standing side by side and voting for the same candidate—that candidate being a person known to be hostile to any restoration, complete or partial, of silver to its ancient place and function in our money system.

The Northeast cares little for Democracy or Republicanism. It is neither Democratic nor Republican, and yet it is both. It is above parties. Instead of belonging to one or the other, it assumes that both belong to itself, and that whichever is in power for the time being must be and shall be subject to its authority.

The people of the West may thank the Ohio Senator, not for informing them of a fact which they had been informed of before, but for admitting it after it had been repeatedly denied. It clears up the question, draws the line, and makes the matter as plain as could be desired.

It is to be a fight between the East and the West, or, rather, between the Northeastern corner of the country and all the rest; and it is to be a struggle for the ownership of the country. Already the control of the whole country has wellnigh passed into the hands of the Northeast creditor section. The demonetizating act of 1873 was so ingenious in its iniquity and so far-reaching in its effects, and it has been used so remorselessly, both against the people and against the Government, by the classes who were to be and are the beneficiaries of it, that all the great instrumentalities and agencies of production, distribution and communication—all the profit-yielding properties of the country—are very largely owned or controlled in the nine Northeastern States, in which less than one-third of the population is found.

The saving banks deposits alone in the nine Northeastern States (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania) amount to more than double the entire stock of gold coin in the country, and the money and cash items of all the banks and trust companies in

hese nine States make an aggregate seven times as great as the entire stock of gold coin in the country. Add o this the several billion of interest-paying bonds and mortgages on West-rn and Southern railroads, real es-ate, factories, mills, mines, water-works, gas-works, telegraph and tele-phone lines, bridges and other produc-ive properties, and reflect that the in-erest on them is payable in money ind money values—and it is easy enough to understand what Senator Sherman means when he tells us that 'when it comes to an issue in regard o money, the East will be against the West, irrespective of party."

The East is in favor of limiting our money stock to one metal, because its enormous wealth in money and mon-ey values is twice as great when esti-nated in one metal as when estimated n two. The demonetization act of 873 makes its stock of money, stocks, onds and mortgages twice as valua-ble as it would be if that act had not been passed, and it will never support any man who is in favor of undoing a measure so advantageous to itself and so oppressive to the rest of the coun-ry.

II.

It has been said that the Northeast owns, or controls, if not the whole country, at least about all there is in t worth having; and we may appeal o undeniable official statistics in sup-port of the assertion. In the first place, it owns the bulk of the money and money items, classed in the Comptroller of the Currency's report as bank capital, surplus, undivided profits and individual deposits. The aggregate of these for the whole country as given in the Comptroller's report, in 1893, was $6,412,939,954, and of this sum, $4,016,424,053 was in the nine Northeastern States. The popu-lation of these States is 18,470,000, or less than one-third of the population of the whole country. Nevertheless, this one-third of the population own nearly two-thirds of the country's ag-gregate of money and money items of wealth. Stated in another form, the fact is, as follows:

Money and cash items in 1893:	
For the whole country	$6,412,939,954
For the Northeastern States	4,016,424,053
For all the other States	$2,396,515,901
Total population (estimated)	67,021,000
Of the Northeastern States	18,470,000
Of all other States	46,551,000
Per capita in the Northeast-ern States	217
Per capita in the other States	86

This disproportion becomes more striking when examined in detail in the Savings Banks statistics. The Comptroller's report shows that the aggregate of deposits in all savings banks in the country in 1893 was $4,785,150,957—and of this sum $4,480,916,637, or over four-fifths, was in the nine Northeastern States, and only $304,239,900, or less than one-fifth, in all the other States. The whole num-ber of savings banks depositors in the country was 4,890,566, and of this number 4,070,147, or more than five-sixths, were in the Northeast-ern States, and only 760,452, or less than one-sixth, in all the rest of the country. The Comptrol-ler's savings banks statement is so full of instruction and interest, and it so impressively exhibits the control which the nine States of the North-east have managed to secure over the money and moneyed wealth of the country, that it will not be out of the way to reproduce the following parts of it:

Savings Banks in United States, 1893—Number of depositors and amount of deposits:

	Depositors.	Deposits.
Maine	155,333	$83,397,350
New Hampshire	174,654	74,377,279
Vermont	89,115	27,262,930
Massachusetts	1,189,936	393,019,862
Rhode Island	142,492	69,906,993
Connecticut	331,061	130,686,729
New York	1,593,394	629,358,274
New Jersey	140,772	36,588,246
Pennsylvania	252,980	66,417,794
Total N. E. States	4,070,147	$1,480,916,657
Delaware	18,613	$3,739,484
Maryland	147,462	44,495,128
District of Columbia	1,400	74,729
West Virginia	5,149	237,707
North Carolina	6,112	391,224
South Carolina	24,422	5,913,139
Florida	1,321	219,448
Georgia	8,494	1,004,765
Alabama	1,848	73,092
Louisiana	6,507	2,003,854
Texas	2,583	356,533
Arkansas	844	123,451
Tennessee	14,126	1,773,174
Ohio	85,614	34,666,213
Indiana	16,127	4,073,131
Illinois	84,861	29,498,504
Wisconsin	1,164	184,698
Iowa	73,108	26,426,031
Minnesota	42,212	10,658,561
Oregon	2,461	683,620
Colorado	11,839	2,217,547
Utah	22,315	2,935,849
Montana	1,736	423,248
New Mexico	885	186,923
California	178,949	138,019,874
Totalall other States	760,452	$304,234,900
Total United States	4,830,599	$1,785,150,957

Thirteen States, Idaho, Kansas, Ken-tucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, Michigan, North Dakota, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming, have no savings banks, and, therefore, are not included in the list.

A careful examination of the table reveals the interesting fact that the little State of Rhode Island has a larger sum of deposits ($69,906,993) than all the Central Western States togeth-er, leaving out Ohio; Connecticut has a larger sum ($130,686,729) than all the Western and Southern States togeth-er; Massachusetts has a larger sum ($393,019,862) than all the thirty-five States and four Territories not includ-ed within the boundaries of the favor-ed Northeast.

Perhaps it will be said in explana-tion of this great disproportion that the Northeast section abounds in cities and towns, and that urban populations prefer that form of wealth represent-ed by money and money items. But this explanation is insufficient, for, while the great Western State of Ohio has ten times as many large cities and twenty times as large an urban popu-lation as the little State of New Hampshire, the latter State has more than twice as great a sum of savings deposits. And the great Western State of Illinois, with a single city having three times as large a population as the whole State of Rhode Island, shows only one-third the savings de-posits of the latter.

An interesting fact revaled by these statistics is that the savings bank de-posits in three of the Northeastern States exceed the whole stock of gold coin in the country. The last mint re-port estimates this stock of gold coin on November 1, 1894, at $581,000,000; but the savings bank deposits in Mas-sachusetts ($393,000,000), Connecticut ($130,000,000) and Rhode Island ($69,-900,000) make together $592,906,000. So that if all the depositors in the sav-ings banks in these three moneyed States were to demand their deposits at the same time it would take all the gold coin in the land to meet the de-mand, and it would still fall short $11,000,000.

III.

It will sound a trifle strange in the West, where money is at times so scarce and hard to get, to be told that in some parts of the favored Northeast it is so plentiful that there is on an average a deposit of $300 to $500 in bank for every voter. Yet the following table shows that the story would be not less true than strange. The table gives the number of votes cast for President in the States named in 1892, together with the number of savings bank depositors in each:

State.	Voters.	Depositors.
Maine	116,422	155,333
New Hampshire	88,329	174,654
Vermont	55,787	89,115
Massachusetts	391,028	1,189,936
Rhode Island	53,168	142,492
Connecticut	164,360	331,061
New York	1,313,817	1,593,894
New Jersey	336,265	140,772
Pennsylvania	1,002,112	252,980
Delaware	37,174	18,613
Maryland	213,275	147,462
West Virginia	171,848	5,149
North Carolina	280,995	6,112
South Carolina	70,502	24,422
Georgia	223,956	8,494
Florida	66,535	1,321
Alabama	232,755	1,848
Louisiana	113,254	6,507
Texas	425,086	2,583
Arkansas	146,627	844
Tennessee	264,928	14,126
Ohio	850,164	85,614
Indiana	554,394	16,127
Illinois	873,646	84,861
Wisconsin	371,167	1,164
Iowa	442,714	73,108
Minnesota	267,730	42,212
Oregon	78,401	2,461
Colorado	93,891	11,839
Utah	23,293	22,315
Montana	44,193	1,736
New Mexico	32,348	885
Washington	87,972	8,955
California	269,586	178,949

There are some amazing things re-vealed in this table—things which show more clearly than a thousand speeches in Congress could, why the Northeastern States are hostile to the free coinage of silver and determined that the scarcer of our two money metals shall be the measure of all values. While in each of the agricul-tural States of the West and South there are a great many more voters than depositors, in the first seven of the nine Northeastern States there are a great many more depositors than voters.

With the object of making the com-parison as fair as possible, let us take the three oldest and most prosperous of the Western States—Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. The first of these has 850,164 voters and 85,614 depositors—one depositor to every ten voters. The next, Indiana, has 554,394 voters and 16,127 depositors—one depositor to thirty-four voters; and the third, Illi-nois, has 873,646 voters and 84,861 depositors—one depositor to eleven voters.

Now, take the first three and least wealthy of the Northeastern States—Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont—and we find that the first has 38,911 more depositors than voters. In the second, New Hampshire, there are 85,-329 voters and 174,654 depositors—two depositors to every voter. In the third, Vermont, there are 55,787 voters and 89,115 depositors—33,328 more de-positors than voters. Every voter in the State has, on an average, $305 on deposit in a savings bank, and 33,328 persons who are not voters, presumab-ably women and children, are in the same comfortable condition. Yet

there is not a single large city in either of these three Northeastern States, and the population of all three put together is less than that of a single city in Illinois.

When we make the comparison between the wealthiest of the Northeastern States and the new and least wealthy of the Western States, the disproportion is prodigiously increased.

Massachusetts has 391,028 voters and 1,189,936 depositors—three depositors to every voter—showing that all the voters and twice as many women and children besides have an average deposit of $330 each in savings banks, to say nothing of the very large number of persons who have deposits in national banks. State banks and trust companies in addition.

Rhode Island has 53,148 voters and 142,492 depositors—more than twice as many depositors as voters.

Connecticut has 164,360 voters and 331,061 depositors—twice as many depositors as voters.

Even in the populous State of New York depositors outnumber voters by 274,987.

But how insignificant is the showing of the newer Western States in this comparison—Wisconsin only one depositor to 370 voters; Iowa one depositor to 60 voters; Minnesota one depositor to 60 voters; while the States of Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, the two Dakotas and Wyoming have plenty of voters, but no depositors at all.

In the Southern States matters are no better, for all the depositors in those States put together make only 58,000—less than half the number in Rhode Island alone.

IV.

Money and bank credits, capital and surplus, are not the only great items that enter into the aggregate of wealth of the Northeast. That section is very rich also in Western property—those kinds of Western property that are most valuable for drawing annual incomes from—railroads, telegraph and telephone lines, real estate mortgages, water works, gas works, electric light works, mines, mills, factories and banks.

If the total of these items of Western wealth owned and controlled in the East could be accurately and officially stated, it would startle those Western bankers, merchants and business men who are accustomed to accept and adopt Eastern theories of finance because they are presumed to be sound and safe. But let us, for the present, content ourselves with those very important and conspicuous earners of incomes, Western railroads. The accurate and official reports of them are at hand, and are strikingly presented in the subjoined tables:

RAILROAD INVESTMENTS IN ELEVEN WESTERN STATES—1894.

	Capital Stock.	Funded Debt.
Ohio	$483,000,000	$486,000,000
Michigan	111,000,000	118,000,000
Indiana	109,000,000	128,000,000
Illinois	420,000,000	545,000,000
Wisconsin	117,000,000	193,000,000
Missouri	275,000,000	282,000,000
Kansas	143,000,000	280,000,000
Colorado	116,000,000	91,000,000
Iowa	65,000,000	58,000,000
Minnesota	294,000,000	351,000,000
Nebraska	74,000,000	145,000,000
	$2,167,000,000	$2,681,000,000

Total investment.....$4,848,000,000

INTEREST AND DIVIDENDS PAID IN 1894.

	Interest.	Dividends.
Ohio	$18,386,000	$11,845,000
Michigan	8,332,000	1,519,000
Indiana	5,320,000	516,000
Illinois	25,556,000	15,183,000
Wisconsin	9,471,000	2,319,000
Missouri	13,521,000	1,913,000
Kansas	10,440,000	.....
Colorado	3,777,000	473,000
Iowa	2,427,000	356,000
Minnesota	16,551,000	4,163,000
Nebraska	6,545,000	.....
Total	$119,397,000	$38,285,000

The first of these tables exhibits about $5,000,000,000 worth of Western railroads and the second shows the interest and dividends they yielded last year. They are Western property, but they are not owned in the West. It would be a very liberal estimate to credit 5 per cent of their value to the States in which they are found. They are owned in the Northeast and abroad and the $119,397,000 interest paid on their bonds and $38,285,000 paid in dividends on their stocks—making a total of $157,682,000—is drained off to swell the incomes of their bondholders and stockholders in the Northeast and Europe.

This, perhaps, is not a matter that we have a right to complain of, since the non-resident owners of these Western railroads have a right to claim their own and do what they please with it. But it may be suggested that it is a matter of tremendous concern whether this annual drain of $157,682,000 shall be paid in free coined silver worth 100 cents to the dollar or in gold at a gold standard of 200 cents to the dollar. Or, to put it in another way, in wheat at $1 and corn at 50 cents a bushel, or in wheat at 50 cents and corn at 25 cents a bushel.

V.

We have given some tables compiled from official reports showing how wealth has been increased in the Northeastern States since the demonetization of silver in 1873 and largely through the operation of that act. But it has not been altogether through the operation of that act. A most unjust and oppressive sectional tariff, devised and enforced for the benefit of the Northeastern "Industrial States," as Mr. Blaine used to call them, had much to do with it. In fact, it may be asserted that our entire revenue, debt, currency and coinage legislation for thirty-three years past has been dictated by the Northeast, and directed to its own enrichment at the cost of the rest of the country. But we are dealing with the relations of the East and West to the silver question at present, and our purpose is to show how the withholding of coinage of one of the ancient money metals from the people has pitilessly transferred not wealth, but the ownership of wealth, from the agricultural debtor States of the West to the moneyed creditor States of the Northeast.

One effect of the taking away of the ancient right of free coinage from silver was and still is to make gold more valuable and all commodities less valuable, and to require more wheat, corn, cotton, wool, cattle, horses, and, in general, all farm products, for a given sum of money. The process is exhibited in the tables given below, showing how the prices of wheat, cotton, and farm animals have shrunken to gold prices since the demonetization of silver in 1873:

WHEAT CROP AND VALUE OF IT SINCE 1873.

	Bushels.	Value.
1873	281,254,700	$323,594,805
1875	292,136,000	294,580,500
1877	364,194,146	394,695,000
1884	512,765,000	330,562,000
1888	415,868,000	383,248,000
1892	515,949,000	322,111,000
1893	396,131,000	213,171,000
1894	460,267,000	225,902,000

COTTON CROP AND VALUE OF IT SINCE 1873.

	Bales.	Value.
1873	3,666,000	$301,087,000
1874	3,330,000	312,480,000
1882	5,176,000	259,016,000
1890	7,311,000	308,424,000
1894	7,549,000	263,000,000

WOOL.

	Pounds.	Value.
1873	158,000,000	$107,000,000
1894	298,000,000	71,000,000

FARM ANIMALS.

HORSES.

	Number.	Value.
1873	9,222,000	$684,000,000
1895	15,893,000	576,000,000

MULES.

	Number.	Value.
1873	1,310,000	$124,658,000
1895	2,332,000	110,927,000

MILCH COWS.

	Number.	Value.
1873	10,575,000	$14,358,000
1895	16,504,000	362,691,000

OXEN AND OTHER CATTLE.

	Number.	Value.
1873	16,413,000	$329,000,000
1895	24,364,000	483,000,000

SHEEP.

	Number.	Value.
1873	33,000,00	$98,000,000
1895	42,000,000	66,000,000

SWINE.

	Number.	Value.
1873	133,000,000	$1,684,000,000
1895	217,000,000	1,817,000,000

It will be seen by these figures that while the country's wheat crop has increased in quantity from 281,254,700 bushels in 1873 to 460,267,000 bushels in 1894, it has actually decreased in value from $323,594,805 to $225,902,000 during the same time. Our farmers produce two-thirds more wheat now than they did twenty years ago, and yet receive one-third less money for it.

And cotton makes an equally sorry showing. The crop of 1894 was more than double that of 1873—7,549,000 bales in 1894, against 3,666,000 bales in 1873—and yet it brought $38,087,000 less money.

Our wool clip in 1894 was nearly twice as large as in 1873—298,000,000 pounds in 1894 and 158,000,000 pounds in 1873—and yet it brought $36,000,000 or one-third less money.

We had 6,671,000 more horses in 1895 than in 1873, but they are valued at $108,000,000 less money. Two-thirds more mules in 1895 than in 1873—and yet they are valued at $13,631,000 less. Milch cows have increased 60 per cent in number, but only 12 per cent in value. Oxen and other cattle have more than doubled in number, but they have increased only one-half in value. Sheep have increased in number from 33,000,000 to 42,000,000 and have lost $32,000,000 in value. And even swine, while increasing 63 per cent in number, have increased only 8 per cent in value.

These enormous losses inflicted upon the farming States continuously through a period of twenty-two years represent the continuous transfer of values from the West and South to the East that has been going on ever since the demonetization of silver in 1873, and which is very largely the result of that act.

THE RATIO QUESTION.

A New Light Not Heretofore Discussed in Congressional Halls.

The following paper, written for the Sunday Post-Dispatch by Mr. John T. Field, presents a valuable collection of data and a silver Christian's argument on the silver question:

THE PRODUCTION OF MONEY METALS.

To the Editor of the Post-Dispatch:

"What shall be the ratio between gold and silver?" Should silver be remonetized?

The tariff question being settled (?) the financial question is again to the front.

The question of remonetizing silver cannot be considered at all satisfactorily without determinining the question of the "ratio." The "ratio," whether 16 to 1 or 20 to 1 or any other set of figures, must be definitely settled, otherwise the question of remonetizing silver is of no practical value.

Mr. Robert Barclay, Director of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, in the Fortnightly Review, reproduces the tables of Dr. Adolph Soetbeer (and the Director of the United States mint), showing the estimated production of gold and silver from the discovery of America (1492), to the year 1892, in kilogrammes, viz.: 12,356,766 kilogrammes of gold and 233,278,334 kilogrammes of silver.

In Senator Vest's speech, delivered August 14, 1893, in the United States Senate, the same tables are given in ounces, and substantially agree, viz.: 397,191,823 ounces of gold and 7,522,507,716 ounces of silver.

During this period of 400 years, there are two distinct epochs in financial history, or rather, in the production of the precious metals. The silver mines of the new world gave new life to Europe and this abnormal production of silver dispelled the darkness of the middle ages.

In 1851 the abnormal production of gold from the mines of California and Australia, so stimulated enterprise as to cause many nations to seriously contemplate demonetizing gold.

It seems proper, then, for a better appreciation of the history of finance that these two periods be considered separately.

During the 360 years, from 1492 to 1852, the production was in the proportion of thirty-one ounces of silver to one ounce of gold. During the forty years, from 1852 to 1892, the proportion was of eleven ounces of silver to one ounce of gold.

The ratio for the whole period of 400 years was in the proportion of nineteen ounces of silver to one ounce of gold.

NOTE—If any one would like to examine this for themselves, let me give the following footings from tables:

	Ounces.
Production of gold 1492-1852.....	153,840,050
Production of gold 1852-1892.....	244,142,755
Total	397,982,805
Production of silver 1492-1852....	4,816,839,012
Production of silver 1852-1892....	2,705,577,704
Total	7,522,507,716

The annual average production of gold from 1492 to 1852 was 427,383 ounces and of silver 13,380,361 ounces, or in proportion of 31 to 1.

The average annual production of gold from 1852 to 1892 was 6,103,569 ounces, and of silver 67,639,442 ounces, or in proportion of 11 to 1.

These figures ought to effectually settle the claim that there is an abnormal (relative) production of silver at the present time.

Unfortunately, speakers and writers on this subject of ratio use short periods. For example, Senator Vest uses the periods, 1833 to 1840, 1841 to 1850, 1851 to 1855, and so on, as though such short periods could give any valuable data in solving a problem which has to do with the lifetime of the human race.

Even France, to fix by law the ratio of value between gold and silver, took the market price of gold and silver bullion for the period of but one century.

To my mind there is a natural law which should govern our legal enactments in this regard; a law as just and as equitable and as beneficent as the law of gravitation. I am convinced that the Almighty foresaw the needs of the human race in the matter of money metals as clearly as He foresaw our needs for light, or for fuel, and as bountifully provided for those needs. When a man had burned up the forests, coal measures were discovered. When men had killed off the oil producing fish, coal oil was discovered. As coal and coal oil are rapidly being consumed, God has brought man to know the uses of electricity for light, for power and for fuel.

As God provided for man's needs in the wood; in the coal; in the fish, and in the rivers of oil in the rocks; in the lightnings which pervade matter; and all these were found when and as needed by the human race, just so God provided the gold and the silver, the only known conception of wkat a metallic money should be, to be found when and where most needed for the uses of mankind and in the relative quantities which he foresaw most beneficial.

Any arbitrary legal enactments which shall run counter to God's laws (the laws of nature), must of necessity produce unfortunate results; the monometallic laws of finance prove this proposition. With this view, let us not stop at a period of even 400 years in the study of this problem—which is coincident with the life of the race—let us take the period of the financial history of the world.

From the best obtainable data, the estimated entire production of the precious metals from the earliest times in the world's history, up to 1892, has been of gold, 701,490,807 ounces; of silver, 10,054,907,572 ounces.

These masses are of the ratio of 14½ ounces of silver to 1 ounce of gold.

From these facts, and there is no doubt of their relative correctness, it would seem that God had fixed the relative value of these two metals by the fact of their relative production, and therefore, as God has provided all things in due proportion, it would seem that this relative production should be that best calculated to serve the best interests of the race in this matter of money metals.

I know the howl that would go up from the moneyed men at a proposition to establish the legal ratio at 12½ to 1, calling it "robbery" and such other gentle names.

It would be best for the masses of humanity should we conform to this law of God as well as to all other laws of God, even should a few be harmed—which it is very doubtful they would be in the end; but we will not discuss that phase of the subject at this time.

A review of the financial history of the ancients might be of advantage at this point.

The standard of the Babylonian Empire was 13½ to 1.

The Egyptian ratio was 12½ to 1.

In Rome, prior to the great influx of gold in B. C. 58, the standard was 19 to 1, and subsequently, for 600 years, was 9 to 1.

Prof. Max Muller's estimates of the relative value from the seventh century B. C. to date, is 13½ to 1.

Note how these "relative values" and "standards" conform to production.

From all the foregoing considerations it would seem that so long as a metallic basis for money shall be a necessity of the commerce of the world, that the nations cannot do better than to adopt the natural ratio, as found in the relative production of the two metals, since the world began.

The question as to whether the United States could remonetize silver on this standard, without the co-operation of other nations, is just such a question as, whether a man should obey God and do right without the co-operation of the other members of the community.

The benefits from doing right, accruing to the individual, must also, in the nature of things, accrue to the community, to the State, to the nation from right doing. Expediency is always harmful. Right is never wrong.

There are many who see in this "silver question," as we call it, a great moral issue. If there is a moral issue in it, it is so because the well-being of the masses is involved, and who can doubt it?

When a moral issue is involved no man should talk of a compromise. The compromise is but to dally with evil, and evil will get the better of us every time. If some, who are not rich because of our present financial plan, shall become poor because the moneyed wealth of the country (which is now fixed by the laws of the country) shall be made to harmonize with the laws of God, which are always righteous, those sufferers should remember that the "law of vicarious atonement" pervades the universe. "The greatest good to the greatest number." Humanity cannot afford to run counter to the laws of God.

JOHN T. FIELD.

MR. HARVEY ON SILVER.

To the Editor of the Post-Dispatch:

In this morning's Republic appears an interview with ex-Congressman DeForrest, of Connecticut, in which that gentleman at the invitation of its correspondent gives his reason for opposing the free coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1; and that paper prints the same with approval. As a constant reader of the Post-Dispatch and a believer in the true bimetallic policy, I desire to present to my co-readers a review of the interview.

As usual the gentleman starts out by saying that the advocates of free coinage are fools and knaves. He says: "There are, of course, a good many intelligent men who are knaves, and there are a good many honest men who are very ignorant, and from these two classes there may be probably a very few who would go in for the 16 to 1 notion." This statement is a very frequent one with our gold standard monometallists; and they seem to regard it as a great argument against the policy of free coinage. It, however, reminds one of the saying that it is very pleasant and consoling to call your neighbor a fool because it takes away that lonesome feeling, as it were.

He then goes on to say he is in favor of using both metals, but that such use must be in accord with the demand of the Democratic platform of 1892: That if gold and silver dollars are to be used, they must be of equal intrinsic and exchangeable value, and that at the present ratio of 16 to 1 such a thing is impossible, as the silver in the silver dollar is only worth 50 cents. This is the usual statement of those who oppose free coinage and by them is considered another strong argument against it.

Now, it is true, that the silver dollar, as measured by the appreciated gold dollar, is only worth about 50 cents; but to what is this due? From 1792, when our monetary system was formulated, until 1873, when silver was demonetized, and made mere token money, the silver dollar was perfectly equal in both exchangeable and intrinsic value with the gold dollar, and at times was even at a premium as compared with it. For the first forty-two years of this period the ratio was 15 to 1, instead of 16 to 1, as it is now, and has been since 1834; with a material difference, however, that up to 1873, we had free and unlimited coinage of both gold and silver, and in this difference lies the explanation of the fact that the silver dollar as compared with the gold is only worth 50 cents.

This fact seems to be entirely overlooked by Mr. DeForrest, as it is by all opponents of free coinage.

Restore silver to its rightful place as an equal with the gold at the mints, and this difference in value between them will soon vanish. This is proven by the history of our monetary system from 1792 to 1873, and also by common sense. As Goschen at the Paris conference said: "At present there is a vicious circle. States are afraid of employing silver on account of the depreciation and the depreciation continues because States refuse to employ it."

This "depreciated silver" argument therefore, will not hold good. It is, however, one of the "stock" arguments of the gold standard advocates.

These are the principal arguments advanced by Mr. DeForrest; the rest of his interview being in abuse of those who stand for the true money of the constitution and in ridicule of free coinage. Now, unless the opponents of free coinage can bring forth arguments more logical than these, their cause still stand before the people on a very weak foundation and will be certain to fall to pieces under the pressure of popular thought. WILLIAM K. HARVEY.

CHICAGO, ILL., July 27.—The Horr-Harvey debate was resumed today. In closing for the day Mr. Harvey handed Mr. Horr as a souvenir a silver dollar of 1799, with the word "unit" upon it. Mr. Harvey said: "Take it, Mr. Horr. Washington may have carried it in his pocket. Jefferson may at one time have had it in his possession; it may have paid for the paper on which the declaration of war was written against Great Britain; it may have been fondled by Jackson when writing his message to Congress against the national bank. It is a fit souvenir for any American proud of his country and of its institutions to carry in his pocket all the days of his life."

"I shall keep this dollar and put it to a good use," replied Mr. Horr. "I intend to have a hole bored through it and then I will hang it round the neck of my little grandchild, born just as we commenced this discussion. It will do Mr. Harvey good to learn that the people of the United States are still, in spite of the gold standard, marrying and giving in marriage, and that children are still born to us in spite of the silver dollar."

The discussion was then adjourned until Monday.

THE CAUSE OF SILVER

Written for the Sunday Post-Dispatch.

The purpose of this article is to present to the readers of the Post-Dispatch a short but clear view of the cause of silver and to show why it should be restored to our monetary system and placed there on an equal footing with gold.

If it succeeds in so doing, the desire of the author will be satisfied, and he will consider himself amply repaid for the time and exertion expended upon it.

Within the past month this momentous question has assumed proportions equal to its importance and now bids fair to be the leading issue in the campaign of 1896. Already the rumblings of the great oncoming wave are becoming heard throughout the land, and, as the county and State conventions draw near, it is heard more and more, and all indications are that by 1896 the question will have assumed the position above indicated.

As our monetary system now stands, we are entirely on a gold basis, and the question before us is, "Shall we remain so?" We have adopted the gold standard, and are asked to continue it. Is it wise that we shall do so?

What does a gold standard mean? It means, simply, that we have adopted gold as our only primary money. To be sure, we have other money than gold, but we are dependent on gold with which to redeem and sustain this other money. In other words, our other money is dependent for its value on our supply of gold available to redeem it.

By going to the gold standard, we have declared to the world that we will redeem our obligations in that metal, and, at the same time, we have debased about $600,000,000 or our money supply, or our entire silver money, and lowered it from its rightful place as a primary money to that of mere token money, thereby placing it on an equality with the greenback, which, as the law now stands, makes it only a promise to pay gold on demand. It is no longer the equal of gold, but a debased currency, dependent upon gold for its value, and this has been the case since the passage of the nefarious act of 1873, demonetizing silver and debasing it by dethroning it as a true money metal and reducing it to the status of a mere commodity.

This is why the gold standard advocates are able to point to the silver dollar and scornfully characterize it as a "dishonest 50 cent dollar." Never before 1873, when this gigantic crime was perpetrated, could the silver dollar of the constitution be so slandered. From 1792, when our monetary system was first established, up to 1873 the silver dollar had always been the equal of a gold dollar, both in exchangeable and intrinsic value, and had, at times, even been its superior. But what a change followed! From that time on down to the present date it has apparently continued to shrink in value as compared to gold, until now its enemies are able to point to it with scorn and truthfully say that it is a 50 cent dollar.

Now, why is this so? How has it come about? By reducing silver from its former position it was made a mere commodity, and by striking it from its place as a primary money and leaving gold alone to occupy that position, an appreciation of the value of the latter metal has resulted, which has kept pace with the increasing demands made upon it, and, it being the standard of value, all other things have depreciated, as measured by it.

Now, restore silver to its former position by means of "free and unlimited" coinage, and this discrepancy will no longer continue to exist.

But why? Well, because by so doing you create an unlimited market for silver and, at the same time, fix its price. The silver dollar, as coined at our mints, contains 371¼ grains of pure silver. Now, by adopting the free-coinage system, you say to the world: "Bring your silver to the mint, and for every 371¼ grains of pure silver we will pay you one dollar." Thus you create an unlimited demand at a fixed price, and, consequently, those who have silver to dispose of will require that price of all purchasers, and thus the coinage value and the commercial value of silver will be made

the same, namely—one dollar for 371¼ grains, pure; and, this being the case, the intrinsic value of a silver dollar will be the same as its face value, and the "50-cent dollar" will be a thing unheard of. Having done this, we will once again be on a true bimetallic basis and will have again returned to the monetary system of the Constitution—the system established by the founders of our country, and which has always served our people so well.

But you say: "We cannot do this. We would be flooded with the silver of the world and our gold would leave us." Now this is the great bug-bear used by the gold standard advocates in their attempts to scare our people into adopting their ideas. It is, however, utterly without foundation. First, because there is not enough silver in the world to flood us, considering that the greater part of the world requires it as money, and second, because our ratio of coinage (sixteen ounces of silver to one of gold) is larger than that of any other country, and it would be unprofitable for foreign silver owners to send it to us at that ratio.

But why adopt a bimetallic system? Why not continue on a gold basis? Is it not the best? Emphatically no. A gold basis is the worst basis in the world. First, because the supply of gold is not sufficient to fulfill the demands that will be made upon it as population and trade increase. And second, because of this fact the gold standard is an appreciating standard, and as was pointed out above, an appreciating standard causes everything to depreciate in value as compared with itself, as seen in the decline of prices since 1873. This decline has steadily kept pace with the appreciation of gold, and while not entirely due to it, may, without error, be attributed to it far more than any other cause. It is a law of monetary science that whenever the supply of primary or redemption money is decreased, the demand for it remaining the same, its value increases; just as it is a law of trade that whenever the supply of any commodity decreases, the demand remaining the same, its value rises. Therefore when the supply of redemption dollars is decreased it takes more labor or more commodities to obtain the same number of dollars than it did before, and consequently wages and prices decline.

Now, by striking the silver dollar from its place as redemption money, and thereby making it mere token-money, the supply of redemption money has been reduced, leaving gold alone to occupy that position, and as the supply of gold is practically stationary, we are confronted by a condition of things in which the supply of redemption money has been decreased with the demand for it not only remaining the same, but actually increasing by reason of the growth of trade and increase of population, and consequently in accord with the above law, its value increases and wages and prices have declined, and will continue to do so as long as this condition exists.

This gold standard is what is known as an appreciating standard, and is the worst affliction from which any country can suffer, because it causes a decrease of all values except those of bonds, mortgages and other securities, the value of which increases as the appreciation progresses.

To illustrate: A farmer mortgages his farm for $5,000, with wheat at $1 per bushel. The farm at the time of the loan was valued at $10,000. Now, appreciation of the standard sets in and goes on until it has reached 50 per cent. In consequence of this appreciation the price has fallen to 50 cents per bushel, in accordance with the law stated above. Therefore it now takes twice as many bushels to secure enough money to pay off the mortgage as it did when the loan was made.

But this is not all; the value of the farm has also decreased until it is now only worth $5,000, and in case of foreclosure its sale will merely satisfy the debt instead of doing that and leaving a balance with which our farmer might commence over again, and thus he loses all by reason of the appreciation of the standard. This is just what has been going on at the rate of about 2 per cent. per annum since silver was demonetized in 1873, and will continue until it is restored to its rightful place as an equal at the mints with gold.

But now let us look at the other phase of the transaction, namely: From the creditor's standpoint. When the banker or money lender loaned the $5,000 to our farmer, he took a mortgage calling for the payment of $5,000, which at that time would have bought 5,000 bushels of wheat, or say 100 acres of land. Now when the debt falls due prices and values have fallen one-half, but his mortgage still calls for $5,000, and having secured that sum by foreclosure he finds that he can now purchase 10,000 bushels of wheat or 200 acres of land, or twice as much of any other thing as he could have purchased with it at the time he loaned it; therefore he has gained just

50 per cent. In addition to interest on the loan, and in this significant fact is to be found the reason why our bankers, trust companies, and money lenders are found like a solid wall obstructing the restoration of silver as an equal of gold. They advocate the gold standard because they know it is an appreciating standard and is daily enhancing the value of the securities which they hold.

But it is also grinding the masses beneath its merciless crushing weight and unless it is lifted from off them it means their utter enslavement to destruction. For this reason we ought never to give up the fight until we have vanquished and restored again the "free and unlimited coinage of both gold and silver without discriminating against either metal, or charge for mintage."

Having done this we will have returned to the money of the constitution and restored the silver dollar upon which is written the motto of our forefathers, "In God we trust," and prosperity will again smile upon our now famished land.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY.

St. Louis, May 13, 1895.

FOREIGN FINANCIERS AND AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE.

The question to be determined in the next national election is of our status as an independent and self-governing people entitled to administer justice among ourselves regardless of the fact that outsiders will profit by the perpetuation of injustice.

The great English bankers whose allies in this country are the power behind the Wall street press, wish their relations with the United States to be adjusted on exactly the same basis as their relations with India. They are determined that financially our people shall occupy the same attitude towards them that the subjugated Hindoos do—that we shall be absolutely dependent on their views of justice and injustice without appeal.

Modern finance makes the methods of Warren Hastings seem poor and clumsy. Hastings was but a novice in extortion, as was that other financier who went into Roman provinces and collected so much of the unearned increment that at last when he was "caught in the gap," the Shorts whom he had been squeezing poured melted gold down his throat to give him the true taste of monomentalism. But such tyros as Crassus and Hastings knew nothing at all of the art of robbery in comparison with the great financiers of London who by merely knowing how to use the rule of three can plunder not only subjugated India but subjugated America as well.

It is against this foreign domination that the Democrats of Illinois are arraying themselves as Americans, and in no other way could they be of so much service to the cause of free and just government.

Unless the money of the American people is money of the mints, stamped with the seal of their sovereignty and expressing their individual supremacy, every dollar that circulates is a token of their subjugation. If they yield the power of issuing or controlling the circulation of money here in America to English financiers or to their American agents and accomplices, they yield the right to be free, and it will be impossible that they can remain free or prosperous.

The world is not governed by statute law, but by the operation of such higher laws as those of trade economy, and if we surrender the administration of these to foreigners, neither constitutions nor congresses, nor navies, nor armies can prevent us from becoming their serfs.

Mr. Edison, had he not been a great electrical inventor, would have been a commanding financier. He proposes to settle all financial differences by making a dollar out of wheat. He would take a bushel of wheat, squeeze the water out of it, compress it into a hard cake the size of a silver dollar and put the Government stamp on it. Should the holder prefer to eat his wheat rather than use it as a dollar, he may at any time put it to soak and swell it to its former proportions. As our wheat goes to all countries, the wheat dollar would be readily taken by foreigners, and might even be preferred to the clumsy metals which have no such intrinsic value. There are many farmers who say they have never made a dollar out of wheat, and when they hear of Mr. Edison's scheme for doing it they will be clamorous for the coinage of wheat, and Stewart and his followers will be completely knocked out.

COINAGE RIGHTS OF SILVER.

"High prices and prosperity is happiness. Low prices and want is misery."—Adam Smith.

People who are not in debt, or who are not obliged to sell anything to pay

lebts with, but who have revenues from real estate, loans, stocks, salaries or wages fixed and protected by a trades union, accept and enjoy low prices as something that is quite in the regular order of things. An early awakening from this serenity is likely, if the now long-continued depression is not soon ended by the restoration of silver to its coinage rights which it possessed before 1873, the only way it can be ended, unless by an uncontrollable issue of paper money, a remedy that would prove to be as bad as the disease.

Increasing, not decreasing, property values is the life of wages and employment. Money locked up instead of expended, invested, besides lessening employment and incomes, is injurious to business generally, and results in lowering salaries and wages, and in the end all kinds of property.

We are now under a wicked and pernicious money system, wicked, because it was stealthily and surreptitiously foisted upon us; pernicious, because it originated in contraction of the nation's money circulation, and in that it is sought to be continued on the same basis and in the interest of a class, bankers and dealers in agiotage.

The Constitution provides for a silver and gold bimetallic money system, and our legislation made it such until 1873, when it was secretly, and by fraud on Congress, changed to a gold monometallic system, and with the following described cheerful results:

1. In 1865 Hugh McCulloch inaugurated contraction of the circulation media, a policy that reduced it from $3,000,000,000 during the rebellion to about $700,000,000 in 1873, with the result of the calamitous panic of that year. Then was added the demonetization of silver, thus paving the way to the destruction of one-half of the primary money of the world. We have had ever since then, as a consequence, continuous, persistent and unrelenting shrinkage of all values, save and alone that of gold money.

2. Commencing with 1862 and ending with 1894, there have been in this country 228,796 business failures, with liabilities amounting to $4,277,000,000, a yearly average of 6,993 failures and $129,000,000 of liabilities for each of the thirty-three consecutive years. To emphasize this appalling fact of our history it needs only to be added that for the four years of the war period (and by the way the most phenomenally materially prosperous years in all our history, notwithstanding the destruction of life and property during the time) of 1862, 1863, 1864 and 1865, the total failures were but 3,180 and liabilities $56,000,000, a yearly average of 798 failures and $14,000,000 of liabilities. The failures for years back have been from 12,000 to 15,000 annually, with liabilities greater in amount twice over each year than for the total of the four years of money plenty from 1862 to 1865 inclusive. The failures for the first three months of the present year were 3,812, with liabilities of $46,000,000—623 more than for the entire four years of money plenty and at the rate of $128,000,000 of liabilities greater per annum than for that period of four years. The failures of last year were punctuated with 9,000 suicides. Two hundred and twenty-eight thousand and odd business men and firms, among the brightest and most enterprising, were sacrificed to the juggernaut of contraction and the gold standard—the British system.

3. A mighty host of unemployed wage earners, producers, estimated to be 3,000,000 in numbers, whose distress is apparently only to be relieved by the gates at Castle Garden continuing to swing outward. Under normal conditions these 3,000,000 persons should be earning at least $2 a day each, $6,000,000 daily, or $1,800,000,000 annually, working 300 days. This enormous yearly loss of wealth to the country can be multiplied by ten for the proximate amount of the total loss already.

4. The national debt at the end of the rebellion was about $2,800,000,000. There has been paid in interest on it since about $2,550,000,000, and of the principal about $1,800,000,000, or a total sum paid of $4,350,000,000. There remains yet to be paid about $1,000,000,000 of the principal with recent additions. At the close of the war about 1,000,000,000 bushels of wheat would have paid the then national debt of $2,800,000,000. To-day it would require about 2,000,000,000 bushels of wheat, Chicago prices, to pay the $1,000,000,000 of national debt remaining. This poverty-breeding depreciation of values is peculiar to every product of our industries and intensifies the business distress.

Under the Clay tariff of 22 per cent we had the panic of 1837. Under the Walker tariff of 25 per cent we had the panic of 1857. Under the Morrill tariff of 48 per cent we had the panic of 1873. Under the McKinley tariff of 58 per cent we had the panic of 1893; two panics under low and two panics under the highest tariffs we ever had, and yet men will prate about the tariff being at once the cause of and remedy for, our financial gloom. It has been wisely said: "A monetary system adapted to productive industries will sustain them under changes of tariff policy, but no tariff policy can sustain productive industries under a monetary system devised for the special advantage of non-producers."

Our national wealth is estimated at about $70,000,000,000, our debts at about half as much. By the demonetization of silver our debt-paying power has been reduced by nearly one-half. Are we a solvent concern? Is our future to be that of free and independent Americans, or are we to become industrial vassals, forever toiling for ruthless foreign taskmasters? Can this country rest in peace much longer under a financial system provided for us by the money power?

In this connection recurs the prophetic statement of Lincoln, "As a result of the war, corporations have become enthroned and an era of corruption in high places will follow, and the money power of the country will endeavor to prolong its reign by working upon the prejudices of the people until all wealth is aggregated in a few hands, and the republic is destroyed."

Webster said, "Liberty cannot long endure in any country where the tendency is to concentrate wealth in the hands of a few."

Greeley said, "We boast of having liberated 4,000,000 of slaves. True, we have stricken the shackles from the former bondsmen and brought all laborers to a common level, but not so much by elevating the former slaves as by practically reducing the whole working population to a state of serfdom. While boasting of our noble deeds we are careful to conceal the ugly fact that that by our iniquitous monetary system we have nationalized a system of oppression more refined, but none the less cruel, than the old system of chattel slavery."

The country would have recovered from the panic of 1873, as it had recovered from worse ones, nor would we have had the one of 1893 but for the demonetization of silver in 1873. It is very erroneous to claim that prices of all other commodities have fallen because the price of silver has fallen and that they will rise if the price of silver bullion rises. In this country its demonetization supplementing the contraction that made the panic of 1873, and this contraction of primary money continuing, when the demand for it remained not only undiminished but increasing, is what is making the business distress so acute—is what is perpetually failing prices.

Free coinage of silver into primary money as before 1873 will enable it to lift prices in part—very materially so. Silver, a commodity, denied free coinage, has no more effect on values than pig-iron has. A rise in its price as a commodity only helps its producers and speculators in its bullion. Silver bullion is not money any more than molasses or watermelons are, and its price at 70 cents or $1.39 an ounce has no more to do with the supply of money, the increase or decrease of values on general business conditions than have the prices of molasses or watermelons. Its right to be coined into primary legal tender money is what enables it as bullion to influence values or business as a part of the money supply. This is indisputably so. An uncoined commodity cannot help business outside of itself, however much its price may rise. Values are influenced by the available volume of currency, not by the price of bullion when a commodity. If Government fiat paper money, as greenbacks, without their disgraceful mutilation, as now, had been issued in sufficient volume at the time of the demonetization of silver we would not have had the shrinkage of values as is the case now, and no such depression in business as marks the present, even though the price of silver had gone as low as that of rags.

HENRY ALTMAN.

Chicago, Ill., April 22.

THE MISUSE OF THE MONEY POWER.

One of the most significant sentences in the Yale address of Justice Brown which, is reported verbatim in the current number of the Forum, is the following:

"If wealth will not respect the rules of common honesty in the use of its power, it will have no reason to expect moderation or discretion on the part of those who resist its encroachmeut."

The root of nearly all the evils and dangers confronting us which Justice Brown pointed out in detail is suggested in this remark. When capital

combines to oppress the people by corrupting legislatures and courts and city councils it lays the foundation for a host of disorders in the body politic. It forms the nucleus around which gather the forces which corrupt municipal, State and national politics. Out of it grows machine bossism, venal voting and legislative boodling.

The grievance which supplies food for demagogism, anarchism and social and political disorder of every kind is the dishonest use of the power of wealth to obtain greater wealth. When those who feel the brunt of oppression see this dishonest power in control of the machinery of the Government and shielding itself and its dishonest gains behind courts and bayonets is it any wonder that passion takes place of calm reason?

If we have difficulties and dangers that give cause for distrust of the permanence of our institutions the misuse of the money power is responsible for it.

"INTRINSIC" VALUE OF GOLD.

From the Kansas City Journal (Rep.)

The gold men are always full of the "intrinsic value of gold," and that by some mysterious law of nature in the adjustment of her mineral deposits gold is endowed with the occult power of infallibility, and like the infinite, never changes.

A friend has sent us a pointer that has been generally overlooked, that explains the whole matter—one that very careful silver men have overlooked. In Horr's debate with Harvey he fairly howled over this fact—attributing the stable value of gold to the uniform cost of mining it. Elaborate calculations have been made to show that it costs more to mine silver, dollar for dollar, than gold—a fact well proved—and thus an answer to that argument satisfactorily afforded.

But here is the real cause: England is the pioneer gold government, and has very effectively provided herself with the means to maintain a supply. The Bank of England is the real treasury of the British Empire, and as gold is made the ultimate money of redemption—or the sole primary money—provision is made for a fixed value and full supply. Thus, by law, or by its charter, the Bank of England is required to purchase all gold bullion, all light weight gold coin and all foreign gold coin presented at the bank at the fixed rate, or value, of £3 17s 9d per ounce—or in our money $18.92. As the Bank of England is the great clearing house of the world and the financial institution of the British Empire, this fixes the price of gold permanently for the world. The only variation in price is that of exchange, or shipment. Anyone can now readily understand why gold shipments from America are sometimes active and sometimes suspended. It is the difference in exchange from $18.92 per ounce at the Bank of England, and the exchange in Wall street. Thus disappears at once the gigantic fog-bank of "intrinsic value." It makes of gold absolute fiat money—and gives England the controlling advantage over all other countries in the supply of gold—for it is only at the Bank of England that gold purchase at a fixed rate is made compulsory. It is only another evidence of the slavery of the United States Treasury to the institution of Threadneedle street and emphasizes still more the crime of our present financial policy.

The reader can verify these facts by using the authorities now before us as we write, which are: Chambers' Cyclopedia. Edinburgh edition of 1884, vol. I., page 667; Encyclopedia Britannica, American edition of 1884, vol. XVI., page 507, art. on "Mint." It shows as conclusively as cause and effect that all this gold crusade and its consequences are brought about and are based on English legislation. How long will the people of America submit to this gold policy that makes even the metal itself gravitate to its control and use by the money lenders of London? No wonder, as Mr. Gladstone remarked last week, that England would still control the finances of the world "if London only stood firm."

BLIND FINANCIAL LEADERSHIP.

The Post-Dispatch has no desire to treat Secretary Carlisle with anything but justice, and it is solely as a matter of justice that it feels impelled to hold up his attempt to tell the people what their financial policy should be as a striking example of blind leadership.

All the greatness attributed to Mr. Carlisle was achieved by him as an expounder of political principles. When he was called from the floor of Congress to Mr. Cleveland's Cabinet as the executive head of the Treasury Department the Post-Dispatch expressed grave doubt of the wisdom of the step. The result has justified this doubt.

It must be admitted that as a minister of finance Mr. Carlisle has been the most conspicuous failure in the history of this country. The President has treated his counsel with ill-concealed contempt and on several occasions has repudiated his utterances and reversed his policy. All of his financial proposals were rejected by the Finance Committees of Congress. They have not been in accord with the view of any considerable proportion of the people or their representatives.

It is a practical maxim of business that advice should be sought from men of proved capacity and success. As a man who has shown total incapacity for practical finance Mr. Carlisle is the last man who should be put forward to tell the people what they must do to be saved in financial matters. As an adviser of successful business men he is a spectacular absurdity.

RUINOUS FANATICISM.

An illustrated periodical has aptly cartooned the condition of this country in a picture representing Stewart as the representative of silver protection, and McKinley as the representative of tariff protection, plucking the feathers out of the American eagle.

Changing the cartoon so that it would show the gold bug and the silver extremist fighting like mad for the privilege of saving the eagle, while the poor bird is being stripped by a protection wolf in the form of the dishonest Sherman law, would as aptly portray the money situation in Congress.

Both the gold monometallist and the silver extremist are fetish worshippers and like all fetish worshippers will not listen to reason. The gold bug worships the golden calf as a money divinity and all who do not join him in his devotions are mad heretics. The silver extremist prostrates himself before the arbitrary ratio of 16 to 1 as a sacred thing and calls all who decline to do this silly act gold bugs. Contrary to the traditions and acts of this Government, to the constitution which empowers Congress to fix the value of coined money, to the platforms of both leading parties, which demand the coinage of both metals on an equal basis of intrinsic and interchangeable values, he insists that any basis but this ratio is hurtful and villainous. He interprets all the utterances of past leaders in favor of bimetallism as indorsements of a fixed ratio, something undreamt of by them.

Meanwhile the country is being wrecked by the operation of the vicious Sherman makeshift. The mass of the people of this country demand honesty in money legislation. There is no safety outside of this basis. The Sherman law is a dishonest measure and the essential preliminary to getting on an honest basis and restoring confidence is its removal.

Repeal the Sherman law and appoint a monetary commission to inquire into and report upon the relative values of gold and silver as a basis for determining the true ratio. This is the way of sanity and good sense. It is the way to honest bimetallism, by which alone disaster may be averted and permanent prosperity secured.

HOW IT WAS WORKED.

The press defenders of the recent bond bunco game are doing a public service in emphasizing the pledges made by the bond syndicate to protect the Government's gold reserve and so to regulate the rate of exchange that there shall be no exports of gold for some time.

The lying of these pledges was a confession that the conditions which forced the Government to issue bonds to maintain its reserve and avert a panic were artificially created. Their fulfillment will be positive proof of a conspiracy on the part of the international gold combine to "pinch" the Government for its own benefit.

The Post-Dispatch recently showed by a table giving the withdrawals of gold from the Treasury and exports of gold for each year since 1879 that it was not the demands of exporters, but the carefully concocted schemes of New York bankers that stripped the Treasury of gold. Although the exports decreased, the withdrawals increased after 1893, and within the first seven months of the current fiscal year the withdrawals exceeded the exports by over $50,000,000.

The complete stopping of gold exports immediately after the gold combine has made $16,000,000 on a bond deal is conclusive that the recent bond issue at an exhorbitant rate of interest was the profitable culmination of a plot to hold up the Government and force it into formal acceptance of gold monometallism.

BLAND'S "TWENTY YEARS' FIGHT FOR FREE SILVER."

Denver, Colo., May 11.—Hon. Richard P. Bland, of Missouri, addressed a large audience in this city to-night on the subject, "Twenty Years' Fight in Congress for Free Silver, and the Fight Yet to Come."

This is the first of a series of lectures which Mr. Bland has contracted to deliver throughout this State.

Mr. Bland spoke to-night as follows:

Ladies and Gentlemen: I have to thank you and the good citizens of Denver for this magnificent reception, and the good people of Colorado for the many pressing invitations they have extended me to address them.

I have chosen for my subject the "Fight of Twenty Years in Congress for the Free Coinage of Silver, and the Fight Yet to Come." This is the first time I have ever visited a silver mining State since this twenty year battle began. I have no interest whatever in the States producing the precious metals, and no sympathy for them beyond the interest and sympathy I have in our common country. You may have as the producers of silver to that extent a local interest in its restoration as money; but if the restoration of silver were a mere local question affecting you alone you would indeed be helpless; and if the restoration of silver benefited you to the detriment of the majority of the people you would have no right to ask it; I can't believe you would demand it.

I have advocated for twenty years the free coinage of silver, because of my convictions that this policy is absolutely necessary to the prosperity of this nation, and especially of the people of my own State. The losses your silver producers have sustained on account of the demonetization of silver are not to be compared with the enormous losses of the farmers of Missouri in the fall of prices of farms and the products of the soil, consequent, as we believe, upon the demonetization of silver.

On this point I submit a few extracts from the Boonville Democrat of April 24 last, published in Boonville, Mo., a marked copy of which was sent to me by the editor, Col. W. F. Switzler. Col. Switzler was the Superintendent of the Bureau of Statistics at Washington during Mr. Cleveland's first administration. I read: "Then what are the facts? In 1873 the value of one acre of the products of wheat, cotton, corn, oats and hay was $15.65; in 1893 it was worth $8.15, a decline of nearly 48 per cent. and a decline continued during the next year."

Again he says: "If American farm products had sold in 1893 for the prices of 1873, they would have brought $1,500,000,000 more money."

This shows a loss to the American farmers on one year's product of more money than the total value of the whole silver output of the United States from 1873 to 1893. According to the report of the Director of the Mint, showing the production of silver in the United States we had produced from 1873 to 1893 about $1,000,000,000. (See the report of the Director of the Mint for the year 1873, page 22.)

Again Col. Switzler goes on to say: "Missouri produced 7,695,000 bushels of wheat in 1872, and the product was worth $10,894,950. In 1890 we produced 30,113,821 bushels, which at the prices of 1872 would have brought $42,640,487; but a shrinkage of values of about 47 per cent. had intervened, and our thirty-odd million bushels were worth only about $22,500,000, a loss of nearly $20,000,000 in one State on a single crop."

It will not do to say this was owing to an overproduction of wheat, for the production has not greatly increased during the last decade. If we take the whole of the farm products of Missouri, no doubt that State has lost annually on account of falling prices in consequence of silver demonetization at least as much as the whole silver output of Colorado annually. It may be said that the prices of all the products of the soil, the factory and the mine, and the products of labor generally, have suffered in the same

ratio; but it is not my purpose to enter upon an elaborate discussion of the merits of the silver question, but to allude to the importance of silver restoration in connection with the particular theme under consideration, which, as before stated, relates to the history of the battles in Congress on this question for the past twenty years.

To comprehend the silver question and the battles fought in Congress for the free coinage of silver, it is necessary to begin with the act of 1873, known as the act that demonetized the standard silver dollar. From the passage of our first mint act in 1792 until the demonetization act of 1873 the standard silver dollar, 371¼ grains pure silver, was the unit of account or standard of value. The amount of pure silver in this dollar was never altered, whereas the gold dollar had been twice changed. For over eighty years and up to 1873 the standard silver dollar, as now coined in pure silver, was the unit of our coinage.

THE ACT OF 1873.

The act of 1873 was entitled as follows:

"An act revising and amending the laws relating to the mints and the assay offices and the coinage of the United States." This act contains in all sixty-seven sections and deals with with the management of the mints and assay offices. The title of the act and the context indicates the sole purpose of the act to be to amend the details relating to the management of the mints and assay offices and the coinage. There is nothing whatever in the title of the act giving notice that the purpose of the act was to displace the old silver unit and to put in its stead the gold dollar as the unit of value; nothing to indicate a purpose to prohibit the coinage of the old silver unit that had had the right of free coinage at our mints and full legal tender from the foundation of the Government up to that time.

Notwithstanding the act contains sixty-seven sections in all, there was no important change in the law relating to the mints and assay offices and the coinage excepting that part prohibiting the coinage of the standard silver dollar and substituting the gold dollar for the silver dollar as the unit of account. And further proof that this revolutionary change from the silver unit to the gold unit, from the law providing for the free coinage of both gold and silver to the law that prohibited the coinage of any full legal tender money except gold, it is only necessary to refer to the manner in which this important change in our monetary system was brought about. The change could have been made in a few words and in one section had the authors of the bill boldly gone to work to accomplish their purpose; but instead of that the work of demonetization was done by piecemeal, by indirection and evidently in a stealthy manner.

The sections that did this are sections 13, 14, 15, 17, 20 and 21. Sec. 13 provides for standard of gold and silver coins.

Sec. 14 provides that the gold coin of the United States shall be a one dollar gold piece which at the standard weight of 25.8 grains shall be the unit of value. There is nothing in the title of the act to indicate such a purpose as this; and before this section occurs and this change is made there are twelve sections preceding it dealing only with the management of the mints and assay offices.

Sec. 15 provides that the silver coin of the United States shall be a trade dollar; a half-dollar or fifty-cent piece; and the weight of the trade dollar shall be 420 grains troy. It further provides that said coins shall be a legal tender at their nominal value for any amount not exceeding $5 in any one payment, putting the trade dollar and the fractional coins on the same level as to legal tender, limiting them all to $5 only. It will be noted that the silver dollar, 371¼ grains pure silver, or 412½ grains standard silver, that had been coined freely up to that time, was dropped from the list of silver coins; yet the work was not quite done, and before completing the purpose, it was necessary to conceal the object by putting intervening Sec. 16, relating to the minor coins, or the nickels and coppers; and then comes Sec. 17, which completes the work begun in Sec. 15.

Sec. 17 provides that no coins either of gold, silver or minor coinage shall hereafter be issued from the mints other than those of the denominations, standards and weights herein set forth. Sec. 15 had set forth the silver coins authorized to be struck at our mints, purposely leaving out the silver dollar; so that Sec. 17 clinches the work by inhibiting the coinage of any silver pieces except the coins named in Sec. 15. Sec. 14 had already provided for the coinage of the gold dollar piece as the unit of value; a quarter eagle, or $2.50 piece; a half eagle, or $5 piece; an eagle, or a $10

piece, and a double eagle, or $20 piece.

Sec. 20 provides that any owner of gold bullion may deposit the same at any mint to be formed into coin or bars for his benefit, giving free coinage to gold.

Sec. 21 provides that the owner of silver bullion may deposit the same at any mint to be formed into bars or into dollars of 420 grains troy, designated in this act as trade dollars, and no deposit of silver for other coinage shall be received; thus absolutely inhibiting all coinage of full legal tender standard silver money; for the trade dollar was not a legal tender, except in sums of $5, and was put upon the same plane as fractional coin or subsidiary money. Gold was made the unit of value and given unlimited coinage at our mints; while it is evident from the manner in which this revolution in our monetary system was accomplished it was done indirectly and stealthily, yet it was the most important and far-reaching legislation on money ever enacted in our government. Even the trade dollar was finally struck from the lists of coins. By the act of July 22, 1876, the coinage of the trade dollar was suspended except to be coined in the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, and its legal tender character repealed. The act of February 9, 1887, authorized the retirement and recoinage of the trade dollar by exchanging standard silver dollars for all trade dollars at that time outstanding, and the recoinage of the trade dollars into standard silver dollars and prohibiting any further coinage of the trade dollar by exchanging standard silver dollars for all trade dollars at that time outstanding, and the recoinage of the trade dollars into standard silver dollars and prohibiting any further coinage of the trade dollar.

INFLATION AND RESUMPTION.

The Progress of Currency Bills Following the Act of 1873.

The act of February 12, 1873, was passed in the closing days of the last session of the Forty-second Congress. I was first elected to Congress in November, 1872; the term of service began on the 4th of March, 1873, not quite one month after silver was demonetized. The Forty-third Congress assembled in regular session in December, 1873, about ten months after the passage of the act demonetizing silver. James G. Blaine, of Maine, was chosen Speaker of the House. During the whole Forty-third Congress the silver question was not alluded to. Both Congress and the country were entirely ignorant of the effect of the act of February 12, 1873. Mr. Blaine himself, who, at the time of the passage of the act of 1873, was Speaker of the House, a few years afterward stated in the Senate that, at the time of the enactment he was not aware of the effect of the act demonetizing silver.

The Forty-third Congress, however, very elaborately considered the currency question. At that time neither gold nor silver were in circulation and but little attention was paid to coin money by Congress or the masses of the people. We were on a paper basis, consequently the discussions of the currency question related entirely to the greenback and national bank note circulation.

The Forty-third Congress passed what was commonly called at that time the inflation act. This act increased the greenback circulation from about $380,000,000 to $400,000,000, but was vetoed by President Grant. This so-called inflation act was passed during the first session of the Forty-third Congress and was intended to meet the difficulties of the country at that time, for an attempted retirement of the greenbacks had produced alarm in the country and brought on a disastrous panic.

At the last or short session of the Forty-third Congress the resumption law, so-called, was passed, providing for the resumption of specie payments on the first day of January, 1879. This law gave power to the Secretary of the Treasury to sell the character and description of bonds authorized by the act of July 14, 1870, known as the Refunding Act. These bonds were payable in coin of the standard value of that date, July 14, 1870. The standard coins of July 14, 1870, were the silver dollars as the unit of account, having full legal tender power and free coinage; and also the gold dollar and its multiples as now coined. These bonds were based on the bimetallic system of free coinage of gold and silver at the ratio then prevailing of 15.98 to 1, commonly called 16 to 1, and the ratio at which we have subsequently coined over four hundred million of silver standard dollars.

It is under the authority of the resumption law that the power is still claimed to exist to sell bonds for resumption purposes, and under which our late bond sales took place. It will be seen that in the Forty-third Congress the law was passed, the purpose

of which was to ultimately retire the greenbacks and go to a coin basis. The Congress prior to that had prohibited the coinage of anything but gold as full legal tender money, so that the act of 1873, passed in the Forty-second Congress, demonetized silver, and the act passed in the subsequent Forty-third Congress, providing for the resumption of specie payments, evidently intended to compel a resumption of specie payments on the single gold standard of payments. Thus the Forty-third Congress adjourned, leaving on the statute books the law of the Forty-second Congress demonetizing silver, and the law of the Forty-third Congress requiring the resumption of specie payments in 1879.

These two acts, had no intervening legislation occurred, would have necessarily forced the country to resumption on the single gold standard.

The next Congress, or the Forty-fourth, was the beginning of the silver fight. The House of the Forty-fourth Congress, being Democratic, elected Mr. M. C. Kerr, of Indiana, as Speaker. I was appointed chairman of the Committee on Mines and Mining. This committee did not have charge of the coinage question proper; but Gen. Banks, of Massachusetts, a member of the House, introduced a bill and referred it to our committee. The object and title of this bill was, "to utilize the product of the gold and silver mines of the United States." The bill provided for the deposit with various assay offices of gold and silver bullion, and authorizing the issuing of certificates of deposits thereon; these certificates showing the weight and fineness of the bullion deposited. The holders of the certificates were to be paid in bullion of the weight and fineness and of the kind and amount deposited on presentation of the certificate. These certificates were not made money or a legal tender for any purpose. No provision was made in the bill for the coinage of the bullion. In fact, the Government was made a mere depository for the bullion and did not become the owner. The idea of the author seems to have been that the certificates would have gone into use in mercantile transactions without having any legal tender power.

The Committee on Mines and Mining was composed of the following members: Richard P. Bland of Missouri, chairman; Jacob Turney of Pennsylvania, Milton J. Durham of Kentucky, Allen Potter of Michigan, N. Holmes O'Dell of New York, Randell N. Gibson of Louisiana, Alexander Campbell of Illinois, James L. Evans of Indiana, Wm. Woodburn of Nevada, Lucian B. Caswell of Wisconsin and John R. Lynch of Mississippi.

About the time that this bill was referred to our committee the silver question was being discussed in Congress and especially in the Senate. I am not informed as to how the secret of the act of 1873 was found out, or who first discovered the mischief wrought by this act. I can say, however, that the first information I had of the demonetization of silver came from Senator Bogy of Missouri. Whether he was the first in Congress to unearth this infamy I do not know. The first great speech, however, made upon this subject in either house was made by Senator Jones of Nevada. This speech was made in the Senate during the first session of the Forty-fourth Congress, and was one of the ablest speeches made at that time or any other time upon this subject, and attracted world-wide attention.

In the meantime the Committee on Mines and Mining took up the Banks bullion bill, and after several weeks' consideration reported it back to the House with a free coinage provision. The bill as thus amended was reported back to the House providing for the free coinage of silver into standard silver dollars at the exact ratio of 16 to 1. The idea was to make it exactly 16 to 1. The ratio, however, prevailing at the time silver was demonetized was 15.98 to 1, which, as stated before, is still the legal ratio. Our committee was not a privileged committee; that is, we were not authorized to report at any time for consideration. Our only opportunity for consideration was during what was called the morning hour. At a stated time each morning committees were called in their order for bills for consideration. When a bill was called up in the morning hour, only one hour was allotted for its consideration. If not disposed of during the hour it went over and was called up in the morning hour again the next day, and so on from day to day until disposed of.

This bill was called up in the morning hour, but no vote could be reached on the bill because of filibustering motions. A motion to adjourn and a roll call on this motion would consume at least one half hour. Another motion would be made for a recess and a roll call on that would consume at least another half hour; thus two roll calls consuming the whole hour and defeating any vote on the bill.

The bill was thus filibustered for near two months and until the final adjournment of the first session of the

Forty-fourth Congress in August, 1876. The chief actors in these obstructive tactics were A. S. Hewitt of New York and Eugene Hale of Maine.

The Presidential election took place in November, 1876, and also the election of members to the Forty-fifth Congress. The Forty-fourth Congress held its last, or short session, beginning on the first Monday in December, 1876. The overshadowing question then was who had been elected President of the United States, and the great contest between Mr. Tilden and Mr. Hayes was fought out during that session. About a week after the assembling of the last session of the Forty-fourth Congress, and on December 13, 1876, I offered as a substitute for the Banks bill and amendments a bill for the free coinage of silver into standard silver dollars, 371¼ grains pure silver, or 412½ grains standard silver, thus restoring the old dollar at the old ratio—the dollar that is now in circulation. This substitute was adopted by the House and the bill passed. It was sent to the Senate, but was never taken up or acted upon by that body.

It was during the first session of the Forty-fourth Congress that the silver commission was authorized, by joint resolutions, August 5, 1876, to inquire into the silver question and the money question generally. This commission as organized consisted of John P. Jones, Louis V. Bogy and George S. Boutwell of the Senate, and Randell L. Gibson, George Willard and Richard P. Bland on the part of the House; with experts from private life, Wm. Groesbeck of Ohio and Prof. Francis Bowen of Massachusetts. George N. Weston of Maine was appointed secretary.

This commission investigated the subject of the demonetization of silver, making an exhaustive report to Congress on March 2, 1877, known as the silver commission report. The Forty-fourth Congress adjourned without having finally acted upon the silver question, and the subject matter went over to the Forty-fifth Congress.

BLAND-ALLISON ACT

Its Final Passage and the First Effort Made to Repeal it.

Mr. Hayes was inaugurated President and called an extra session of the Forty-fifth Congress to meet on the 15th of October, 1877. Samuel J. Randall of Pennsylvania was elected Speaker of the House.

On November 5 of this special session I moved the suspension of the rules and had passed a bill for the free coinage of silver. This was substantially the same that the House passed in the Forty-fourth Congress. This bill passed the House by a vote of yeas 164, nays 34.

The bill went to the Senate and Mr. Allison, from the Committee of Finance in the Senate, reported it back, striking out the free coinage part and inserting a provision for the purchase of not less than $2,000,000 nor more than $4,000,000 worth of silver bullion per month, and requiring the bullion to be coined into silver dollars provided for in the House bill. The bill, as thus amended, passed the Senate and finally passed the House. It was vetoed by President Hayes, but was passed over his veto in both houses on the 28th of February, 1878, thus becoming the law commonly known as the Bland-Allison act. The free coinage bill, as it passed the House, received more than two-thirds vote; it required two-thirds to suspend the rule and pass it.

The following prominent public men voted for this free coinage bill as it passed the House: Mr. Carlisle of Kentucky, now Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Foster of Ohio, who was Secretary of the Treasury under Mr. Harrison's administration; Mr. Herbert, now Secretary of the Navy; Mr. McKinley, now Governor of Ohio; Mr. Mills of Texas, now a Senator from that State; Mr. Morrison of Illinois, now Interstate Commerce Commissioner.

The fact that most of these gentlemen, if not all of them, have changed their views upon this question should be attributed to the uncertainty of human opinion and the action of public men, for surely the restoration of silver is as meritorious and as necessary now as it was then. Among those who voted against the bill and are now in public life were Mr. Blair of New Hampshire, a member-elect to the Fifty-fourth Congress; Mr. Fry of Maine, then a member of the House, but now a Senator; Mr. Reed of Maine, a member-elect to the Fifty-fourth Congress; Mr. Hoar of Massachusetts, then and now a Senator, and Mr. Morrill of Vermont.

It will also be observed by the record that the following who were members of the Forty-fifth Congress are members-elect to the Fifty-fourth Congress, all of whom voted for the bill: Mr. Cannon of Illinois, Mr. Culbertson of Texas, Mr. Hooker and Mr. Money of Mississippi.

Those who voted against the bill and who are members-elect to the Fifty-fourth Congress are: Mr. Blair of New Hampshire and Mr. Reed of Maine.

The following who voted for the bill on its final passage in the Senate and are now Senators are: Mr. Allison of Iowa, Mr. Cameron of Pennsylvania, Mr. Cockrel of Missouri, Mr. Gordon of Georgia, Mr. Jones of Nevada, Mr. McMillan of Minnesota, Mr. Morgan of Alabama, Mr. Teller of Colorado, Mr. Voorhees of Indiana.

Those who voted against the bill and are now Senators are: Mr. Hoar of Massachusetts and Mr. Morrill of Vermont.

Before the passage of the act of February 28, 1878, Congress passed a concurrent resolution declaring that under the law United States bonds issued under the refunding act of July 14, 1870, and the redemption act of July 14, 1875, were payable at the option of the Government in standard silver dollars, 412½ grains, or in gold coin, without violation of public faith. This resolution was passed in the Senate by yeas 43, nays 22. In the House this concurrent resolution passed, yeas 189, nays 79. Thus settling, so far as the people's representatives in Congress were concerned, beyond controversy that we had no public debt whatever that is not legally payable at the option of the Government in standard gold and silver coins.

This fact must be taken into account and was taken into account at the time when the question of the ratio was under consideration. Our debt was based upon a bimetallic system consisting of gold and silver, with the free coinage of both at the ratio prevailing in 1870, or the present legal ratio, 15.98 to 1. The fact that hostile legislation has depressed and depreciated silver bullion, as compared to gold bullion, is met and answered by the other fact that the demonetization of silver has caused the appreciation of gold and has made the difference between the bullion value of gold and silver, and that the repeal of this legislation will replace the positions held by gold and silver at the time both had free coinage at our mints.

The relative value of the two coins now in circulation is that of parity, and this parity would be maintained as to all the coins that would be put in circulation under the bimetallic system of free coinage at the present ratio. Nature has set her seal of limitation upon the product of silver, consequently it cannot be coined or issued without limit as paper might be, unless we debase the metal by putting less silver in the dollar. No one proposes to do that.

The next contest fought over silver was of a minor character, relating to the retirement and recoinage of the trade dollars before referred to.

In the Forty-sixth Congress a free coinage bill was reported by Hon. A. J. Warner of Ohio. This bill was debated and considered for some days and finally passed the House May 24, 1879, yeas 114, nays 97. The bill was never acted upon in the Senate.

The next fight occurred after the election of Mr. Cleveland in 1884. In Mr. Clevelnad's first message to the Forty-ninth Congress, of which Mr. Carlisle was Speaker, he strongly insisted upon the repeal or suspension of the coinage of silver under what is called the Bland-Allison act. There was great pressure brought to bear on Congress to secure the repeal of this act. The demand for the repeal came from the same sources that had opposed the restoration of the coinage of the standard silver dollar, and that had continually demanded the repeal of the law. It originated in the bank and bondholding circles in New York, the Chambers of Commerce and Board of Trade of that city, and with the metropolitan press on the Eastern seaboard demanding the repeal of the silver law.

An effort was then made to create an alarm throughout the country, and, indeed, a semi-panic feeling had been brought about by the clamors of these money changers of New York and throughout the East, so that when Congress met in December, 1885, the whole country was aroused upon the silver question. It was declared by the gold standard people that any further coinage of the standard silver dollar would bring about disaster to the country.

On April 8, 1886, a vote was taken in the House of Representatives on a proposition to suspend the coinage of silver dollars. The proposition was overwhelmingly defeated by a vote of 84 in favor of suspension and 201 against suspension; and a free coinage bill offered by myself was defeated by a vote of 126 for and 163 against it; thus ending the effort to stop the coinage of silver, and thus also terminated the endeavor to create a panic, for after it was ascertained that it was impossible to suspend the coinage of silver the gold standard advocates ceased their croaking.

BULLION PURCHASE BILL.

An Interesting Contest for the Free Coinage of Silver.

The next battle fought was after the election of Mr. Harrison as President, and in the Fifty-first Congress, of which Mr. Reed of Maine was elected Speaker of the House. This Congress met on the first Monday in December, 1889. The first vote taken in this Congress was on June 5, 1890, in the House of Representatives, on the bill known as the Windom silver bullion purchase bill. Mr. Conger, the chairman of the Committee on Coinage, Weights and Measures, offered a substitute for the Windom bill. The Conger bill was also a bullion purchase bill, not a free coinage bill. I moved to recommit this bill, with instructions that the Committee on Coinage, Weights and Measures report back to the House a free coinage bill. This motion was defeated, yeas 116, nays 149, and the substitute offered by Mr. Conger was then passed yeas 135, nays 119.

Of the members who voted for free coinage at that time and are now members of the next House, or the Fifty-fourth Congress, are Mr. Abbott of Texas, Mr. Allen of Mississippi, Mr. Bankhead of Alabama, Mr. Blanchard, then a member of the House, now a Senator from Louisiana; Mr. Catchings of Mississippi, Mr. Clark of Alabama, Mr. Cobb of Alabama, Mr. Carine of Texas, Mr. Crisp of Georgia, Mr. Culberson of Texas, Mr. Dockery of Missouri, Mr. Herman of Oregon, Mr. Lester of Georgia, Mr. McCreary of Kentucky, Mr. McRae of Arkansas, Mr. Richardson of Tennessee, Mr. Robinson of Louisiana, Mr. Sayers of Texas, Mr. Stockdale of Mississippi, Mr. Tarsney of Missouri, Mr. Tucker of Virginia, Mr. Turner of Georgia, Mr. Washington of Tennessee and Mr. Wheeler of Alabama.

The Conger bill was sent to the Senate, and while the bill was pending in the Senate Mr. Plumb of Kansas offered an amendment for the free coinage of silver, which was agreed to, yeas 42, nays 25. This free coinage bill was sent to the House and a vote taken thereon June 25, and defeated by a vote of yeas 135, nays 152.

A conference committee was appointed on the part of the two honses. A majority of this committee agreed to a bill authorizing the purchase of 4,500,000 ounces of silver bullion every month and the issuance of Treasury notes in payment for bullion so purchased. This bill passed both houses and became a law, which is commonly known as the Sherman law. The total amonnt of silver purchased under the Sherman act, as given by the Director of the Mint in his annual report for the year 1894, page 15, was 168,674,682.53 ounces of fine silver, costing $155,931,-062.25. This report shows that there has been coined of this bullion 38,531,-142 silver dollars. The amount wasted by the assay officers and sold as sweeps was 63,570.37 ounces fine silver, leaving a balance on November 1, 1894, of 138,869,081.28 ounces fine silver. The coinage value of the bullion now in the Treasury, according to this report, is 179,471,103 dollars, showing a gain of seigniorage of $54,-369,719.36.

According to the report of the Director of the Mint referred to, page 13, we had coined, under what is known as the Bland-Allison act, 378,163,793 standard silver dollars; and under the act of July 4, 1890, or what is called the Sherman law, $38,531,143, and ont of the trade dollar bullion we had coined 85,078,472, making the total coinage of the standard dollars since 1873 to November, 1894, $421,776,408. The amount of standard silver dollars coined since the latter date will not greatly vary this total.

The next battle on the silver question was at the second session of this Congress, the Fifty-first. Senator Stewart of Nevada moved to lay aside the federal election bill, then pending in the Senate, and to take up free coinage bill No. 4675. To this bill Mr. Vest of Missonri offered a substitute bill, also for free coinage, which was agreed to, yeas 39, nays 27. This free coinage bill came to the House and was referred to the Committee on Coinage, Weights and Measures. After protracted delay in the committee Mr. Conger, the chairman of the committee, reported the bill back with an adverse recommendation, and no further action was taken.

The next or Fifty-second Congress assembled the first Monday in December, 1891, and elected Mr. Crisp of Georgia Speaker of the House. There was a great contest over the silver question at the first session of this Congress pending the Presidential election.

The Committee on Coinage, Weights and Measures reported a free coinage bill, which was taken up and considered by the House for three days, and on the evening of the third day, March 24, 1892, I moved the previous question on its final passage. Mr. Burrows of Michigan moved to lay the bill on the table. On this motion the vote was 148 for tabling the bill and 148 against it. The Speaker voted against tabling the bill, making the vote stand for tabling 148 and 149 against it. Filibustering motions were then resorted to by motions to reconsider the vote to table the bill, motions for adjournment and for recess. These motions were interposed until it became evident that no vote could be had on the bill without a cloture rule. The House, at a late hour of the night, adjourned with the nnderstanding that the Committee on Rnles would bring in a cloture rule for the purpose of bringing the bill to a final vote. No snch rule, however, was reported, and no final vote was taken upon the bill.

The Senate, however, during this session, and in July, 1892, took np and passed a free coinage bill by a vote of yeas 29, nays 25. This bill was sent to the House and referred on July 5 to the Committee on Coinage, Weights and Measures. The Coinage Committee reported the bill back to the House with the recommendation that it do pass. The Committee on Rnles brought in a clotnre rnle for the purpose of compelling a vote upon this bill, but the resolution was defeated by a vote of 136 yeas, 154 nays, thus defeating the consideration of the bill, and no further attempt was made to pass it.

The Presidential election of 1892 took place in November after the adjonrnment of the first session of the Fifty-second Congress and resulted in the election of Mr. Cleveland over Mr. Harrison.

THE SHERMAN LAW.

Immediately after the election of Mr. Cleveland the anti-silver forces of the country organized for the purpose of secnring a repeal of the so-called Sherman law. The bankers and bondholders of this conntry, aided and snpported by the bankers and bondholders of Europe, commenced raiding the Treasnry gold and deliberately set to work to bring on a stringency in the money market and to raise the hue and cry against silver as the cause of the stringency. The money changers of England induced that Government to suspend the free coinage of silver for India. This was done early in the summer of 1893, and evidently for the purpose of affecting legislation in this country on the silver question. No sooner had the British Government snspended free coinage of silver in India than this fact was seized npon by the gold standard people in this country as a firther excnse to make war npon silver here. This war npon silver canscd great consternation throughont this country and the world.

To give a further "object lesson," as it was called, to teach the people the bad effects of silver coinage, the banking institutions of England and of this country began a systematic process of hoarding money, drawing in their loans and refnsing advances to their customers, thns precipitating what was called—and properly called—a bankers' panic. Probably it was not intended to bring abont snch a severe panic as ensned; bnt the people generally became alarmed, not because they were afraid of silver money or that they distrnsted our money in any sense, bnt on the contrary, in their eagerness to possess their money and hold it, they made a run on the banks, withdrawlng deposits, showing that it was the banks they distrnsted and not the money of the country. These runs npon the banking Institntions caused many to fail; a widespread and disastrous panic ensued.

The object lesson was now complete. England had done her part in stopping the coinage of silver in India; the banking Institntions of this country and the Eastern metropolitan press together had terrorized the people into a general panic.

The President called Congress together amid all this excitement to consider the silver question. Congress assembled in special session under the call of the President August 7, 1893. The President's message to Congress demanded the nnconditional repeal of the pnrchasing clause of the Sherman law, argning that with this law wiped from the statnte books prosperity wonld again come to the people.

This was the most critical time for silver legislation since the demonetization act of 1873. The friends of silver in this country and the world knew that the snspension of the free coinage of silver in India, coupled with the suspension of all the pnrchases and coinage in this country, wonld contract currency throughont the world, cause panics in the silver market and a further divergence between the relative valne of gold and silver. The friends of bimetallism also knew that this war on silver would necessarily make a great demand for gold, and thns send np gold in the market. Shonld gold be the sole standard of valuation, the advance of gold, which is but another name for the depreciation in the price of all property, except mortgages, bonds and taxes, would be ruinons to the conntry.

Mr. Wilson of West Virginia, on August 11, 1893, introduced a bill to repeal a part of an act approved July 14, 1890, entitled "An act directing the purchase of silver bullion and the issuance of treasury notes thereon, and for other purposes." This bill provided for the repeal of so much of the Sherman law as authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase monthly 4,500,000 ounces of silver bullion and issue Treasury notes in payment for the bullion. To this bill I offered an amendment or substitute providing for the free coinage of silver at the present ratio of 15.98 to 1.

Under an order of the House the bill was debated for two weeks and a vote taken upon the substitute, submitting a free coinage proposition at various ratios, beginning with 16 to 1, going up to 17, 18, 19 and 20 to 1. To set forth the truth of the history of this fight for the repeal of the purchase clause of the Sherman law it is necessary to say that the friends of free coinage had no hopes of securing the enactment of a free coinage law at any ratio. It was well known that Mr. Cleveland would veto such a bill.

It was, however, vainly hoped that we could secure some amendment to the repeal bill that would either result in the defeat of the bill or greatly mitigate the consequences of the repeal; hence, while we were in favor of the free coinage of silver at the present legal ratio of 16 to 1, we did not hesitate to offer and vote for ratios up to 20 to 1, believing that any amendments of this character would result in the defeat of the repeal.

Again, it put to the test the sincerity of those who are fighting silver coinage at the present ratio by compelling them to vote for free coinage at a greater ratio or to demonstrate the insincerity of their professed friendship for bimetallism. The result of this experiment showed that practically the only real friends of bimetallism were those who advocated and adhered to the justice of free coinage of silver at the present legal ratio. The vote for free coinage at 16 to 1, or the present legal ratio, showed yeas 125, nays 227; for free coinage at 17 to 1, yeas 106, nays 240; 18 to 1, yeas 102, nays 239; 19 to 1, yeas 105, nays 239; at 20 to 1, yeas 122, nays 222.

It is proven by this record that the strongest proposition before the House was for the free coinage at the present legal ratio; that no gains were made by an attempted change of the ratio, but, on the contrary, it weakened the coinage proposition.

After all free coinage propositions were voted down I offered a further amendment, restoring the law of February 28, 1878. On this proposition the yeas were 126, nays 223.

After voting down all proposed amendments the repeal bill passed the House by a vote of 239 yeas and 108 nays. This extraordinary vote against silver was one of the most remarkable transactions that ever took place in the American Congress. Impartial history would show that this result was secured by methods most reprehensible and deplorable. The moneyed power of this country and Europe had sought to bring our people and their representatives into complete subjection. Debtors everywhere were threatened with the pressure of foreclosure and bankruptcy; the owners of money absolutely refused relief to the people. A corner on money had been executed, business was prostrated in every section of the land; a reign of terror was thus brought about. Resolutions were formulated in blank in Wall street and telegraphed to the various Chambers of Commerce and Boards of Trade throughout the country, with requests for their adoption, demanding the repeal of the purchase clause of the Sherman act. The vast debts throughout the country were pressed for collection, and when debtors went to the banks to secure loans to meet their obligations they were coolly told that it was not safe to loan money until the repeal of the purchase clause of the Sherman act.

It was insisted by the money lenders that so soon as this act was repealed money would be plentiful, would be loaned without stint, and prosperity would immediately return. This pressure induced the people to petition Congress for the repeal of this act, and the result of all was an overwhelming vote in the House for its repeal.

The bill went to the Senate. There it met with a stubborn opposition, for at the time the bill passed the House and went to the Senate it was well known and understood that a majority of Senators were opposed to the repeal; but the same pressure was used to pass the bill in the Senate as had been resorted to in the House. All offers of compromise were spurned; unconditional repeal was demanded by the money power as the only salvation to the people; for without it the money that was hoarded and cornered would be held until an impoverished people were brought into subjection and compelled to yield to the demands of greed. The repeal bill of the House was reported from the Finance Committee of the Senate by Mr. Voorhees, chairman of this committee, and with a few unimportant amendments, and was taken up in the Senate on the 28th day of August and debated until the 30th day of October, at which time all amendments that had been offered were voted down except the committee amendments, which were agreed to, and the bill passed on the 30th day of October and was sent to the House.

The House agreed to these amendments and the bill finally passed the House of Representatives November 1 and was approved by the President on the second day of November, 1893. The debates in the House and Senate on this bill were probably the ablest and most prolonged discussion of the money question that ever took place in any parliamentary body. The friends of silver predicted then precisely what has taken place. They predicted a great appreciation of gold, a depreciation of prices, hard times and business stagnation as the result of silver demonetization. These things have come to pass. The friends of gold monometallism insisted that the repeal of the Sherman act would restore confidence throughout the country, invite an inflow of gold to our shores, and would bring universal prosperity; just the reverse has occurred.

We have sold bonds to the amount of $162,000,000 since the repeal, in order to check the flow of gold from our shores and to maintain the single gold standard. People everywhere have been out of employment and business prostration generally prevailing; unrest and discontent with this legislation still exists and the great masses of the people believe to-day that their only hope for future prosperity is a full and complete restoration of silver coinage.

AN OBJECT LESSON.

But the Allied Money Powers Taught the People Something.

The gold monometallists have given the people an object lesson, indeed—one that they will not forget; an object lesson that has been the best educator in favor of bimetallism that could have possibly taken place. The demonetization of silver in 1873 and our failure since to fully restore it, has caused gold to go up to a premium over silver bullion and commodities to over 25 cents on the dollar. The combination of the plutocrats of the old world that secured the suspension of free coinage of silver in India to furnish an argument and pretext for the plutocrats of this country to demand the repeal of the silver law here, have accomplished their purpose, and by these repeal laws sent gold up another 25 or 30 cents on the dollar.

Notwithstanding this hostile legislation against silver, silver will purchase as much of commodities now as it would in 1873, showing that it is a more equitable and honest measure of value than gold.

These speculators in gold, bonds and mortgages, having forced gold up and forced up all debts payable in gold, and forced down the prices of commodities and silver, now insist that they have made the chasm so wide between the value of gold and the silver bullion that the people are helpless to remedy it and coolly ask, "What are you going to do about it?"

Some people who still claim to be bimetallists insist that we must now change the ratio of silver to gold by coining silver at its present commercial value, measured in gold. A cool proposition, indeed, having put gold up near double what it ought to be, to insist on such a ratio.

To all these we answer: First, in the words of the late Mr. Windom, then Secretary of the Treasury under Mr. Harrison, in his annual report for 1889, page 73, speaking of a change of ratio: "The paramount objection to this plan, however, is that it would have a direct tendency to prevent any rise in the value of silver; seizing it at its present low price, the law would, in effect, declare that it must remain there forever, so far as its uses for coinage are concerned." Again we answer, that to coin silver at the present ratio to gold would be a decree that gold, now confessedly enormously enhanced in value, should forever maintain that position. And again, to coin silver at the present commercial ratio presupposes the melting down of 421,000,000 silver dollars we now have in circulation, and recoining them at one-half their value. In other words, this would wipe out practically one-half of the silver dollars we have coined. The shortest cut to this end would be to repeal their legal tender power; in this way would we directly enact the zeal of the gold bugs.

This scheme will not do; we will bridge the chasm by reversing the laws that caused the difficulty. France, for 70 years, by the open mints of her country for free coinage of gold and silver at 15½ to 1, maintained the two metals at a parity at this ratio. As was well stated by the British Royal Commission of 1888, France was enabled to do this because she was a

ration of great commercial powers and had sufficient wealth, property and commodities to make the exchange by selling her commodities and wealth as much for 15½ ounces of silver as for one ounce of gold. France maintained this parity even after Germany and the United States had both demonetized silver. The par was never broken until the mints of France were closed to the free coinage of silver.

Cernuschi, an eminent writer of France on the silver question, in the hearings before the United States Silver Commission of 1876, volume 2, page 484, speaking of the limitation put on the coinage of silver by France in 1874, stated: "France committed a great mistake when, in 1874, after the example of Belgium, she limited the coinage of silver. This has been a great mistake. If France had continued to coin silver freely, the German silver would have flowed into France, and some gold of France would have flowed into Germany, but silver would have maintained everywhere its value relatively to gold. In limiting the mintage, a difference has been created between the value of the bullion and value of the coin."

The population of our country nearly doubles that of France; likewise our wealth and need for money exceeds that of France in about the same proportion. France in territory is not larger than the State of Texas. Surely if it was a mistake for France to limit the coinage of silver, after the United States and Germany had demonetized it, it would be no mistake for this great country to restore it. For we have the wealth to be exchanged for gold and silver at our ratio, and silver restored here will be at a par practically the world over; for the very simple reason that silver, no matter where found, whether in this country or other countries, would buy as much of our property as gold would buy. No one holding silver would, no matter where located on the civilized globe, take any less for it than he would for gold, so long as he could get in this country in exchange for his silver as much of our wealth as he could for his gold.

This is the doctrine laid down by the Royal Commission of 1888 and assented to by all of them, although one-half of the commissiou were gold monometallists.

To coin silver at the present commercial ratio of silver to gold, after having by hostile legislation created the difference in the value of the two, would be an outrage upon justice, a robbery of creditors and the people. It would simply mean, by legislative decree, to say that the present status of silver demonetization shall remain for all future time; that silver shall never take its place as of old, at the old ratio, as the equal of gold in commerce.

But the gold monometallist insists that from natural causes gold has been selected to the exclusion of silver as the money of commerce. Of all the lies that have been told, and they are many, about silver, this is the most damnable and indefensible. Everybody knows, who is conversant at all with this question, that this state of things has been brought about, not by natural laws, but by artificial means—brought about by closing the mints of commerce against the coinage of silver. For thousands of years before these laws hostile to silver were put in force, silver stood as the equal of gold in all the transactions of national and international trade. Hostile legislation, secured for the purpose of enhancing the value of the holdings of owners of incomes, of mortgages, bonds and debts, causes silver to be shut out. The causes of silver exclusion have not been natural unless it be in that sense in which in our modern times it seems to have become natural for one set of people to cheat, wrong and defraud another set.

As to the fact that commodities generally fall with the fall of silver or the rise of gold, I first refer to the tables of Mr. Sauerbeck in his index numbers, copied in the coinage laws of the United States, 1792 to 1894, pages 431, 432 and 433. The same facts are admitted by the British Royal Commission before referred to, pages 17 and 18. Not longer than a year ago Sir Guilford Molesworth, an officer of Great Britain in the service of India, makes the following statement corroborative of the position I have taken: "It is a very common fallacy in England to attribute the fall in gold prices to improved manufacture, production and transport; but it is absurd to suppose that these causes should affect in so marked a manner one standard of value (gold) and yet leave the other (silver, which is the standard of two-thirds of the world) unaffected; for, though gold prices have fallen heavily, silver prices have remained very steady throughout the world. Moreover, these alleged causes have been in continuous operation during the greater part of the century, and therefore the fall of prices, if due to such causes, should have been spread gradually over the whole period subjected to such influences; but, on the contrary, both gold and silver prices had risen considerably during the fifteen years preceding 1873, and were steadily rising. It was only after 1873 that gold prices suddenly fell to an extent that has been perfectly appalling."

The contention of the gold standard people that we must have the same money that Europe has, that we must have the gold standard because Europe has the gold standard, would require us next year, should Europe adopt the single silver standard, to also adopt the single silver standard, to be in harmony with Europe. We can have no independence on the greatest of all questions, the money question. We were once independent and our independence was secured against the power of England when there were but three millions of us. Shall we now bow to England when we are seventy millions of people?

The single gold standard forced by the money powers of Europe upon their Governments has practically enslaved the people of that continent. European influence is at work to bring the American people into subjection to the plutocracy of that country and to their aiders and abettors in this. The power of money is confessedly great. The power to issue money is a sovereign power belonging to the people through their Government. A limited and contracted currency or a system of currency that necessitates continued contraction and fall of prices is a system of tyranny most grinding and oppressive. No people can maintain their freedom if they submit to it; hence, to maintain our free institutions it is absolutely necessary that we maintain our independence and sovereign power of issuing money. This great power the people cannot surrender at the dictation of gold gamblers of Europe and of this country.

I have digressed from my theme further than I had intended, but what I have said, I hope, is pertinent to the matter under discussion.

The next great contest came up in the House of Representatives in the first regular session of this same Congress. This fight occurred on what is commonly called the seigniorage bill. This bill provided for the coinage of all silver bullion held in the Treasury, purchased under the provision of the Sherman act; that the seigniorage or gain arising from the purchase of said bullion, amounting to about $55,000,000 should be first coined and used in payment of public expenditures; that after the coinage of the seigniorage, the remainder of the bullion should be coined as fast as possible and the coin used for the purpose of redeemin the Treasury notes, issued for the purchase of the bullion.

This bill was taken up February 7, 1894, and debated for several days, but when an attempt was made to bring the House to a vote upon the bill, filibustering motions were resorted to, led by Mr. Tracey of New York, and Mr. Reed of Maine; and the bill was thus tied up in the House from February 7, until February 23, when the Committee on Rules reported a rule cutting off all filibustering actions, bringing the House to a direct vote. This rule was adopted and a vote compelled upon the bill and amendments. The House voted on various amendments and motions to recommit, and finally passed the bill by a vote of yeas, 168; nays, 120.

The bill went to the Senate March 5, 1894, and was taken up and passed the Senate precisely as it passed the House, yeas, 44; nays, 31. This bill was vetoed by the President and taken up in the House April 4; and on a roll call to pass the bill, notwithstanding the objections of the President the yeas were 144, nays, 114; the constitution requiring two-thirds to pass a bill over the veto of the President, the bill failed.

The first session of this Congress adjourned without any further efforts on the silver question. Before the reassembling of the Fifty-third Congress, the first Monday in December, 1893, in the short session, the bankers and money changers of Wall street and Europe set to work to bring another pressure on Congress. They raided the Treasury of its gold, and before Congress met another $50,000,000 of bonds were issued. After Congress met another issue of $62,000,000 was made. It was now contended that we should retire the greenbacks, and even silver certificates and silver dollars, and issue bonds payable specifically in gold.

The relation this fight had to the silver question is apparent. The bondholders and money lenders of this country and Europe are determined, if they can possibly bring it about, to compel this government to abandon its sovereign power of coining money and issuing it by the Treasury itself, except gold, and to turn over to bondholders and banking corporations of Europe and Wall street, the control of the volume of our money.

These various propositions, however, were defeated, one after another. So

that the question now remains for the people to determine in their future elections for President and Congress which system shall prevail; that is to say, whether we are to have the free and unlimited coinage of both gold and silver—the money of our Constitution—the money supply to come from the people's government, or whether we are to abandon the bimetallic system and enter upon that system that contemplates nothing but gold for legal tender money, and national bank notes issued by corporations—misnamed "sound money"—to supplement it. This is the future fight on the money question.

In conclusion, attention should be called to the fact that heretofore no President of the United States since 1873 has been a friend of silver. Mr. Hayes vetoed a limited coinage bill. It is well known that every President since that time has been hostile to free coinage and would veto any such bill if sent to him. This has had the effect of discouraging Congress in all these contests. I have reason to believe that silver would long ago have been restored to its old place in our system of money had there been a President of the United States favorable to it. It is well known that the Senate today is overwhelmingly in favor of free coinage and will probably remain so for all future time.

The battle to be fought, and the all-important point to gain, is to secure a President who will sign a free coinage bill if sent to him and who will not use the power and patronage of his office to prevent such a bill coming to him, but, on the contrary, will recommend such legislation. If we can once secure such a President the battle is won. To this point all our energies in the future must be directed.

It is not my purpose, and would be out of place in a non-partisan lecture or speech of this character, to indicate how that may be brought about further than to express the hope that every true friend of the free coinage of silver will make a firm resolve and stand to it, that he will not support in any manner a presidential candidate, no matter how nominated or what party platform he stands on, unless that platform and candidate give assurance of silver resteration.

Chairman A. J. Warner of the Bimetallic League now delivered his opening address:

"The most extraordinary condition of affairs," said he, "meets the assembling of this convention. Almost perfect peace prevails over the world. The earth is yet yielding her fruits in abundance and rich harvests are being gathered under favoring skies. There is enough and to spare, and yet never before in the history of the country has there been such widespread fear and distress, never before such loss of confidence and destruction of credit. Industries are everywhere breaking down and laborers are thrown workless on the streets, with want staring them in the face. Scores of banks, most of them prudently managed and showing assets which under ordinary circumstances would place them above suspicion, are driven to suspension. There has been a shrinking of hundreds of millions in the value of stocks and other property, and in agricultural products. To lay all this condition to the silver purchasing law is absurd. Under this law, since 1890, $150,000,000 have been added to our currency. Does anybody believe the presence of this $150,000,000 makes money scarce and dear? Would we be better off if we were out of it?

"The real object lesson of the situation is very different from that which the gold conspirators intended. It enables us to see the beginning of the shrinkage in prices that must take place in order to go to a purely gold basis. This is the trouble in the change in the money standard. The value of money may be doubled either by doubling the weight of standard coins or by destroying half of the metal out of which coins are made. One is as effective as the other. The establishment of a single gold standard is the same as putting the value of two dollars into one. It is doubling the unit and putting property down one-half. That is what is hurting. The talk of such a standard as honest money and such a policy as sound finances is rank and hypocritical."

Referring to the act of 1873, Chairman Warner said: "The members of Congress, the Speaker of the House who signed that bill, the President who approved, never knew that it demonetized silver. There was but one man in the Senate who knew the act demonetized silver; and yet he has never been hung and shot for treason. (Great applause.) That act will be known in history as the crime of 1873. Let the memories of those who stand connected with it rot in oblivion." (Applause.)

Continuing he said he was willing to have its act of 1890 repealed if its other Sherman law, its act of 1873, can be repealed by the same bill. Let both Sherman laws go together and place the country back on the constitution

and the law as it stood before 1873. In his conclusion the speaker denounced the metropolitan newspapers of the country as being controlled by the money power and characterized their editorials as being but the inspiration and the bidding of the goldbugs instead of the conscientious expressions of the writers.

After Mr. Warner had concluded the convention proceeded to the appointment of committees. A committee on credentials was appointed, consisting of one member from each State. On motion of ex-Congressman Symes of Colorado, the chairman was authorized to appoint a committee of five on permanent organization. As this committee the chairman named Symes, Ragan of Texas, Stark of Ohio, Washburn of Massachusetts and Fullinwider of Illinois. A committee consisting of one delegate from each State was authorized to be appointed on rules and order of business, this appointment to be by the various State and Territorial delegations. The committee on Permanent Organization was also authorized to select a larger hall in which to hold the sessions of the convention.

The convention then adjourned till 2:30 p. m.

On reassembling the Committee on Permanent Organization reported recommending Hon. Allen W. Thurman of Ohio, son of the "Old Roman," as permanent Chairman of the convention. The report was ratified by a unanimous vote and Chairman Thurman being introduced by the retiring Chairman was received with great applause and spoke as follows:

"Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen: The fight between those who think the circulating medium of this country should be hard money—that is, real money, gold and silver, and paper redeemable in the same—and those who believe in the use of soft money—that is, paper promises to pay money, redeemable in other promises to pay—is on. Since the late demand in the East to have the Government issue bonds and the cry now made for the unconditional repeal of the Sherman law, charging it, regardless of facts, with all the ills flesh is heir to, ought to make this perfectly apparent to every thinking man; for should the Sherman law be repealed without substituting anything in lieu thereof, it means the final destruction of silver money as a measure of value, and no man can tell if it will ever be restored to its former place. This means for years and years to come, its reduction to token money, after which the issue resolves itself down simply to the question whether the paper money of the country is to be issued by banks upon the debts of the people, or upon other kinds of corporate securities, or if it is to rest upon the broad and safe basis of gold and silver. This is so, because gold alone certainly cannot afford a sufficient basis upon which the amount of circulating medium required by the people of this country can safely rest."

No blister draws sharper than interest on money. It works day and night; in fair weather and foul. It gnaws at a man's substance with invisible teeth. It binds industry with its film, as a fly is bound with a spider's webb. Debt rolls a man over and over, binding him hand and foot, and letting him hang on the fatal mesh till the long-legged interest devours him. One had better make his bed of Canada thistles than attempt to lie at ease upon interest.—H. W. Beecher.

MISFITS IN FINANCE.

Popular Fallacies Shown in Legislation on the Currency Question.

New York, April 8.—Society seems to progress not steadily, but by jerks. An era of quick advancement follows and is succeeded by a period of stagnation or retrogression. Again, while in some lines the evolution of the race is going forward under a full head of steam, other branches of thought and action are neglected. Perhaps we may go on a step further and say that excessive energy applied along some lines in itself hinders progress in other lines, or that there are occasional returns to ignorance and barbarism which are the results of over-rapid progress in civilization. It is only in such ways as this that we can explain modern tendencies away from enlightened ideas of government and towards paternalism and kindred evils. The prevailing idea of the paternalist is the desire to lean on something stronger and richer for support. If things are not right, the Government must make them right, and if the Government fails to make everybody rich and happy, then the people will elect a new government which will perform its obvious duty to its constituents.

The paternalist idea as applied to the currency is that the Government must make money for the people. If each person has not enough money the Government must make more. It must keep on making more until everybody shall have enough. This idea, in more or less direct form, appears in much of our currency legislation since the war. The perfect flower of this idea is the absurd Sherman law of 1890. The root of the fallacy lies in the failure to realize what money is. Money is a medium of exchange. It is some commodity or commodities set apart for the exchange of other commodities. Obviously, then, there must first be the other commodities and the desire to exchange them. The money comes in to facilitate the exchange. This view is the essence of all thought about the currency question. The exchange of commodities is the first thing.. The money is brought in simply to facilitate the exchange. Moreover, all real money is itself a commodity of an actual value equal to the value it represents. Or it may be a paper representative of that commodity. The power of the Government may be invoked to regulate the measurement, to act as a sort of arbitrator between the two persons desiring to exchange commodities to determine how much gold or silver or copper or nickel shall go into one coin, how much into another, to put its stamp on the pieces of metal and give names to them. That is as far as the Government has a right to go.

The great thinkers on political economy are agreed on this; that is, so far as they have ever considered the subject at all. For it is something new, the development of paternalism in currency as in other things. It is an outgrowth of civilization, just as Anarchist destruction of property in the name of organized labor. Like them it is a poisonous fungus of the flower. Nearly all men of the present time who have given trained thought to the subject are agreed on the limit of the government power to interfere in money matters. More important still the constitution of the United States in distinct terms presents these limits of the power of the government. It declares that Congress shall have the power to "coin money, regulate the value thereof and of foreign coins." This is the limit of the power which the constitution gives. The framers of that wonderful document seem now almost have been inspired, so grand, simple and obedient to scientific law are the few precepts which they established for the government of the country of

whose greatness they did not dream. They were not confused by ideas that the Government must create money and give it to its people, nor that the Government must act as the tool of the producers of any particular commodity or any class or community anxious to escape its just debts. They recognized that money is a medium of exchange, that its sole legitimate purpose is to facilitate the exchange of commodities. The few simple words of the constitution quoted above state all the functions of money and the functions of the Government in relation to money.

Measured by this standard, how preposterous seems our currency system of to-day, a mass of heterogeneous elements, in a large measure the result of government interference in matters which should be purely private as between debtor and creditor, the fruit of many perverted and ignorant minds, and of the scheming of interested factions. The trouble began with the issue of greenbacks for war purposes. This was entirely proper in view of the extraordinary circumstances, and it was justified by the constitution, which empowers Congress "to borrow money on the credit of the United States." These greenbacks were simply notes representing borrowed money. They were not money at all. But when the people saw how they passed as money, how they apparently answered all the functions of money, and how they could be issued indefinitely, limited only by the power of the presses, the mischief was done. The poison had entered their minds and with dangerous sweetness was turning them from the stern precepts on which they had been reared. Having seen how easily, apparently, the government could make money, and also feeling that they would like more money themselves, they called on their representatives in Congress to make more. When they perceived that the more money was issued the easier it was to pay their debts previously contracted, they were still more anxious for it. This represented another step in the progress of moral incline. Then came the producers of silver and the larger class more or less directly affected by the prosperity of the produced. They demanded that the increased money should be silver. And so the monstrosity grew until now we find the government up to its ears in its banking business and nearly swamped, not only coining money for the benefit of holders who may bring it for that purpose as the constitution intended, but purchasing silver to the extent of over the entire national product, issuing notes on the same and redeeming these in gold worth more than the silver bullion on which the notes were issued.

The financial functions of a government begin and end with the collection of money to pay its running expenses and disbursement of money for these expenses. The coinage of money for the owners of bullion is not a financial operation, but a mechanical one. In view of the fact that paper has been found more convenient than coin, the meaning of the constitution has been so stretched as to permit the government to issue notes against gold and silver deposited, instead of coining the bullion for the owners. Then the government duty would be to so regulate the value and amount of bullion for which these notes should be given that every dollar should be the equal of every dollar at home and abroad.

SILVER IN HISTORY.

The False Money Panic in England and Its Solution.

(A chapter from Macauley.)

The financial panic in England just two hundred years ago presented many points of similarity to the crisis through which the United States is now passing.

Observe how simple and effective was the remedy! Among the many problems which embarrassed the historic reign of William of Orange, not the least was the question of the recoinage of silver. It is the old story, often repeated, that the adjustment, when it becomes necessary, of the financial standards of any country is inevitably attended with at least a temporary disturbance of trade.

THE FINANCIAL EVIL.

Says Macauley in writing of the assembling of Parliament in 1695: "The silver coin, which was then the standard coin of the realm, was in a state at which the boldest and most enlightened statesman stood aghast."—History of England, chapter xxi.

Up to within a short period the coin had been struck by primitive processes, being shaped and stamped by the hammer. The pieces, being rudely made, could be pared down with little danger of the mutilation attracting attention. Coin-clipping had grown to be a very common kind of fraud. At first disregarded, so great at last did the evil become that "in 1695 it could hardly be said that the country possessed for practical purposes any measure of value of commodities." A half-crown or shilling of full weight was almost a curiosity. The bad effects resulting from this state of the currency can be readily imagined. All pecuniary transactions were thrown into confusion. For lack of some fixed standard of value men could not safely contract without some stipulation, not always convenient to make, as to the quality of coin in which payments were to be made. The officers of the exchequer, having as an experiment weighed £57,000 in hammered money, recently paid in, found the weight scarcely one-half what it should have been. The great instrument of exchange being deranged, "all trade, all industry was smitten as with a palsy." "It may well be doubted," says Macaulay, "whether all the misery which had been inflicted on the English nation in a quarter of a century of bad Kings, bad Ministers, bad parliaments and bad judges was equal to the misery caused in a single year by bad crowns and bad shillings."

ONE REMEDY.

The Government had sought to provide a remedy by improved methods of coinage. The pieces were no longer struck by hand, but were turned out by machinery. Their shape being exactly circular and the edges inscribed, clipping was not easy, nor was counterfeiting as practicable.

But the remedy did not work. The old hammered pieces and the new milled coins being current together and alike receivable for public and consequently private dues, it was found that the perfect coins disappeared from circulation. In other words, bad and good money being on the same footing, the good money was driven out, so while the Government mint issued the new money by the wagon-load it did not reappear in the "till of the grocer or the wallet of the farmer."

"The politicians of the day marvelled exceedingly that everybody should be so perverse as to use light money in preference to good money. In other words, they marvelled that nobody chose to pay twelve ounces of silver when ten would serve the turn."

Another remedy was demanded. The obvious one was of course to call in the old money for recoinage and to declare it to be no longer legal tender after a certain date, and this measure was at last decided upon. But there were inconveniences and difficulties attending this course. In the first place the collection of the currency for the purpose of recoinage would produce for a time a deficiency in the amount in circulation. Then there would be the loss in value between the old coin and the new. The first trouble was provided

against to some extent. But it was in arranging the second that the political mountebank got in his work.

On the one hand it looked like a hardship that those who happened at the time to hold the mutilated coin should lose the large difference between their real weight and their stamped value. On the other hand, it would amount to a large tax on the public for the Government to make good the difference to the holders.

It was at this point that the speculous proposition was made that the standard of the coins should be lowered, that the new shilling should be worth only ninepence half-penny. This measure was urged by a large party as a ready solution of the matter.

Parliament, it is true, passed a recoinage act which provided for recoining the money of the realm according to the old standard. But this did not stop the agitation of the measures to lower the standard. This was of course popular with thousands who were willing to pay a debt of £100 with money worth only £80. And thousands of others seemed dull enough to suppose that the Government by calling ninepence a shilling could make them equal to twelvepence, forgetting that Government can only fix the standard of money, but cannot give it value, just as Government can fix the number of cubic inches in a quart, so that men in buying and selling by the quart can know what it will mean, but it cannot make less than that worth as much as so many cubic inches.

England was threatened by this proposition with an act of wholesale confiscation for the benefit of the Government and of the debtor class.

The very agitation of such a measure, backed as it was by a large party, was a severe shock to credit.

The advocates of the measure seized upon the temporary confusion necessarily resulting from the calling in of the currency for recoinage as an excuse for urging its adoption. They declared that the depression was entirely caused by the failure of Parliament to adopt their proposition, and, as a new Parliament was to assemble, strenuous efforts were made to elect members committed to the policy of lowering the standard.

It became the great issue in the elections. The people were harangued at every place of public resort, "from the chocolate-house in St. James street to the sanded kitchen of the ale-house on the village green."

In verse and prose the suffering multitude were incited to rise in rebellion, and to tear in pieces the members of Parliament who had stood firm for honest money. Tumults occurred in many places. The very depression of which these agitators complained was increased tenfold by the announcement of their proposed method of relieving it. Especially did this result follow when the general voice of the nation seemed for a time to favor the measure, and there was a prospect, at least, of its being adopted. The old coin since the recoinage act had been hurried to the exchequer in large quantities, and, being put under the ban, had almost become worthless as a medium of exchange. The new milled coins and gold did not come into circulation to take its place. For, with the prospect of the cheaper money, no one cared to pay out gold and standard silver. This was hoarded. "No person who thought it probable that at a day not far distant he would be able to pay a debt of a pound with three crown pieces instead of four, was willing to part with a crown piece until that day arrived." Besides, no person cared to lend money or sell on credit, with the prospect of having to receive payment in money of less intrinsic value. Thus, there was not only almost a total absence of money in circulation, but all trade and enterprise were at a standstill. The cry of distress went up from every corner of the kingdom.

Even opulent men could not obtain ready money to pay the weekly bill of the baker and the butcher. The Bank of England could pay only 15 per cent on its notes.

But this cruel agony, which extended over a number of months and produced the crash of many fortunes, was to suddenly give way to a period of unbroken prosperity.

Parliament met. All eyes were turned to it. Would the demands of the political mountebanks prevail? Would the Government make itself the laughing stock of the business world by trying to enrich the country by calling 7 pence 12 pence? Would it continue the depression of commerce by failing to provide a currency which would be received at its stamped value, not only in London, but in Amsterdam or Calcutta? Would it commit the blunder of driving out good money by issuing money having only an artificial value? Would it forever ruin public credit by a wholesale confiscation of debts?

Never did more hang in the balance. A mistake here would have been a calamity, compared with which the loss of the entire fleet and the defeat of the army would have been blessings.

But the genius of Montague, the young Secretary of the Treasury, was equal to the crisis. With heroic firm-

ness and unparalleled eloquence, he made the fight for honest money and won. After a stormy debate, "which resounded through all Christendom," Parliament at last, by an overwhelming vote, resolved that "the standard of the money of the Kingdom should not be altered in fineness, weight or denomination."

The defeat of the agitation this time was complete. The country again breathed freely. One stroke of statesmanship had turned the shadow of death into morning. "Within four days," says Macaulay, "there was a perceptible improvement in trade." The tide turned. "From the moment the Commons declared their fixed determination to maintain the standard of the currency, the milled money began to come forth from a thousand strong boxes and private drawers." Great quantities of gold were turned loose from secret corners and from behind the panels of wainscots.

"The dead corpse of public credit rose and stood upon its feet."

Business confidence recovered from the most tremendous shock it had ever sustained, and "the deep and solid foundation had been laid in which was to rise the most gigantic fabric of commercial prosperity that the world has ever seen." And this happy transformation was the result of establishing in the policy of the Government one simple proposition:

"That the words pounds and shillings should have a fixed signification that every man should know what his contract meant and what his property was worth.

SILVER IN HISTORY.

It is supposed that silver was used as money metal earlier than gold, but the date at which either was first employed for this purpose is unknown. We do know, however, that both were in use long before the beginning of the Christian era. Genesis tells us that Abraham returned from Egypt "very rich in cattle, in silver and gold," and in one of his purchases he paid to the children of Heth "400 shekels of silver, current money with the merchant." This is the earliest authentic record that we have of a transaction in which money was employed, and this deal took place somewhere about twenty centuries before Christ, as chronology is ordinarily reckoned.

But the money metals at that age passed by weight. Coinage had not yet been devised. At each transaction the metal had to be weighed out, its purity having first been ascertained. The metals were fashioned in the shape of bars or wedges, and were of different sizes, though even then a great deal of cutting or breaking must have had to be done to make the correct "change." This method was slow, cumbrous and wasteful, and, of course, offered great opportunities for cheating. It was often difficult to get at the exact purity of the metal with the crude processes of the time and the variation in the scales, which was not uncommon, must have sometimes been sufficient to make an important difference in the value of the metal used as the medium of exchange. These drawbacks did not disappear until coinage came into vogue.

But clumsy and uncertain as was this system of exchange, it was simple and eminently scientific compared with those which prevailed among all peoples at an earlier day, and among some peoples at a later day. In the beginning, of course—that is, in a state of savagery—when wants were few and simple, each person supplied his own needs. The wild beasts which he killed furnished him food and their skins with clothing, while his stone tools enabled him to fashion the rude wooden framework of the habitations which he built after he had got tired of living in caves and mud huts. Later on, as the gregarious instinct began to operate, and communities began to be formed, a system of barter began, by which, for example, corn and wheat was exchanged for cloth or cattle. This system in turn, in the evolution of barbaric and half-civilized society, was displaced by a scheme which brought into vogue certain specific commodities as instruments of exchange.

The ancient Spartans used iron as measures of price, the Carthaginians leather, the old Syracusans and Britains tin, the Greeks and the early Scots nails, the Chinese pieces of silk, the Abyssinians salt, the Africans certain sorts of shells, the Icelanders and the Newfoundlanders codfish, the Tartars tea pressed into cubes, and the Russians platinum. In the early days of settlement on the American continent the Indians employed wampum and beaver skins as a medium of exchange with the whites, and the latter were employed to a considerable extent among the whites themselves. In parts of the South at one time slaves were a measure of value, as tobacco was in Virginia until about a hundred or a hundred and fifty years ago, and bullets and furs in Massachusetts. Cattle was afavorite medium through which values were expressed in the pastoral days of the race in Asia and Europe. Our word "pecuniary" comes from the Latin *pecus*, cattle.

Nobody knows who devised or made the first coin, nor can we tell the country to which he belonged or the age in

which he lived. He deserves immortality, though, like many another benefactor of humanity, immortality has eluded him. It is generally supposed that the first coins were struck in some of the Greek States, but Herodotus, who was a Greek himself, said that they originated in Lydia, a country in Asia Minor, which the reader of ancient history remembers, when he remembers it at all, solely because it was ruled at one time by Croesus, the great plutocrat of antiquity. Seven or eight centuries before Christ, coins were in use in some countries, while three or four centuries before the Christian era almost every country making any pretensions to civilization had a coinage system of some sort.

The advantages which gold and silver have above all the other metals for use as money enabled them early in the Christian era to supersede the other metals to a large extent and reduce them to a subordinate place. When both gold and silver began to be freely employed as money it became necessary to fix a ratio between them and to determine their relative powers as measures of value. As silver was the more plentiful and easily to be obtained it was cheapest. In Rome, about the beginning of the Christian era, the relative value of gold to silver was 1 to 9. That is, 1 ounce of gold would exchange for 9 ounces of silver. Since then silver has been growing cheaper with respect to gold. At the time of the discovery of America the ratio was 1 to 11.3. In 1600 it was 1 to 13, in 1700 1 to 14.2, and in 1800 1 to 15.6. At about the middle of the century, or around 1850, the proportion was 1 to 15.4, and in 1873 it was 1 to 15.8. These figures represent the relative value of these metals in the market. Since 1873 the tendency of silver has been rapidly downward. The primary causes have been the great increase in the production with respect to the other metal. The consequences have been a closing of mints in Europe to silver, the cessation of its coinage on private account in India, and the creation of a monetary problem for the United States which threatens disaster to our financial system.

In general, the first monetary standard which may be said to have been adopted by the principal countries was that of silver. Some of the countries held on to that standard. As gold began to come more and more into use, however, some countries set up a double standard, making both mteals a legal tender in payment of debts. England was one of these double standard countries.

Along to the time of Edward III. gold had not yet been admitted to the coinage; but in his reign, which began in 1327, it was accorded this honor. Its legal-tender power, though, was limited. In 1717 England admitted gold to an equality with silver, and the double standard was adopted. The advantages of gold over silver soon after began to be manifest, and the legal-tender quality of silver was limited to payments of $125 in 1774. Nine years later, though, this limitation was stricken off and the double standard was resumed, but in 1798 the white metal was once more reduced to a subordinate position. This time the tide had turned permanently against silver, for in 1816 gold was made the sole standard in England, and silver's legal-tender power was restricted to payments of 40 shillings, or about $10. This condition of things is still in existence.

Many other countries of Europe also have been experimenting with the different standards, and some of them have the double standard. France, Italy, Belgium and Switzerland joined together and formed the Latin Monetary Union in 1865, and in 1867 Greece entered the combination. In 1868 Spain adopted a like monetary unit, but it did not formally join the union. The principal coins are of the same weight and finess in all these nations, though they are not all of them called by the same names. These are all double-standard countries. Servia and Roumania later on adopted the same monetary unit as that of the other nations named, though they do not regularly belong to the union. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Denmark and the dual monarchy of Sweden and Norway are, like Great Britain, gold-standard countries, while Russia clings to the silver standard.

The United States adopted the double standard in the beginning at a ratio of 15 of silver to 1 of gold. This ratio, at the time of its adoption, 1792, was very close to the market proportion. A little later, however, silver lowered in value with respect to gold, and as people, when they are privileged to pay their debts in varieties of money of different value, use the cheapest, gold soon disappeared, and silver was the sole coin in circulation. The silver dollar, it was provided, should contain 371.25 grains of pure silver, the alloy in it increasing it to 416 grains, and the gold dollar was to have 24.75 grains of the pure metal. The same amount of pure silver has remained in the silver dollar ever since, but the amount of alloy has been changed, and changes were made in the pure metal in the gold dollar.

The necessity for having gold in the currency led to an alteration in the coinage ratio. In 1834 the gold dollar, which contained 24.75 grains of the pure metal previously, was cheapened

by reducing its contents to 23.2 grains, and in 1837 the standard of fineness of the silver dollar was altered so that the coin had less aloy, its entire weight being 412.5 grains, instead of 416 as before, but the pure metal in it remained at 371.25 grains, the gold dollar now being changed to 23.22 grains of the pure metal. Both the dollars have remained at this weight ever since. Under these changes the ratio became 16 to 1, or, to be precise, 15.9837 to 1.

The legal ratio of 16 to 1, adopted in the legislation of 1834 and 1837, did not agree with the market ratio, however, which was about 15.6 to 1 at that time. Under the earlier ratio gold vanished, but it was now silver's turn to disappear. As gold now was the cheaper metal debts were nearly all paid in it to the exclusion of silver. Silver was more valuable as bullion, relatively to gold, than it was as coin, and it became merchandise. No one would pay debts with it when a gold dollar, which could be exchanged for a smaller amount of silver than was in the coin, would do as well. In obedience to what is known as Gresham's law, the cheaper coin displaced the dearer, and only one was in active circulation, and that one was gold.

This was the condition of things between 1837 and 1873. The market ratio between the money metals changed but little during that time.

Silver counted for more as bullion than as coin, and consequently but little of it was coined except in fractional parts of a dollar, as "change" Although coinage of both the metals was free, only $8,045,838 of the silver dollar pieces were coined from the establishment of the mint along to 1873, while the coinage of gold was sometimes in that period five times that much in a single year. This was the situation of affairs whe the silver dollar was demonitized in 1873.

The silver demonitization act of 1873, it is frequently said, was pased "surreptitiously," and the movement which led to it has been called a "conspiracy" and a "crime." Let us see if ther be any basis for these charges. John Jay Knox, an official of the Treasury Department and later a Comptroller of the Currency, was requested by the Secretary of the Treasury to prepare, in outline, a revision of the statutes governing the mints and assay offices of the country, and in 1870 the measure was placed in the hands of the Secretary, George S. Boutwell, who sent it to the Senate, with the recommendation that it be pased. In the enumeration of the coins to be issued from the mints the standard dollar was omitted. But Mr. Knox, in a letter accompanying the bill, made particular mention of this fact. The coin was omitted because there was no demand for it. Although they could be coined on the same terms as gold pieces, only a little over 8,000,000 of the silver dollars had been coined in the eighty-one years ending with 1873. There was no demand for their coinage because in each dollar, at the ruling price for silver in 1870, when the so-called demonitization bill went to Congress, there would be about $1.03, as measured in gold.

The bill omitting the silver dollar from the list of coins was before two Congresses; it was exhaustively discussed between 1870 and its passage in 1873 in both branches of Congress and through the press, and every member of Congress knew that the silver dollar was dropped from the list of coins who attended to his duties, and every reader of the newspapers knew it who had any interest in the question. There was nothing "surreptitious" about it. Most of the men in Congress at that time who are now free silver men voted for the bill, which became a law on February 12, 1873. Nobody discovered that it was a "conspiracy" until two or three years later the silver in the dollar went far below the 100c. mark relatively to gold, and the silver miners saw that there would be a large profit in silver coinage on private account.

In the latter part of 1873 silver started downward, and has, with an occasional rally for a year or thereabouts, been going down ever since. When the silver demonitization bill was passed, on February 12, 1873, the quantity of silver in the dollar was worth in the market about $1.02. It was worth 96c. on an average in 1875, 88c. in 1880, 82c. in 1885, 80c. shortly before the passage of the Sherman law in 1890, and its average in the past week has been about 55c. The market ratio between the metals, which was about 16 to 1, the same as the legal ratio, around the middle of 1873, has been about 28 or 29 to 1 in the past week.

What made silver, which did not vary much from the proportion of 15½ to 1 as compared with gold from 1800 to 1873, drop so fast and so far since? The answer is simple—an increase in supply and a decrease in demand. In the calendar year 1874 the amount of silver produced in the world was, in round figures, 55,000,000 ounces, while the production in 1892 was 152,000,000. So much for the increase in supply. Now for the decrease in demand. Germany, taking advantage of the immense sum of of gold put into its hands by the French war indemnity, in 1871, started to demonitize silver in that year and placed itself on the gold basis. The Scandinavian States of Denmark, Sweden and Norway changed to the gold standard in 1874, while in the same year the Latin Union limited its silver coinage, and two years later the mints of the Union were closed to silver altogether. Holland took similar action a year earlier and Spain a year later, while Austria-Hungary changed from the silver to the gold standard in 1891-3, and India in 1893 closed its mints to the coinage of silver on private account. Here are the chief causes for the decline in the price of silver.

The United States Government's attitude toward silver since 1873 will now be set forth: In 1877 the House of Representatives passed a bill prepared by Mr. Bland to coin silver dollars on the same terms and conditions as gold, the coin to be a legal tender for all debts public and private, except where otherwise expressly stipulated in the contract. This was a free coinage measure, and had it been enacted coinage would have been resumed under the conditions which prevailed previous to 1873. In the Senate, however, Mr. Allison, of the Committee on Finance, reported the bill with the free coinage section stricken out, and in its place was a provision that the coinage should be not less than $2,000,00 of silver bullion a month, and not more than $4,000,000. In this shape the bills passed, but it was vetoed by President Hayes, and it was carried over the veto on February 28, 1878, and became a law. The Bland-Allison act was succeeded by what is popularly known as the Sherman law, which dates from July 14, 1890, which provides for the purchase of 4,500,000 ounces of silver bullion a month at the market price, to be paid for in Treasury notes, such notes to be legal tender for all debts, public and private, except where stipulated otherwise in the contract. This is the law which the country asks Congress to repeal.

FREDERICK S. SCHILLING.

FINANCIAL CONTESTS.

Several times in the past the people and Congress were as deeply wrought up over financial issues as they have been in 1893. In the contest on the United States Bank question in Jackson's days in the presidency there was even more excitement throughout the country than there has been this year, and the fight between the Whigs and President Tyler eight or ten years later when they tried to re-establish the bank also stirred the people profoundly in every State of the Union. Then there was the contest in Van Buren's days, precipitated by the panic of 1837, which ended in the establishment of the independent Treasury, and that fight in 1877-8 during Hayes' term, which resulted in the passage of the Bland-Allison law over the Presidential veto. These fights, too, attracted the earnest attention of the country at large, and the result in each case was awaited with interest even on the other side of the Atlantic also.

The fight on the United States Bank question began about the middle of Jackson's period in the presidency. Jackson early showed his hostility to that institution. In his message to Congress in 1829, in his first year in the presidency, he attacked the bank, and he repeated his assaults in 1830 and 1831. It is fair to state, however, that the bank had been opposed by Jackson's party for a long time. The one which Jackson attacked was the second institution of the kind which the country had. The first United States Bank was proposed by Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury, and was part of his comprehensive monetary scheme to establish the Government's credit and to strengthen the country's finances. Jefferson opposed the bank scheme on the ground that Congress had no constitutional authority to charter an institution of the sort, and other men who subsequently became leaders in the Republican (afterward Democratic) party took the same ground. Hamilton won, however, and Congress granted the charter, which received the approval of President Washington.

The bank began operations in 1791, and was to run for twenty years. Its capital was fixed at $10,000,000, $2,000,000 of which was to be subscribed by the Government, and the bank was to loan the Government that amount of money, which was to be paid in ten annual instalments of $200,000 each. The bank was allowed to establish branches in the various States, it was to have a virtual monopoly of the banking business for twenty years, and its notes were to be receivable for all Govern-

ment dues. When the charter of the bank expired in 1811 Congress refused to renew it, and the institution expired by limitation. The people, though, exerted pressure upon Congress in favor of reviving the bank, and the second United States Bank was incorporated in 1816, its charter to run twenty years, or until 1836. The capital stock in this bank was fixed at $35,000,000 payable one-fifth in cash and four-fifths in Government stock, and the Government was permitted to appoint five of its twenty-five Directors. The bank was to have the custody of the public funds.

It was this second United States Bank which Jackson attacked. The majority of the people appear to have been favorable to the bank, and to desire a renewal of its charter, and a bill with this end in view passed both branches of Congress, but Jackson vetoed it, and the veto was not overcome. This was in 1832, in the long session of the Congress which met in 1831. The bank question then became one of the issues, and, in fact, the leading issue, in the presidential and congressional campaigns of 1832. The country was torn up on the question as it never had been before on any monetary issue and as it never was afterward on any issue whatever except on the slavery question, and perhaps on one or two occasions on the tariff. Jackson, who had been renominated in that year, carried the election by an overwhelming majority, receiving 219 electoral votes as against 49 for Henry Clay, his opponent, and the Congress which was chosen in that year took his side on the bank question.

In this fight in 1832 against the bank Jackson received powerful aid from two sources—from the State bank interests, which would be immensely benefited if the United States Institution were overthrown, and from the blunder of Clay and his party in forcing the issue to the front at that time, and affording a sort of justification to Jackson's charges that the bank was manipulated by politicians in the interest of a political party. It was an amazing and fatal lack of judgment on Clay's part to stake the existence of the bank on the result of a presidential canvass, as Clay and all his friends saw when it was too late to remedy the error. Jackson's re-election, of course, and the tremendous indorsement which he gained in the choice of a Congress holding his views on the financial question sealed the doom of the United States Bank. Its charter, which was to expire in 1836, was not renewed.

But Jackson was by no means content with preventing a new lease of life to the bank. He determined to cripple it before its existing lease expired. In his message of 1832 to Congress, just after his re-election, he expressed doubts as to the solvency of the bank, and urged an investigation to see if the Government funds deposited in it were safe. A committee of Congress made a careful investigation into the condition of the bank, and declared that it was sound. Jackson's attack, however, started runs on some of the bank's branches, and weakened the institution in this way.

Jackson now resolved to take the public funds out of the bank and directed Louis McLane, Secretary of the Treasury, to order this removal. The law empowered the Secretary to withdraw the funds by order, but it provided that he must previously inform Congress of his purpose, and give his reasons therefor. McLane was unwilling to issue the order, as Congress had declared that the deposits were safe, therefore Jackson transferred him to the head of the State Department, and W. J. Duane was put in his place. Duane refused to issue the order and he was deposed, and Roger B. Taney, then Attorney General, was made Secretary of the Treasury. Taney ordered that after October 1 the public revenues should be deposited in State banks and not in the United States Bank as before. This was in 1833. Three years later the institution, under its governmental charter, passed out of existence. Jackson was victorious, but his action, which has been condemned by the leading financiers of both parties since then, helped to disturb monetary conditions and to unsettle business, and was one of the causes of the financial convulsion of 1837.

In 1837, when Martin Van Buren entered the presidency, he was called upon to grapple with a monetary problem even more serious than that which President Cleveland has encountered this year. The panic of that year was the most disastrous financial convulsion which the country has ever known. The storm had been gathering through the latter years of Jackson's service in the presidency, and about the time that Van Buren stepped into power it burst on the country. It began by the failure of a large business in New Orleans, and soon it reached dimensions which completely dwarfed all preceding panics. The failures in New Orleans in March and April aggregated $50,000,000 of liabilities, while those in New York reached $100,000,000, and in some of the other great business centers the destruction reached proportionate figures. Financial and commercial houses and industrial establishments collapsed on all sides, and

the distress was widespread and calamitous.

In this crisis the country turned to the President for relief as it did in 1893. A delegation representing the chief business interests of New York called on Van Buren early in May, 1837, when he had been in office barely two months, and asked him to call Congress in extra session to deal with the business troubles. Congress was summoned, and it met on September 4, or about four weeks later in the year than it did in 1893, and the session ended on October 16. Van Buren, in his messsage to Congress, proposed the adoption of an independent treasury in which to keep and from which to disburse the public money. In the days of the United States Bank the Government's cash was kept in that institution, but Jackson in 1833 had it withdrawn and deposited in private banks, which were called by Jackson's enemies the "pet banks," and this course, which assisted largely in inciting the wild speculation of that period, was one of the causes of the panic. Van Buren desired to change all this by putting the public funds directly under the Government's control.

The independent treasury scheme did not command the favor of Congress ,however, and it failed of passage. All that the extra session did to relieve the depression, or to attempt to relieve it, was to pass a law authorizing the issue of $10,000,000 in treasury notes so as to increase the circulation. Van Buren had been asked by business men from all parts of the country to rescind the order known as the specie circular, which had been issued by his predecessor, Jackson, making public land purchases payable in gold and silver, but he declined to do this, and the country was displeased as a consequence. Undoubtedly Van Buren's course in resisting these appeals was wise, for the substitution of bank currency again for specie in land payments would have weakened the Government without helping the people, and would have postponed the return of business activity and prosperity. The independent treasury project was an issue in the congressional election of 1838, and it won the favor of the country. The Congress chosen in that year passed an independent treasury bill, which Van Buren signed. In Tyler's days in the presidency the Whigs killed this system, but the Democrats in Polk's time re-established it, and it has remained in existence ever since.

The next great fight in Congress on a monetary issue occurred in 1841, when Tyler was in the White House. The contest then was on the revival of the United States Bank, which the Whigs favored, but which Tyler, who had been elected by the Whigs, opposed. The revival of the bank, it was understood by the Whigs in the canvass of 1840, would be accomplished if Harrison and Tyler were elected, and probably it would have been if Harrison had lived, but Tyler, who went into power on Harrison's demise a month after the inauguration, had different ideas about State rights and the powers of Congress under the Constitution. In the extra session which convened on May 31, 1841, not quite three months after the beginning of the presidential term, two bills were passed for the re-establishment of the United States Bank, but Tyler vetoed both of them. These were Whig measures, and that party had a majority in each branch of Congress, but the vote upon them was not on rigid party lines. Tyler's hostility to the bank idea became known immediately on his accession to the presidency, but the Whigs tried to compromise with him, and Clay, the great compromiser and pacificator, prepared a bill which he thought would overcome Tyler's scruples. The bill was vetoed, however, and the requisite two-thirds vote to override the inhibition was not secured. Then another bill, which was framed to meet the President's objections, was sent to him, and this, too, encountered the veto.

Then the crisis in the relations between the Whig party and the man it elected came. Between the time of the veto of the first bill and the passage of the second Tyler was alternately coaxed and threatened by the Whig statesmen and the Whig press, the latter form of persuasion, however, largely predominating. He was asked to resign, and plots, it was reported, were on foot to assassinate him, but he was not moved from his course. The veto of the second bill came on September 9, 1841, and on the 11th all the members of the cabinet—Thomas Ewing, Secretary of the Treasury; John Bell, Secretary of War; George E. Badger, Secretary of the Navy; John J. Crittenden, Attorney General; and Francis Granger, Postmaster General—except Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, resigned, while Webster, it was understood, remained in the Cabinet merely to complete the arrangement for the extradition treaty with Great Britain, which was adopted in 1842, soon after the ratification of which he stepped down. The feud now between the Whigs and Tyler was complete, and it was disastrous to both. Tyler dropped into obscurity after leaving the White House, and the Whig party was beaten in the presidential election immediate-

ly following the fight, and never won another national victory, except in 1848.

Two more great contests on financial measures, not counting that of 1890 when the Sherman law was passed, and that of 1893 in which the effort was made to repeal it, occurred in Congress. One of these was in 1874, when a bill was passed making a considerable increase in the paper money of the country, and the other was in 1878, when the Bland-Allison measure went through both branches of Congress by large majorities. The bill of 1874 created intense excitement throughout the country, and great pressure was brought to bear upon President Grant, chiefly from the West and South, to induce him to sign it. Those were the days of the greenback movement, when there was a loud and persistent demand from a large part of the country, heightened and intensified by the panic of 1873-78, then in its most acute stages, for "more currency." Grant at first intended to sign the bill, but after a close study of the question and conditions he changed his mind and vetoed it and it failed to pass over the veto. His course was applauded by the thinking people of the whole country.

President Hayes interposed his veto to the Bland-Allison bill, but it overrode that obstruction and became a law, continuing in operation twelve years, or until repealed by the Sherman act of 1890. Hayes' veto message was one of the strongest deliverances emanating from the White House since the close of the war, but it had no effect upon on Congress and comparatively little on the country at large. The people had the silver craze at that time in an extreme and deplorable degree, and the action of Congress in overriding the veto found favor with a large majority of the people. The enactment of the Bland-Allison law was a blunder of the largest dimensions, and from it and the Sherman law, which was a vast improvement upon it, have come all the financial evils which have beset the country in the past fifteen years.

FREDERICK S. SCHILLING.

DEMONETIZATION.

Is It Progress or Retrogradation?---That is the Question.

[The following paper is by Mr. Edwin Harrison of St. Louis, a close student of the financial question.]

Demonetization—Is it progress or retrogradation? Before suggesting an answer to this somewhat absorbing question in its relation to the recent silver demonetization movement I would like to return to the subject of the communication which appeared in the columns of your paper on June 2 in relation to the present ratio, and incidentally to the nature of money. I may say in parenthesis that the incentive to the writing of that communication was the assumption by a local writer, whom we may call Intrinsicus, than money has intrinsic value and that it follows that there is a wide difference and independence between money value and money use, and that money may serve a full money use without possessing full money value. This, he claimed, is the case with the silver dollar. The assumption that that dollar has full money use and some money value is an admission that it is money. I showed that the definition of money value universally accepted by political economists, whether gold standard advocates or bimetallists, is "value in exchange," whether the money be wampum, gold or paper, so that whatever the future may bring, the present value of the silver dollar is its value in exchange, which is at the rate of sixteen ounces of silver to one of gold; also that value is not and cannot be intrinsic, but that it is "an impalpable relation," changeable with and dependent upon the whims, notions and estimates of men and on their machinations to affect the supply and demand of the valued article. If the value of coin varies, as is all but universally admitted by political economists, not excepting Jevons and other gold standard advocates of high repute, as well in the case of gold as in that of silver, what becomes of that lost or gained value, which, if it is intrinsic, is inherent and, therefore, inseparable and unchangeable? Bank of England notes sometimes command a premium over gold. Are they money, and what is their intrinsic value? It is a fact that cannot be evaded, that the value of money is its value in exchange, and that there is no such thing as intrinsic value in money.

But revenos a nos moutons. Has the demonetization of silver been a movement in the direction of progress? No doubt some are greatly benefited by the change which has been made, but is it promotive of the greatest good to the greatest number, or the reverse? At a certain gathering of business men and gentlemen of various professions in this city last spring, this question was touched upon. One of those present, a gentleman prominent in business, social and educational circles, and generally regarded as an unusually well-informed man, declared that the passing from bimetallism to the single gold standard was inevitable, and as clearly a step in the direction of progress as was the discarding of the tallow candle in favor of the electric light. There are many who believe with him, and not a few of them are convinced that bimetallism is a craze particularly characteristic of the wild and woolly West, lacking a support of sensible and learned men—a folly which will have its day, but which must pass away as the people become more enlightened. But there is so much evidence diametrically opposed to this assumption that it is difficult to understand how any one can assert that demonetization of silver is so clearly progression that it may be aptly compared with the progress which every one recognizes as having taken place in the substitution of the electric light for the tallow candle. For such a comparison is tantamount to saying that the case is too clear to justify well informed men, to say nothing of political economists and statesmen, in seriously entertaining a different opinion. And yet there are political economists, statesmen, and a multitude of intelligent laymen, abroad as

vell as at home, who do not recognize his demonetization as a blunder, and he character of these men is too solid, and the weight of their opinion too great to be aphoristically cast aside. Mr. Dalzell, the well-known Republican member of Congress from Pennsylvania, has well said: "This question of the relations of the precious metals to each other and to commerce is recognized as a difficult one, about which it is wise not to hazard any too positive opinion."

In no case does it appear that the silver demonetization which took place in various countries in and about 1873, and in England at an earlier date, was brought about as the result of deliberate and intelligent legislation. The search light of retrospection has not only failed to discover and evidence that the adoption of gold monometallism was the result of forethought and wisely matured conclusions, but it has revealed just the opposite state of facts. Each of these acts of demonetization seems to have been hasty and ill-considered and passed in ignorance of its importance and of the consequences that were to follow. E. Benjamin Andrews, President of Brown University, remarks on this point: "The truth seems to be the demonetization of silver was not natural or the result of thought, but the reverse. The policy was not debated, but entered upon in entire blindness. Neither in Germany nor in the United States, the lands where it was inaugurated, was any legislator at the time awake to the stupendous significance of the act. * * * That no party to the deed understood or had seriously considered its bearings, has since been abundantly proved." I presume that no one will deny that the so-called "mint bill" of 1873 became a law through the ignorance of the members of both Houses of Congress and of President Grant, who signed the bill, of the fact that it contained a clause forbidding further free coinage of the standard silver dollar, and that it limited the legal tender to $5. Progress does not usually result from legislation effected under such circumstances. Intelligent presumption and ninety-nine chances out of a hundred are against such probability."

Political economists of to-day—men whose opinions are not influenced by pecuniary or political considerations, but whose highest ambition is to discover the relations between cause and effect by studying the lessons of the past, so that they may be able to foresee where history is to repeat itself when a given cause is put in operation, as well as by pure reasoning from cause to effect, and to proclaim the truth for the cause of science and the simple love of truth—are nearly a unit in inveighing against this so-called progress. Among others I may quote Prof. Andrews, who, writing nine months ago of the bimetallist committee of Boston and New England, which had just beeen organized, and of its members, said that it comprised "some of the best-known business men of Boston" (that intellectual hub)—"bankers, manufacturers, merchants, railroad men, lawyers and State and National officials, past and present—gentlemen from nearly every part of New England being represented in it. * * * * The popularity of the movement has been surprising and proves the mistake of those, East and West, who have supposed New England to be given over to gold monometallism." He holds that "restoration of silver is indispensable to the proper progress of civilization. * * * * In contending that gold has immensely appreciated since 1873, and that this, with the general fall of prices which it involves, is a terrible evil, our Western friends are perfectly right." Speaking of the successive acts of demonetization of silver by one country after another, he says: "People point to this steady march of the sole gold system as if it were beyond question a phase of advancing civilization, a natural law of progress, and it is irrational as well as useless to oppose it. History has been re-read since this thought gained currency and has shown it to be an illusion. Gold monometallism has not been spread by any rational conviction, but by perverse legislation. * * * The statement which one so often hears now regarding the progress of wealthy countries from silver to gold was not the belief of Locke, who declared that gold is not the money of the world, or measure of commerce, nor fit to be so. Sir Isaac Newton and Ricardo also give no countenance to that modern fancy. * * * * It is quite certain, I believe, that the ostracism of silver began in ignorance, not at all in that circumspection and deliberation which must have marked it had it been a true instance of economic evolution like the discarding of stage-coaches or the abolition of slavery." Witness the wisdom and deliberation of the legislation of our own Congress in 1873, which extinguished the tallow candle of bimetallism by the effulgence of a demonetization act so completely hidden under a bushel that it took five years for the Chairman of the House Committee, who reported the "mint bill," to discover that he was a party to the turning on of such a light. Conkling, Blaine, Voorhees, Pig-iron Kelly, all expressed their unfeigned astonishment at the discovery.

Said Mr. Kelly in 1878: "In connection with the charge that I advocated the bill which demonetized the standard silver dollar, I say that, though the Chairman of the Committee on Coinage, I was ignorant of the fact that it would demonetize the silver dollar from our system of coins, as were those distinguished Senators—Messrs. Blaine and Voorhees. * * * But I am prepared to say that in all the legislation of this country there is no mystery eqnal to the demonetization of the standard silver dollar of the United States. I have never found a man who could tell just how it came about or why." Of course if he did not himself know, how could other members of Congress or anybody else be expected to know? Those who were concerned in enacting this law which bore the innocent-looking title of "Mint bill," a bill, as Mr. Kelly said, "to reorganize the mints, not to revise the coin money of the country, and which was passed without allusion in debate to the question of retention or the abandonment of the standard silver dollar," knew not that they were striking silve from its position of equality with gold, and it is not probable that silver demonetization could ever have been effected in this country except in the manner in which it was done. The measure had not been a party issue. There had been no agitation of the subject by either the press or public speakers. President Grant, ignorant of the fact that he had signed a bill which had sealed the doom of bimetallism in this country, at least for the time being, wrote eight months after he had attached his signature to it: "I wonder that silver is not already coming into the market to supply the deficiency in the circulating medium. * * * I confess to the desire to see a limited hoarding of money. But I want to see the hoarding of something that is a standard of value the world over. Silver has this. * * * Our mines are producing almost unlimited amounts of silver, and it is becoming a question, What shall we do with it?"

The attitude of Stanley Matthews as to the duty of our Government in regard to the use of our silver currency is well known. I might also mention Senator John P. Jones as one of the most learned men of his day in the history and science of money, except that such men, like prophets, are seldom honored in their own country as they are abroad; and ex-President Harrison and Senator Lodge and Thomas B. Reed. But as to the latter I refrain lest I might not be taken seriously. Daniel Webster said: "Gold and silver, at rates fixed by Congress, constitute the legal standard of value in this country, and neither Congress nor any State has authority to establish any other standard or to displace this." But perhaps the great expounder is looked upon now as a back number and no longer in the category of those whom the affable Intrinsicus would call "well-informed persons."

Passing from the indiscreet West and the more sedate New England to the wise old England and the continent, we find a large and strong disinclination to accept the progress theory. In Austria Edward Suess, Professor of Geology at the University of Vienna, Vice-President of the Imperial Academy of Science, Member of the Austrian Parliament, etc., tells us that: "The question is no longer whether silver will become a full value coinage metal over the whole earth, but what are the trials through which Europe is to reach that goal?" In France another equally distinguished political economist, Emile DeLaveleye, remarks: "Economists who attach themselves to absolute theories are very much like the political philosophers of the eighteenth century from whom they descended. They follow out, at whatever cost, what seems to them a simple, logical, rational principle, without taking any account of nature, history or traditions. They assert that in the matter of money there needs to be but one metal, precisely as in legislation there needed to be but one chamber. A nation has but one will. How absurd then to give it two organs to express that will, and it is no less absurd to have two metals with which to carry on their exchanges when one metal only would suffice." One of the delegates from France, M. DeNormandie, in the International Monetary Conference of 1861, said: "One sees demonstrated by facts, with crushing evidence, the superiority of the double over the single standard. In 1837, '38, '39 a violent crisis raged in America. The Federal Treasury withdrew its deposits from the United States Bank and inundated the English market with American paper. At London the situation became extremely serious, and the metallic reserve of the Bank of England fell from 200,000,000 francs to 75,000,000. The Bank of England was even forced to recur to the Bank of France, which loaned it 50,000,000 francs in credit vaues—itself, thanks to the French bimetallic system, scarcely feeling any shock from the catastrophe at New York and London."

In Germany may be mentionel the five bimetallist members of the German Silver Commission, who have been described by an impartial writer as "German authorities of high standing and great learning." The German

Government does not seem to be wholly satisfied with its demonetization act, and Bismarck's opinion as to the kind of progress involved in the act has frequently been expressed by himself in no uncertain terms.

But even in the very citadel of gold monometallism, in crafty, acquisitive England, to whom all the balance of the world is debtor and pays tribute, first in the amount nominated in the bond, and, in addition, the increment due to the steady appreciation in the value of gold, we find that the professors of political economy in the great universities ,and about all other economists of any note, agree that the maintaining of the double or rather bimetallic standard is practicable. Mr. Balfour, who, it will be conceded, is one of England's greatest statesmen, said in his Mansion House address in August, 1893: "I am given indeed to understand that those who deny the theoretic possibilities of bimetallism call themselves orthodox economists. * * * Permit me to remind you that there was a period when the orthodox view of science was that heat, for example, was some subtle material pervading all things. That was orthodox. We now know that it is not a material, but that it is a mode of motion. * *

* Are we to ignore the investigations of men like Jevons and the distinguished economists who have followed? * * * I am well aware that there is a vast mass of opinion—although not well-informed opinion—to the effect that a man who maintains the possibility of bimetallism should be ranked with those who think that the sun goes round the earth, or that the earth itself is flat. But I may say without offense that those who hold this opinion show themselves but little instructed in the recent history of the subject. It is permissable for those who base their opinions on these matters upon the imperfectly remembered scraps of economic knowledge picked up fifty years ago, it is permissable for them to still hold a bimetallist as a harmless lunatic. But I do not think that any man who has seriously considered the literature of this subject during the last generation holds this opinion or can possibly hold it. I doubt whether there is a single economist of reputation under 60 years of age who will commit himself to the view that it is impossible to maintain a joint or double standard."

Space will not permit the quotation of but one other authority whom I refer to in evidence that the mild lunacy of bimetallism has not only affected the woolly West, and some of the erratic presidents, professors and Congressmen of the United States, the professors of the European universities, the Websters, Grants, Matthews, Harrisons, Andrews, Walkers, Suesses, De Laveleyes, Foxwells, Balfours, Bismarcks, etc., but that the contagion is epidemic even in entrenched England. I quote our own distinguished political economist, Prof. Francis A. Walker, as follows: "The change of English sentiment during the last ten and five years, and especially in the last two years, has been truly remarkable. The universities and colleges have become bimetallist. I do not know a single British professor of political economy who is a gold monometallist; while several, and those the most distinguished, are active working bimetallists. The East Indian interest is, as it always has been, for bimetallism. The cottton spinning interest is bimetallist; the shipping interest is bimetallist; the agricultural interest is bimetallist; the agricultural interest is bimetallist. The Irish, under the leadership of Archbishop Walsh, are fast coming into line for bimetallism. A selfish, shallow, supercilious gold monometallism is entrenched to-day in the London banking interests and in the London city press. But to-morrow it may be driven from even this refuge. Lord Herschell's Commission of 1887 divided six and six on the question of practical participation by England in a bimetallist league. Since that time one of its ablest monometallist members, Mr. Leonard H. Courtney, has become a bimetallist. Mr. Balfour, the Conservative leader of the House of Commons, is a fighting bimetallist. The recent grotesque failure of the British Government to fill the break in the great dam of Indian finances has only added strength to the bimetallists' argument."

Much more substantial argument and proof than anything that has yet been produced will have to be brought forward before such men as I have quoted can be persuaded that the resort to a perpetually stretching money standard and shrinking money volume is progress. On the contrary, they propose to demonstrate to and, if possible, convince those who have been led astray by a false god, the error of their ways. EDWIN HARRISON.

FREE COINAGE THE REMEDY

For the Financial Ills Which Now Afflict the Nation.

WASHINGTON, D. C., Jan. 8.—In a three hours' speech in the Senate yesterday afternoon Senator George G. Vest of Missouri made clear the necessity of free coinage of silver to remove the financial ills of the nation and remedy the blunders of the Administration. The speech was the strongest ever made by the distinguished Missouri Senator in Congress. His audience gave his words the closest attention. The galleries were well filled, and on the floor were Speaker Reed and the leading men of the House of both parties. Several times during the delivery of the address the Vice-President was compelled to suppress the applause that it brought out. The Senator first reviewed the decision of the Supreme Court annulling the income tax law, then the tariff legislation of the two parties and concluded with a review of the position of the parties on the financial question. He arraigned the Supreme Court for the income tax decision; he laid the responsibility for the lack of revenue at its door, when it exempted the "sordid wealth of the land" from taxation. He attacked the President and the Secretary of the Treasury for their proposition to retire the greenbacks and place circulation in the hands of the national banks; quoted Secretary Carlisle against himself and declared the conflict between bimetallism and the gold standard was irrepressible and that the sooner it was decided the better it would be for public and private life.

Touching the annullment of the income tax by the Supreme Court Senator Vest said:

"The Wilson act, which was enacted by both houses of Congress, and became a law without the signature of the President, would have furnished ample revenue to conduct this Government, with a small surplus besides. If that law had not, as to between $40,000,000 and $50,000,000 of taxation, been declared invalid by the Supreme Court of the United States, there would have been no deficit in the Treasury, as every intelligent man must concede. That the Supreme Court made this decision was a matter of surprise to every intelligent lawyer in the United States and especially to those of us engaged in the legislation of the country. I shall observe the laws of decorum and of comity between the co-ordinate branches of government, but I shall not conceal my opinion of that decision of the highest tribunal of the land."

The Senator reviewed the history of the Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of an income tax from the Hilton case in 1796 down to the Springer case in 1866. He held that the Supreme Court in an unbroken line of decisions had held that an income tax was constitutional.

"Mr. Justice Brown of the Supreme Court, from whom I differ politically, a lawyer of eminent ability and unquestioned integrity, in his dissenting opinion summarizes all the cases from the Hilton case to the Springer case, showing that the Supreme Court had again and again affirmed the power of Congress to levy an income tax upon the proceeds of real and personal property without apportionment."

Referring to the opinions of Justices Brown and Harlan, the Senator continued:

"If I had made the declarations which have come from these two Justices of the Supreme Court, I should be charged with partisan malice and misrepresentation. Coming from distinguished lawyers holding the highest judicial positions in the country, of life tenure, and removed from personal and political motive, I submit that these declarations constitute the most fearful arraignment of this court of last resort found in the judicial annals of the country. I do not propose to analyze this decision nor shall I trust myself to enter into conjecture as to the reasons that caused one member of the court after agreeing, on deliberate argument, as to the constitutionality of

the largest portion of the law, in two weeks afterwards, upon a motion for a rehearing, to reverse his opinion and fasten upon the country 'the sordid despotism of wealth.' This Justice unquestionably had the right to change his opinion. It is the highest prerogative of a judicial officer.

"But I must say most respectfully that it is a matter of regret that he did not see proper to put upon the record the reasons that caused him to make the change; that he did not stand before the American people as the only member of that court really responsible for this far-reaching and terrible decision. It is known alone to him and to his judicial associates. Not even the clerk of the court is able to say what individual justice changed the decision after the case was first argued. The reasons that controlled him are lost to the profession and to the country, and it is simply a matter of conjecture as to why in a case like this, the most important possibly that ever came before the Supreme Court of the United States, he allowed his name and his reasons to be buried in obscurity."

The Senator's reference to Justice Strras, whose name was veiled under the reference to an unknown justice, created quite a sensation on the floor. Continuing, Mr. Vest said:

"The Senate of the United States has been ridiculed and maligned because of executive sessions. What would be thought of a member of this body who had changed his opinion on a great question like that before the Supreme Court and did not have the manhood to stand before the American people and declare his responsibility for that result? I can imagine now the storm of opprobium, the charges of corruption, the whitened wrath of the independent press against a Senator who would dare to hide his name in order to escape responsibility for a public act."

Mr. Vest here had a colloquy with Senator Hill regarding the constitutionality of the income tax, and the opinions of lawyers regarding it before the last decision of the Supreme Court. Mr. Vest resuming the thread of his discussion said:

"I do not propose to speak at length in regard to the effect of this decision. My sole object is to repel and repudiate with all my power the assertion that Congress is guilty of either recklessness or ignorance in enacting that statute. I say that every intelligent lawyer concluded that the question had been judicially determined. To have doubted that the Supreme Court would have followed the decision of 100 years would have been a reflection upon the intelligence and consistency of that great tribunal. In the individual selfishness that always comes in times of great depression, while gloom and disaster and great issues have been impending over the country, classes of our people have not understood the full effect of this terrible decision.

"It has marked a new era in our history, and I much mistake the American people if the time will not come when neither soft words nor honeyed phrases will be sufficient apologies for the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court. The people of this country will never submit to the system which has been put upon them by the Supreme Court, in opposition to its decisions of an entire century. That Mr. Vanderbilt, with his hundreds of millions of dollars, should pay no more for the support of the general Government than the poorest man in the land, is abhorent to every honest mind. The army and navy of the United States, the military and financial resources of the Government must be used to defend Mr. Vanderbilt's untold millions and yet he pays simply internal revenue taxes and tariff import duties upon what he may choose to consume, and the poor man does the same. He pays no more to support the army and navy than I do or any other citizen of this country, without regard to his estate or moneys.

"The people of the United States will never concede that either the State or National Administration should be fixed upon a basis like this. The decision, I say, has not attracted the attention that hereafter must be given to it. The time will come when the prophetic language of Justice Brown will come home to every intelligent and thoughtful man throughout our wide domain that this adjudication of the highest tribunal in the land has fixed upon the country the sordid despotism of wealth."

Taking the charge made by Senator Sherman, that the Democratic party is incompetent to manage the affairs of the nation, the speaker showed that when Mr. Cleveland retired from the presidency in 1889 the Treasury was overflowing, and that when Harrison retired in 1893 the Treasury was bankrupt. He showed that during the four years of Cleveland's first administration the gold exports of this country amounted only $78,507,504. He proceeded to show that under the Republican administration and the McKinley tariff law the surplus fell off, the revenues fell off and a state of bankruptcy ensued. In Harrison's administration the gold exports, instead of being only $79,000,000 and a fraction, as under Cleveland's four years, amounted to $213,784,759. The Senator proved that

here was where the exporting of gold and the panic began. The great evil which is now being complained of is the exporting of gold, the Senator held, but under Democratic rule, even as ascribed by Mr. Sherman, only a little over $79,000,000 in gold went out of the country, while under the Harrison administration something over $213,000,000 in gold was taken out of the country. Even in the present administration of Mr. Cleveland, the records show that but $181,068,087 in gold has been exported from this country.

"In 1889-90, flushed with the victory of '88, the Republican party came back here under the impression that they owned the country for an indefinite period. They placed themselves and the fate of their organization upon three bills. The first was the force bill, a Massachusetts measure, controlled and managed in the House of Representatives by Mr. Lodge and controlled and managed in the Senate by Mr. Hoar. After a terrible struggle, with the assistance of patriotic Republicans, we were enabled to defeat that odious measure. Contemporaneously, by using the parliamentary power placed in the Speaker of the House, the McKinley act was passed, enormously increasing duties and increasing them upon the broad and open and undisguised assumption that revenue should be levied for protection, and not to pay the expenses of the Government at all. That bill came to the Senate, and was here enacted into law. The Republican party put its oriel emblem before the United States and emblazoned it 'protection for protection's sake.' They went to the people upon that issue. They passed another law to give relief, as they said, to the finances of the country. It is known as the Sherman act, and stored in the Treasury of the United States, as so much cord wood, as so much lumber, silver bullion not to be coined, but to be made the basis of Treasury notes issued to the people.

"What was the result of that legislation? The Republian party came back from their appeal to the people discomfited and defeated. The McKinley law was repudiated distinctly and emphatically. The Sherman law was repudiated by the very author of the bill and his colleagues who gave their votes for it. The Senator from Ohio stood on this floor and declared that his own offspring must be bastardized and put beyond the pale of the law. It had brought disaster upon the country. It had disturbed the finances. It was unworthy of the name of the great statesman, formerly Secretary of the Treasury. That law was passed under political coercion, so far as the Senator from Ohio was concerned, I will do him the justice to state."

Coming then to the question of free coinage and the division of party sentiment on that issue, the Senator declared that it could not be evaded and that public men who attempt to do so are "guilty of absolute crime." He said:

"We are now told that the Democratic party is hopelessly divided upon the question of the free coinage of silver. In what better condition are our Republican brethren? They dare not take the issue into their own ranks in regard to the free coinage of silver because they know it would disintegrate and divide their party hopelessly. They passed the Sherman act to retain the votes of the silver Republicans from the Western States, and all the world knows it. They afterwards were compelled from the stress of public opinion in the Northeastern and Middle States to repeal that law. To-day they hold control of the committees in the Senate on account of the same potent influence inside of their own organization. Then Senator from Colorado, Mr. Teller, frankly and in his own manly way, told us the other day that if the Committee on Finance had not been organized in favor of free coinage, no committees would have been appointed and no chairmanships made in the Senate.

"No declaration could be more emphatic and distinct. Now the struggle of our Republican friends is to evade that issue, if possible, and not to permit the general public of the United States to ascertain that they are hopelessly divided, as they claim, and as I concede, the Democratic party to be.

"Whatever the Democratic party may have omitted to do, it has never enacted any law which it was compelled to come before the people of the United States and admit to be vicious legislation, that ought not to have been placed upon the statute books. We are honestly divided in regard to the free coinage of silver, and it is a tribute to the personal integrity of the individuals composing the Democratic party that manhood and patriotism still exist in public life, that those of us who entertain an opinion different from the President of the United States, the head of our party, come out boldly and unequivocally and announce it.

"We are engaged now, all the people of this country, in an irrepressible conflict—a conflict as irrepressible as that which marched the armies of the North and South in the civil war. I trust the arbitrament may not be by violence. I hope and believe that it will not be, but the conflict is just as irrepressible and must be fought out to the last ex-

temity between those of us who believe in retaining silver as standard money of redemption and those who believe in a single gold standard and the exclusion of silver and its use only as fractional coin. All attempts to evade this issue are impossible. The sooner it is settled the better for the tranquility of the country, the better for the public and private life of the land. Those who attempt to evade it and who by the use of cant phrases, such as 'sound money' and the declaration that 'this lunacy has passed away,' are guilty of absolute public crime, if intelligent men, when they assume that the vast millions who believe in the free coinage of silver will ever concede that they are either dishonest or incompetent to decide that question."

Senator Vest then took up the McKinley and the Wilson tariff bills, comparing the two measures, paying special attention to the wool schedule. He said:

"But I come now to the most important part of this whole discussion—so far as the comparison of the two laws is concerned. The wool schedule has always been the citadel of undisguised and unlimited protection. Strike out the wool schedule and you strike out the element of vitality from the protective policy of the Republican party. In 1893, a year of immense importations and exports, we imported of woolen fabrics, $36,987,904 worth. The duties under the McKinley act were $6,457,582, a duty of 100 per cent within a shadow of a fraction. That was the ultima thule of protection. That was the arcadia to which all protectionists must go—100 per cent, making the importer pay upon the goods which he imported, an equal amount with the value of the goods themselves. I said in the debate upon the tariff bill, and have repeated it a hundred times in speaking to the people, that if the Wilson law did nothing else, it drew the line between protection for protection's sake and the imposition of duties for revenue. I never approved that law in all its features, as the world knows. I took it because it was better than the McKinley act, and on that ground alone, but not as a fair revenue measure, or one that I would have drawn had I had my own way."

The Senator declared that a tariff for protection embraced the great sublime Christian doctrine of "You tickle me and I'll tickle you."

"It permeates and pervades the whole tariff fabric," said he, "and that, to speak plainly, is the curse of the scheme. It puts up the price of everything to the American consumer, in order that the profits may be divided among certain classes. The Democratic party has always opposed it and will continue to oppose it because it holds with its great founder, Mr. Jefferson, that this Government is made for the people without governmental partnership with any class. Burdens and benefits to be borne alike by all, and let me add, every man to pay taxes to the general government in proportion to the protection that is given to his property. By that doctrine, the Democratic party will live or cease to live. I have no hesitation in saying that the time will soon come when an immense majority of the American people will come to the conclusion that a return to true Jeffersonian principles is the only safety for the Republic."

The Senator then turned to the condition of the Treasury and the means adopted by the Administration to maintain the gold reserve and the gold standard in our country. He began with the emphatic declaration that he stood for free and unlimited coinage of silver. He said:

"I admit the proposition that the civilized world is to-day under control of the gold man. No man can visit Europe without knowing it. Go to Germany and you will find all the bankers and capitalists and privileged classes in favor of the single gold standard. Go to England and, of course, they are for the single gold standard—I mean the privileged classes, though there is a large bimetallic party in the British Parliament. Go to Austria, and you will find it struggling to get back to the gold standard after having used a redeemable paper money up to 1891, and in France there is the same condition.

"Even there the people are opposed to single gold standard, and the bankers and capitalists are in favor of it. In the United States it is the same. Go to the great moneyed centers and you will find all the great capitalists denouncing the 'silver craze' and the 'silver lunatics.' Go out among the people at large and you will be profoundly astonished, in the West and South particularly, to find an overwhelming majority of both parties in favor of the free and unlimited coinage of silver.

"I admit that the financail influence of the world is against silver, and, as a logical consequence, capitalists are able to influence this country, and, if possible, would intimidate it whenever they found that there was any approach to free silver coinage. They tolerated the act in 1878, but when the Senator from Ohio gave his great name, world-wide as a financier, to the Sherman act of 1890, the capitalists of Europe said that the United States was now going to a silver basis and they were determined to withdraw their

confidence from it. Who doubts this proposition to-day? Look at the condition of the country now.

"The other day the chief executive issued a proclamation in regard to the foreign affairs, asserting the Monroe doctrine, and it was met with enthusiastic acclamation from all sections and classes of the country. What was the response from Great Britain? We heard the hostile guns even in this chamber, and the tail of the British lion was twisted in a corner of this chamber until the royal animal howled like a whipped cur. But did England respond with shot and shell and saber stroke and battleships? Oh, no! She responded with small pellets of paper called American securities, that were poured upon the New York market. A panic was created. Stocks fell, and now look at the sequel. The President of the United States thought proper and rightly and patriotically—and what I complain of is that he did not come to the conclusion before—to offer to the highest bidder the bonds of the Government which he is about to sell to maintain the gold reserve.

"Two syndicates had been formed in New York, made up of capitalists. It is said in this morning's papers that one of those syndicates, with Mr. Morgan at its head, had hoarded $400,000,000 of gold. What is the answer to the President's proclamation? Wall street is dissatisfied. Wall street will not have it. The syndicate has hoarded the gold and we cannot have a popular loan in the United States. Could anything be more humiliating? Could anything be more in the shape of national dishonor? This great country with 70,000,000 of the most intellectual and progressive people in the world, with a continent for its inheritance, throttled and manacled by the gold holders and hoarders? When we undertake to establish a foreign policy, when we undertake to protect our financial system, we are met by these men with the ukase of autocrats: 'We have the gold, and we intend to make you sell us your bonds at our price.' War would not be a greater calamity. I heartily indorse the sentiment in the President's message that no greater calamity can come to a people than self-humiliation.

"What American can go abroad without a blush of shame on his cheeks, when talking to an intelligent Englishman with regard to our respective affairs? I met an English gentleman at Cologne and traveled with him, and when we were talking in a friendly way about the relative strength of our two countries, he said:

"'We do not propose to fight our English cousins with shells, bullets and powder. We hold your securities. We have built your railroads. We own your breweries. We have your mills, and you cannot afford to fall out with your English cousins.'

"In New York each morning, where do the brokers and speculators run? They run to the foreign market, and if the English market is up, the American market corresponds. If the English market is down the American market drops also. England is the great barometer, financially, for the United States, and we, who should be the most independent people, and the most self-supporting in the world, are to-day subsidiary to these foreign influences, because of the single gold standard.

"We are worshiping the same fetich. We are idolators in the same temple under the present system, and if we undertake our emancipation, we are immediately told not to talk about silver because they will pour their securities upon us and bankrupt our country.

"What honest man could live under such a system of individual relations with his neighbor? What would you think of yourself if a rich neighbor should come to you and say, 'Pay me my money or I'll turn out your wife and children before the cold and bitter wind.' Nationally, we are in that condition. Why, better anything than to have ourselves manacled and gyved as we are now under the single gold standard, which, we are told is a synonym for commercial and national prosperity.

"It is one of the chiefest regrets of my public life that I have been forced, against my inclination, into antagonism with the head of my party. I make no apology for saying that I believe the principles of the Democratic party are necessary for the welfare of this country and that anything which looks toward its disorganization or weakening is detrimental to the public good.

"So believing, never, never in all my life have I been countered with so much self-regret as when I was compelled to part with the head of my party upon this financial question, and not only with him, but with my personal friend, the Secretary of the Treasury, with whom my relations have always been of the most cordial description.

"But it was impossible for me to remain a Senator upon this floor, with my ideas of representation, and do otherwise than I have done. Whatever might have been my personal opinion, an enormous majority of the people who sent me here are the friends of silver coinage. No constitutional question was involved, for I have always held that no constituency or Legisla-

ture could instruct me to violate the Constitution as I understood it, but on questions of policy they have the right. If I had not been in favor of the free coinage of silver I would have given place to one who could have come here and represented the Democrats of Missouri faithfully and honestly."

The Senator denied that the country has all the money necessary for the transaction of the people's business. He said:

"The curse of our new system to-day is that the money is congested in the great centers. It is not amongst the people at large, and the advocates of the single gold standard make no distinction between falling prices and low prices. When we have low prices in the country, it may be may be well for the poor and humble, but falling prices constitute a curse to all classes and all sections.

"No man will invest in property when he thinks he can buy it more cheaply the next day or month or year, and the result is that now, with the single gold standard, the purchasing power of gold increased daily and the price of everything else falling, we have falling prices and congestion in business. Here is the solution, in my judgment, of this whole matter. If we had more money in circulation, and the capitalist was forced to let go of his hoarded money and put it into investment, we then would have prosperity unexampled, with the great resources at our command.

"No country can be prosperous with an increasing population and a decreasing volume of money. There are counties in Missouri to-day where the people, great as that State is, rich as it is, resort to barter. Money in banks? Oh, yes; and money congested in the centers. Why, what is the matter with your single gold standard system? What is the condition to-day? With our enormous crops, my State can feed the world. The valley of the Nile would never compete with it, yet I am afraid that in this cold weather they are burning their corn for fuel, as they repeatedly do in the far West. Enormous crops and falling in values, while the Eastern States declare there is plenty of money and exclaim, 'Oh, what is the matter with these hay-makers out West, who know nothing about finance?'

"The Secretary of the Treasury calculates that there is $504,000,000 of gold in circulation. Where is it? I should like for any man to specify where that gold is. We know there is $160,000,000 in the national banks. Some Senator the other day talked about the stockings filled with gold. I should like to see one. I should like to find the old woman of this country, outside of Wall street, who has a stocking full of gold. I could make more than my salary by exhibiting her as a financial curiosity. Why, Mr. President, there is not a $5 gold piece to the county out West, outside of the banks. You may address an audience of 2,500 or 3,000 people and ask: 'Is there a man here who has a gold piece?' and he cannot be found. There is not any gold in circulation. There is not $500,000 outside of the banks and Wall street, or the safes of gold speculators."

Senator Vest concluded his address as follows:

"There is an irrepressible conflict on this question, and men must align themselves upon one side or the other. If you propose to retain the single gold standard and the national banks, then go to the people and have it done, and put an end to the present condition of distrust and unrest and uncertainty. But if, as I believe, the people of this country would respond to the call of those who, as Democrats and Americans, demand that one-half of the metallic money of the world shall not be destroyed; that this financial despotism shall be struck down; that we shall have gold and silver, the money of our fathers, to be the money of our children, we propose to have it done at the ballot box and to crystallize it by legislation."

CHIEF PROVISIONS OF THE MEASURE INTRODUCED IN THE SENATE.

WASHINGTON, D. C., Jan. 12.—Senator Vest has completed his financial bill and introduced it in the Senate. Senator Mills and others gave valuable assistance. Its provisions are, in brief, as follows:

The bill provides that all Treasury notes and gold and silver certificates shall be destroyed, and an equivalent amount of notes payable in standard gold and silver coin shall be issued and paid out instead of the notes. No coin note of larger denomination than $5000 nor smaller than $10 shall be issued, and the denomination larger than $50 shall not exceed one-fourth of the total amount of the coin notes outstanding at any time. The coin notes are to be legal tender for all debts.

The second section repeals all laws which authorize the owners of gold and silver bullion to deposit it and receive gold or silver certificates, and the Secretary of the Treasury is directed to receive no more coin or bullion in the future.

Section 3 provides that the gold certificates now outstanding are to be paid in gold coin and the silver certificates in standard silver coin or coin notes. If the gold in the Treasury amounts to less than $100,000,000, exclusive of that necessary to redeem gold certificates, they are to be redeemed in silver coins; if more than $100,000,000, the Secretary of the Treasury in the exercise of his discretion may redeem in either gold or silver coin.

Section 4 makes it unlawful for any national bank to issue bank notes or currency, and all acts authorizing such issue are repealed. It is made the duty of the Secretary within twelve months to sell the United States bonds deposited in the Treasury by national banks to secure the circulation in the case of national banks retiring their circulation or going out of business, and after redeeming notes or currency as provided by the national bank act, the surplus is to be also paid in the coin notes to the bank owning the bonds in the amounts respectively due them.

Section 5 requires the Secretary of the Treasury to have coined as fast as possible the silver bullion held in the Treasury, purchased under the Sherman act of 1890, including the gain or seigniorage, and this coin is to be used in the payment of public expenditures and for the redemption of the coin notes authorized by this act.

Section 6 provides that when the revenues of the Government are not sufficient to meet its current expenses, the Secretary of the Treasury shall issue a sufficient amount of coin notes to cover this deficiency, and all laws authorizing the future issues of interest-bearing bonds of the United States are repealed, except as otherwise provided. The section also provides that if the gold in the Treasury at the time the act shall take effect does not amount to $100,000,000, exclusive of that held to redeem gold cirtificates, the Secretary is directed to sell United States bonds at not less than par, in gold coin, bearing not to exceed 3 per cent interest, redeemable after five years, but no greater amount of such bonds are to be sold than may be necessary to procure for the Treasury the full amount of $100,000,000 in gold.

Section 7 provides that silver bullion brought to any mint of the United States for coinage shall be received and coined into standard dollars of 412½ grains, but no deposit of silver bullion of less value than $100 shall be received, nor shall any bullion be received that is so base as to be unsuited for the operations of the mint. The Director of the Mint is to retain as seigniorage and cover into the Treasury the difference between the New York market price and the coined value of the bullion, and this is to be paid out by the Secretary of the Treasury in the current expenditures of the Government.

IN FAVOR OF FREE COINAGE.

Addresses by L. B. Prince and W. J. Bryan.

IN FAVOR OF FREE COINAGE.

Ex-Governor L. Bradford Prince, of New Mexico, was greeted with warm applause when he appeared on the stage at Entertainment Hall at 4 o'clock yesterday afternoon to open the discussion on "The Re-monetization of Silver."

The Governor is a free silver advocate, and is considered to be one of the ablest speakers on that side in the West. He spoke for one hour and a quarter. A liberal extract of his speech follows:

"The subject of a single or a double standard for money value—of monometallism or of bimetallism—is attracting more attention the world over to-day than any other. It affects every human being living in civilized countries, because it necessarily controls all values—of land, of products, of industry and of labor, on the one hand; of money, and hence of capital, interest and fixed incomes, on the other.

"The chief difficulty in its discussion in the United States has been that it has taken a sectional turn, and that the people of the two sections so misunderstand each other on the subject that any fair discussion is almost impossible. That the West, which is the producer of the great staples, with its wealth in the form of commodities, and owing large debts payable in dollars, should desire the money basis to retain the double standard existing through all history; and that English and German bankers, the great creditors of the world, receiving their interest in money, should desire a contracted financial basis, is perfectly natural. It was to be expected that those of our people in the East who are under foreign control, and others of the creditor class selfishly interested in the increase in the value of money, would unite with the foreign bankers in their single-standard method of contraction; but the misfortune is that the great body of Americans east of the Mississippi, really patriotic at heart and anxious for national prosperity, should have given so little attention to the subject as to imagine their interests also to be different from those of their Western brethren. Hence has arisen the misunderstanding to which I have referred."

Governor Prince then alluded to St. Louis as being a good place for a fair discussion of the money question, for it was the central city of the country, midway between the East and West, and here was a favorable place to do something toward a reconciliation of sectional views, or, at least, a partial clearing away of prejudices, on account of an almost equal connection with each section.

To show that he understood the sentiment both in the East and the West, Governor Prince remarked that he had served seven years in the New York Legislature; was twice honored by votes of thanks of the New York Chamber of Commerce, and was still holding an honorary membership in the New York Board of Trade; had served as Chief Justice and as Governor of a Western Territory, and was connected with various Western bodies, commercial, scientific and literary, including the past presidency of the Transmissisippi Congress.

Governor Prince then pointed out how the Western people look upon those of the East as their enemies, and that the sole idea of Eastern capitalists was thought to be a wicked desire to ruin their poorer brethren of the West. On the other hand, it was not unusual to hear Eastern men speak of those of the West as "inflationists," as "cheap money men," as absolutely dishonest and as "wanting to get a dollar for 50 cents." But all this was reciprocal slander. As a rule, men of both sections were honest in their money ideas. The Western man, as a rule, was a bimetallist, because he hears the subject constantly discussed and has given it careful study. The Eastern man was a monometallist, as a rule, because he has simply been so situated that he has given no attention to the financial questions involved in demonetization, but has seen nothing but gold views in the journals he reads and takes it for granted that they are correct. But

the Eastern monometallist was not the depraved creature he is thought to be. The Governor declared that the generally intelligent Eastern community was ignorant of the questions involved in demonetization, but, as a rule, the Western community was enlightened on the subject.

THE EDUCATIONAL IDEA.

"What we should lay special stress upon, then," said the Governor, "is the educational idea. We can never expect justice to the producer and a restoration of national prosperity until we have the aid of our Eastern brethren in undoing the pernicious legislation of 1873 and giving us again the bimetallism which is the only safeguard of stability in property values and protector of the rights of labor; and we cannot have that co-operation until they have become informed as to the questions at issue so as to act intelligently.

"In the first place, let us remind our Eastern friends that bimetallists are not asking for anything new, or unusual, or untried. On the contrary, the joint use of gold and silver as measures of value and mediums of exchange—in other words, as money—has been the universal custom of the world since the birth of civilization. Coming down to our times, the free and unlimited coinage of these two metals was the heritage of the American people, as it was enacted in England, in 1666, in the reign of Charles II., and again under George III. in 1768, and continued until long after the Revolution.

"When the Constitution was framed, it specially recognized gold and silver equally as the only proper measures of value, prohibiting the States from making anything but them a tender in payment of debts."

The speaker traced the history of our money down to the demonetization act of 1873, which, he declared, was passed by stealth, absolutely without the knowledge of the American people, and, as appears, without the knowledge of any member of Congress, with the possible exception of three. The title of the act gave no suggestion of its object. It was understood by all that the bill which passed was simply a revision of the mint laws, and very little attention was given to it. When it was discovered some time afterward that by the omission of the standard silver dollar from the act, silver had been demonetized, the country was amazed. Now all that bimetallists contend for is that this act, thus secretly and fraudulently passed without knowledge by legislators or people, and which no one will even yet defend, should be repealed.

Continuing, Governor Prince said:

"England is a creditor nation to the extent of about ten billion dollars. She holds the securities of other bonds to that extent and draws from them each year $500,000,000 in interest. The best computation shows that we alone are paying her $200,000,000 a year in interest—more than half a million a day! Every increase in the value of a dollar, therefore, enormously enlarges her income. By demonetizing one of the two money metals, the remaiing money in the world—reduced one-half in volume—would rapidly increase in purchasing power. This was perfectly easy to foresee. Her money-lenders wished contraction in order to increase the value of their investments, principal and interest. The demonetization of one of the two precious metals was the easiest way to accomplish this. They did not care which metal it was—the result would be the same. For some years they formed the plan to demonetize gold, and Chevalier and others earnestly advocated that course. But that did not succeed, and then they attacked silver. Here they achieved success by the secret passage of the act of 1873 in the United States. Bimetallists simply ask that this act be repealed, and that the law of free coinage be restored as it had always been before. Monometallists resist this. That is the whole issue.

"I submit that it is the monometallists who are insisting on a change from the universal custom and asking it through a perpetuation of an acknowledged fraud. They should be on the defensive, for the burden of proof of good results is on them."

The speaker said that it was a misrepresentation to say that the bimetallists of the West were only "a lot of silver miners who want to get a dollar for 50 cents worth of silver." Of course, the silver mining district was much affected, but the silver miners were so small in number, as compared to the vast body of the people affected by the evils of contraction, that they need scarcely be considered as a factor. If there was not an ounce of silver produced in the United States the question of bimetallism would be unchanged.

SILVER AND WHEAT.

"The total annual product of silver has never reached 60,000,000 ounces," said the speaker. "In 1892 it was 58,000,000; last year it was considerably less; while the product of wheat averages about 500,000,00 bushels. The average price of wheat in 1873 was

$1.29, while to-day it is selling at your exchange at 50 cents, after paying freight to St. Louis. The loss to the producer of silver, through demonetization, was never in any year over $32,000,000, while the loss, from the same cause, to the producer of wheat was over $250,000,000. In the same way every producer has suffered.

"When the facts are presented to the monometallist he immediately answers that the loss in value is the result of over-production or of improved machinery. But the improved machinery, with scarcely an exception, was in operation before 1873, and the constant fall in prices continues just the same from year to year as at the beginning of the twenty years' period. Wheat and cotton have never, within the century, been as low as they are to-day.

"And if we examine as to the theory of overproduction we will find that the facts are against it. All together it is calculated that if the aggregate of agricultural products raised in 1893 could be sold for the bimetallic value of 1873, the gain to the farming community would be nearly or quite $1,500,000,000. In other words, they have lost that vast amount on the crops of a single year through the demonetization of silver and consequent rise in the value of the remaining money.

"Yet silver has not decreased in money value more than other products of industry. It has, of course, felt the general effect of the rise in value of gold money, but has kept on a par with other staple articles. An ounce of silver will buy as much wheat, or corn, or hay, or oats, or wool, or cotton, as it would before the act of 1873. Every commodity has been reduced in its money value since the single gold standard was established and money began to increase in value. To-day, according to best authorities, money has risen to about 147, calling it par in 1873. Of course, this correspondingly reduces the price of everything else when compared with it.

"But the monometallist will suggest that it makes no real difference to a country whether the standard of values be high or low; if it is high and the seller receives less for his goods, that is equaled by the fact that he pays correspondingly less for what he buys. There would be some force in that argument if commodities were all affected equally and simultaneously, and if there were no payments to be made in money itself. But there are vast numbers of contracts and obligations which require the payment of money, many of them running over long series of years. All of these are directly affected by the change in the value of money. When a dollar is worth 147, and is increasing over 2 per cent every year, it is easy to see that great injustice is done by requiring compliance with such contracts. The only practicable means of securing justice to all is to restore the money basis to its normal standard by the remonetization of silver.

WHERE THE BURDEN FALLS HEAVIEST.

"Meanwhile the increased value of money falls with terrible weight and injustice upon the debtor classes. The debts being stated in dollars, and the dollars having increased in value and cost, the debts are correspondingly enlarged. The man who borrowed a thousand dollars in 1871, when money was at par, now finds that he owes $1,000, each of which is worth 1.47 of the dollars he borrowed. As the nominal amount is the same, it is simpler to state the case in other terms. It requires half as much more of average commodities to purchase the one thousand dollars in money now than it did in 1873. Of some commodities it requires almost or quite double. If a farmer borrowed a hundred and nineteen dollars in 1873 he could repay it with 100 bushels of wheat. To repay it now requires considerably over 200 bushels. The measure of value—the dollar—has greatly increased in value, and yet he is compelled by law to repay just as many of them as he received before they began to rise. It is exactly the same as if he had contracted to deliver 100 bushels of wheat, and Congress had afterwards enacted that a bushel should contain sixty-four quarts, instead of thirty-two, and that all old contracts should be paid in the new, enlarged bushel.

"With each dollar now worth $1.47, the taxpayer has to meet the increased burden required to procure these unjustly enlarged dollars. A large proportion of our taxation is not the result of current expenses, but of these 'fixed charges' required for paying the interest on public debts, and whatever may be the decreased price of all commodities in money, the number of dollars required to meet these 'fixed charges' is not lessened. So, again, our railroads owe enormous amounts in bonds, and interest thereon is often the largest item in calculating their expenses. It is payable in money, and money at its greatly increased value must be had in order to liquidate it. The rates of fare and freight must be made such as to meet these charges. So, everyone who travels or receives commodities by rail is forced, without his consent and without any fault or neglect on his part, to pay part of the extra 47 per cent added to every dollar of railroad interest.

"Calling the amount of interest paid by this country to England each year $200,000,000, the added cost to our people is $94,000,000 in our commodities, for which we have to toil—just that much added each year to the burden on American labor, without any return, as the price on that one account for the theoretical benefit of a single gold standard.

"We hear a good deal about 'honest money' and an 'honest dollar.' Let us see about this: Here is a dollar which has increased since 1873 and is still regularly increasing in value 2.4 per cent each year. If it would buy ten pounds of any commidity ten years ago, it will buy 12.4 pounds to-day. If a man borrowed $100 ten years ago, he has to pay back 24 per cent more in value to-day than on the day of the loan, besides all interest. The most important quality in a measure of value is stability. The measure should be unchangeable. If a person borrows a sum in 1874, he should repay the sum, with the same purchasing power, in 1894. There is a manifest injustice—a manifest dishonesty—in requiring the man who borrowed $100 in 1872, when it was equivalent to eighty-four bushels of wheat, or 550 pounds of cotton, to pay back $100 which have appreciated to $147 in 1894, and equal 200 bushels of wheat or 1,700 pounds of cotton.

AS APPLIED TO OTHER THINGS.

"The United States Constitution provides that Congress shall pass no law impairing the obligation of a contract. Yet Congress, by its legislation, has changed every contract in which a cash payment is at some time to be made, by increasing the value of the money which has to be used. Suppose that Congress should decree that each year one inch should be added to a yard measure—everyone would cry out against the dishonesty involved in requiring a man who has contracted to furnish 1,000 yards of cloth, supposing the yard to be 36 inches, to fulfill his contract when the length was increased to 37 or 40 inches, without any change in compensation. Yet the annual increase of 2.4 per cent is almost exactly an inch on a yard. Had the yard measure increased exactly as money has since 1873—that is, to 147—it would now reach 53 inches.

"So, if Congress should enact that a bushel should increase in the same ratio, it would now hold 47 quarts, and everyone having a contract to deliver potatoes or wheat or apples by the bushel, would be compelled to deliver that increased quantity. If the same ratio were extended to weights the pound would now weigh 23 ounces.

"A law regarding a simple commodity only affects that one article, but one which changes the worth of the measure of all values, affects everything which is bought or sold by that standard. Money is the embodiment, in one measure, of the measures of length, of capacity and of weight—of the yard stick, the bushel and the pound. Congress, by the demonetization act of 1873, has accomplished exactly what separate acts providing for the annual enlargement of each kind of measure would have done; the only difference is that the effect was so concealed that the indignation of the people was not immediately aroused.

"There is another fallacy that it may be well to explode by a few facts. Quite frequently we hear the statement that the value of every commodity is what it costs to produce, and that, consequently, the real value of silver is what it costs to extract. Disregarding for a moment the absurdity of this proposition in regard to a money metal, which is a measure of value, let us see what it would mean if it were in any sense true—if, for instance, silver were simply a commodity. The brilliant author of the statement usually follows it up by saying 'And in such a mine'—naming some one of the most famous producers of the time then in the height of its phenomenal success—'it only costs so many cents'—20 or 30 or 40, perhaps—'to mine an ounce of silver.' Therefore, he argues, silver in general is only worth 20 or 30 or 40 cents an ounce. Such an extraordinary logician is only fit to be an early victim of the foolkiller. On the same principle, if a man found a nugget of gold weighing five pounds, and carried it home, occupying a day in the operation, counting his time worth $2.50, that gold would be worth half a dollar a pound.

"If the principle had any truth in it, it would be the average cost of production which would be the criterion, not the extreme either of cheapness or expense. As a matter of fact, both gold and silver—taking the whole production and expense—cost more to produce than they are worth. The fact is that—except in the case of newly discovered regions—the production of the precious metals depends on their value, not their value on the production. The value of money, and the number of ounces of a money metal to be counted as a given value, are matters of legislation, not of trade.

"It is worth remarking that so far from a large supply of one or the other metal being made to reduce its value, in a number of cases, where dominant nations looked to their own interests, exactly the reverse was the case. The dominant power raised the value of the metal of which it had the most abundant supply, exactly opposite to the theory of the anti-silver men that a large production requires a diminution in value, and it will also be observed that the value was always fixed by edict and not by natural law.

"Another point is worthy of notice: That so far as Europe is concerned, it was the steadfast bimetallism of one single country—France—which preserved the stability of the ratio through 70 years of fluctuation, including the violent change in relative production brought about by the gold discoveries in California and Australia. If France could do this, single-handed, why not the United States?"

FOR EXAMPLE.

"The two great articles of food are corn and wheat. Now let us suppose that a gigantic syndicate bought up all the wheat in the country and then induced Congress to pass a law forbidding the grinding of corn into meal. What would happen? It is obvious that the price of wheat would be immediately enhanced and that would continue to increase as wheat became more and more scarce. On the other hand, the price of corn would go down, the demand for it having fallen off.

"This appears to be as near a parallel to the Congressional action on the silver question as can be suggested, except that the latter is much more disastrous and far reaching in its consequences, because it has enhanced the value, not of a simple commodity like wheat, but of gold standard money, which is the legal measure of value of everything else.

"Gold and silver have been the two money metals from the beginning of civilization. Now, suppose a certain syndicate, having in various ways obtained control of most of the gold of the world, should be able to influence Congress to demonetize silver. The result is obvious. Gold, the only money metal left, increases in value as the burden of the pecuniary business of the world, previously divided, falls upon it alone, and silver—its great use destroyed—rapidly falls.

"Then, when the owners of silver ask that the legislation which caused this condition shall be repealed and the natural use of silver restored, so that it may recover its proper value, they are met with the cry that this is a monstrous and unjust proposition, because everyone can see that silver is worth only 60 cents an ounce, as it is actually selling for that in the market.

"And when the great body of the people who are compelled to pay double value for money, because it is now confined to gold, arise and demand that their ancient right to coin and use silver be restored, they are told that gold is the only honest money and that no one wants silver or 'cheap money' except selfish silver miners.

"What does free coinage mean? It means the system which was established at the foundation of our Government, which provided that everyone having gold or silver could take it to the mint and have it melted and stamped as coin. If there were limitations as to the amount or place of origin, there would constantly be contentions, and we should have two classes of silver, entirely different in value, coined and uncoined.

"The whole principle underlying the stable and unvarying values of the precious metals as measures of commercial exchange, requires an absolutely free and unlimited right of coinage at a fixed ratio.

WHAT WE NEED.

"The need of the hour is such an awakening of interest in this question in the East as will cause inquiry and investigation and independence of thought. We are one nation, our interests are identical; that which effects one section, effects all; and in this matter the conditions are practically the same, East and West, North and South. The ideas studiously inculcated in the East that this is a Western matter and one in which the silver-producing States are principally interested, is utterly deceptive, as I have endeavored to show. The farmer of New York or Ohio is interested precisely as is his brother in Iowa or Kansas. The man who owes a mortgage in Massachusetts feels the increasing pressure of the obligation as strongly as his fellow-debtor of Missouri or Dakota. The increasing number of foreclosures, the lengthened list of sales for unpaid taxes, the armies of the underpaid and unemployed, tell the same story everywhere.

"On theory it was easy to say what the results of demonetization must be; actual experience is showing what they they are. A steady decrease in all property values and a steady increase in the burden of all fixed charges, can bring but one result. The cry of the suffering goes up to heaven. The most despairing and the most touching of their prayers are never heard on earth, for they come from those who suffer in silence. The aggregate of human misery caused by this grinding of the upper and the nether mill stones is a thing to make angels weep. We live in the most favored of all lands. God has given us a goodly heritage. The natural resources of our country should make it one of universal prosperity and happiness. There is no reason for suffering and want. Its causes are purely artificial. By the selfishness of man the good gifts of Providence turn to ashes in our hands. The food is taken from the mouths of the weak and the defenseless.

"No judgment from on high has been visited upon this people; neither war, nor famine, nor pestilence has been suffered to afflict us. Yet in the midst of physical health the nation is sick. In the midst of wealth there is poverty and in a land of plenty there is suffering and starvation. God grant us all the will and the wisdom to seek the causes of these things, and having found them to apply the remedy."

SENATOR TILLMAN'S SPEECH IN FULL.

The Complete Text as it Was Printed in the Congressional Record.

Numerous inquiries addressed to the *Post-Dispatch* make it apparent that there is a general desire to see Senator Tillman's speech in full, as actually delivered. No newspaper has yet printed the speech in full, and in the versions of it that have been published some of the strongest and most striking passages have been omitted. The following is a reprint of the speech exactly as it appears in the *Congressional Record*. The only omissions are a long extract from an official document, which Senator Tillman himself did not read, but simply referred to, and the syndicate contract of February, 1895, which was annexed as an appendix.

Mr. Tillman: Mr. President, I shall make no apology for doing what is my right here, to exercise the functions of a Senator and discuss the issues presented to the Senate. I know, sir, that custom has made it a rule that new members of this body should listen rather than be heard, and my brief experience — and while in the city I have been very attentive upon the sessions of the Senate — has shown me that the custom is a wise one, because new men who come in here, especially those who, like myself, have had little, in fact no legislative experience, realize very soon that what they do not know about the affairs of this great Government is far more than they do know.

My experience has been in a different arena. I am a farmer, pure and simple, with no collateral occupation. The speeches that I have made have been upon the hustings, out in the open air under the trees, before the common masses of the country, where men are allowed, if they feel disposed, to applaud the utterances of the orator. I find here that the Senate considers it beneath its dignity to applaud anybody, and the galleries are reprimanded severely if they break over the rule and indicate that they approve something that has been said, I find further that no matter how well pleased men are with what is being said — I mean Senators, for I look upon those in the galleries as automatons merely, you know — the rule is to Gorgonize the speaker with a Senatorial stare, and turn him into stone almost. What has been the result? I find that men eminent in our history,

whose speeches are read all over the country, get up here like schoolboys and read essays in a monotone to empty chairs, when the Senate of the United States, supposed to be in session, has gone to the cloakrooms or somewhere else.

Now, sir, this could not have been the purpose and the idea of the creators of the Senate, the fathers who framed the Constitution. This grand deliberative assemblage, the grandest in the world, must have been designed by those who framed the Constitution to be a deliberative body where the ablest men of the country, representing sovereign States, would meet together in council and listen to each other's arguments and the presentation of facts and base their action thereon. But what are we? The mere servants of party, bound hand and foot by the feeling that we must obey the behest of party conventions; and those who speak at all — and God knows there is enough speaking or reading — speak merely for home consumption and to have their constituents read what they have said and what Uncle Sam sends out free through the mails under the frank of the Honorable This or the Honorable That.

Take any able speech that has been made here — and there have been many made since I have been here — who reads it? Speeches do not get into the newspapers except in a garbled shape. A Senator sends them home to his State. If a speech is eloquent, very cogent, his fellow-Senators subscribe for a few hundred or a few thousand copies, which they send out, and the eloquence and the logic and the argument which it has taken the Senator months to prepare are buried in the records in our archives. His words do not reach the citizens of other States; especially do they not reach the citizens of the party to which he does not belong.

How much of this, Mr. President, is due to self-complacency, to the feeling among you — I hardly feel prepared yet to say among us — that you are the Senate? How much of this so-called Senatorial dignity of which we hear so much and see so much is worthy of preservation? It hangs over this Chamber like a wet blanket; it smothers down independent action, it obliterates the man, and we are here the puppets, the cogs in the wheel of party, to do the bidding of the manipulators of the party machines. (Manifestatious of applause in the galleries.)

The Vice-President rapped with his gavel.

Mr. Tillman: Speeches here change no votes. There is not a man on this floor who on any question affecting his party has ever been budged one inch from his position by a speech from a man on the other side. Even though his reason was convinced he felt that he must obey the behest of the party to which he belonged.

Now, sir, while I in part represent South Carolina on this floor. I have a higher conception of my duty than to feel or believe that South Carolina's interests only are in my keeping. I am an American Senator. I have one vote out of ninety which deal with the lives and liberties and property of the people of this country, and unless I discharge my duty in a conscientious manner and from a broad and patriotic standpoint, rising above local prejudices and interests to consider the interests of the entire country, I am unworthy of a seat here.

So far as I know I am the only farmer pure and simple in this august body. Yet out of the 70,000,000 people in this country, 35,000,000 are engaged in agricultural pursuits alone. If, then, one farmer has broken down the barriers and forced his way here, upon his head rests the responsibility of giving utterance to the sense of wrong which they have. Therefore, Mr. President, I feel constrained to-day to raise my voice to speak, and before I get through you will realize the fact that I speak plainly and bluntly and use Anglo-Saxon, the vernacular, the langnage of the common people, for I am one of them and I expect to tell you how they feel, and what they think, and what they want.

The Senator from Ohio (Mr. Sherman) said the other day that the question of the free coinage of silver is old straw, that it has been thrashed and thrashed and thrashed; that there is nothing new in it. It has been thrashed, sir, by lawyers; it has been thrashed by rail-

road magnates; it has been thrashed by the president of this corporation and the attorney of that corporation. It has not been handled on the pitchfork of a farmer. I am here to see if I can not get a few grains more wheat — of truth — in the handling of the question. Farmers use a pitchfork in handling straw, therefore the simile is good if the statement is good. They also use pitchforks to handle manure, and perhaps I shall find some of that in my pathway before I get through.

Of course, the novelty of a farmer pretending to talk finance or to understand the question is so great that most of my colleagues are doing me the honor, I believe for the first time this session, to sit here and listen to me. I thank you, gentlemen, that you have not adjourned and gone off. Whether I shall repay you or not I can not say. Two things, though, I can promise you: First, that I will try to tell the truth as I see it; and the other is that when I get through, I shall stop. That is not a virtue of many of those who have spoken here, because they have run around a circle, traveling like a kitten following its tail, and have simply tired their fellows out, and they had to leave for self-protection. (Laughter.) The wise man said long ago that "there is nothing new under the sun," and, of course, those who have been here for years, who have heard these old questions of the tariff and finances talked over and spoken about for months and months and years, feel so tired and worn out and disgusted that the mere names of finance and tariff give them a tired feeling.

What is the position of the Republican party as set forth by its acknowledged leader, the Senator from Ohio (Mr. Sherman)? I am sorry he is not here. How did he set it forth in his speech on the 3d day of January? What did he propose to do? He said that the present trouble with the finances of the country arose from a deficit in the revenues, and the remedy is to issue more bonds and tax the people. That is all — increase the tariff in order to increase the revenues and issue bonds to pay the defict and get the gold reserve straight, and we will all be happy. That is the Republican policy. They do not propose any other scheme of relief at this time.

What is the policy outlined by the leader, as you say, on this side, the man who lives at the other end of the avenue? His policy is more bonds, no increase of revenue — he has enough revenue just now — retire all the greenbacks, all the silver certificates, and perhaps the national banks may graciously come in and fill the void by issuing notes.

In what respect do they differ? Mr. Sherman wants coin bonds. Mr. Cleveland wants gold bonds. Mr. Sherman wants a higher tariff; Mr. Cleveland wants the present tariff. Mr. Sherman, as a means of relief to stop the endless chain, which is a patent contrivance, with thieves at one end and dishonest officials at the other, to rob the American people, wants to keep the redeemed greenbacks in the Treasury, so no one can get them to raid the Treasury, while the President says that the only refuge he sees is to redeem, to blot out, and issue bonds in place of every solitary piece of paper that circulates without interest. And both of them mean contradiction, lower prices, harder times.

Neither of them tell us what is to bring relief. Mr. Sherman — I will read from his speech presently — does give what he considers a comprehensive, a good scheme for futnre use; mind you, not now. The whole idea appears to be that a promise of this Government which is a mortgage on the labor of this country for thirty years to come is better than a promise of this Government without interest, which circulates as money in the everyday affairs of the people. Now, I ask any man here who has a scintilla of honesty in his heart or in his brain to tell me the difference between the promises of this Government; and if one of them, which would relieve the people, is good, being to-day at a premium, in the name of fairness and honesty why should they wish to retire greenbacks and put out another promise that will bear interest? In whose interest is such a scheme brought here but that of the moneyed classes, who are to-day rolling in wealth? The idea is to sink deeper in the bog of pauperism and poverty the sweatlug, toiling masses, the farmers, and other laborers, who are

to pay the interest and redeem the bonds at some future time, possibly.

I saw in the *Arena* the article which the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Peffer) quoted in his speech, but deeming it too long for my purposes, and also fearing that the figures might be wrong, I obtained the official documents and prepared a table showing just what this system has cost us. In 1866 the national debt was $2,636,000,000 in round numbers. At that time cotton was worth 43 cents a pound, and it would have taken 1,940,000 bales to pay the entire debt. Wheat was worth $2.36 a bushel, and it would have taken 1,116,000,000 bushels to have paid the national debt. It may be said that that is not fair, because the inflation just after the war, the unsettled condition, the impoverished and war-wounded condition of the South caused cotton to be abnormally high. Then come down to 1873, when silver was demonetized. The public debt had been reduced to $2,105,000,000; cotton was worth 20 cents, and notwithstanding the reduction of $500,000,000 in the debt it would have taken 22,000,000 bales of cotton to pay it, nearly double what it would have taken at the end of the war. Wheat was worth $1.56, and it would have taken 1,349,000,000 bushels of wheat to pay the debt — upward of 200,000,000 bushels more, notwithstanding the reduction.

Come to 1879, when specie payments were resumed. Cotton was then worth 10 cents. Wheat was worth $1.21, and it would have taken 39,000,000 bales of cotton to pay it. Wheat was worth $1.21, and it would have taken 1,649,000,000 bushels to pay it, notwithstanding the reduction. Come down to 1894 and add in the last infamous issue of $162,000,000 of bonds; put that on top of the debt. The public debt was $889,000,000; cotton was worth 7 cents, and it would have taken in 1894 25,000,000 bales of cotton to pay the debt, more than double the amount it would have taken at the close of the war. Wheat was worth 61 cents, and it would have taken 1,474,000,000 bushels to pay it.

We have struggled, we have delved and plowed — and we furnish nearly all of your exports — during the entire time we have paid in interest and principal on the national debt $3,914,000,000, at an average of 12 cents a pound for cotton, 63,000,000 bales; at an average of $1.25 for wheat, 3,131,000,000 bushels of wheat, and to-day after all these payments, in the words of the poet, we "drag at each remove a lengthening chain," with a ball at the end of it or a bondholder straddle of it; and to-day it will take more of the products of the farm to liquidate the national debt than it would have taken when the war closed.

I will insert a table giving the figures in detail.

YEAR.	Debt, interest-bearing and noninterest-bearing, less cash in Treasury.	Debt could have been paid in bales of cotton of 500 pounds each.	Average price of cotton.	Debt could have been paid in bushels of wheat.	Average price of wheat.
1866	$2,636,086,164	12,340,020	$0.43	1,116,222,103	$2.36
1873	2,105,415,062	21,054,150	.20	1,349,134,615	1.56
1879	1,996,414,905	39,928,298	.10	1,649,294,673	1.21
1894	889,313,380	25,916,812	.0694	1,474,284,229	.61
Paid in principal and interest since 1866..	3,914,424,535	65,240,414	.12	3,131,539,684	1.25

Sir, in 1861, when the unfortunate civil war broke out, the entire people of this country numbered 31,000,000. Their aggregate wealth was $16,000,000,000. Nearly one-third of our people were in insurrection, endeavoring to break up the Union, leaving, say, twenty-one or

twenty-two millions in the North. Gold was hidden; it disappeared from circulation. The greenback was the only standby and support of the Union, and no honest man here will deny the fact that the greenback alone enabled the North to conquer the South. To-day we number somewhere between sixty-five and seventy million people. Our aggregate wealth, according to the census, is $65,000,000,000. We are at peace. We are beginning to fraternize in business and in social life, and the anger of the war is passing away, thank God! And yet the same insatiate cormorants, the shylocks, are here prating about the credit of the country and asking you to formulate a scheme and to enact it into law to complete what has been partially accomplished, to put the country on the basis of gold alone, doubling, as they acknowledge it will double, if it has not already done so in a large degree, the debts of every debtor. For whose benefit?

A well-informed man on the Naval Committee told me a day or two ago that by actual computation there were 4,000 millionaires in America, whose aggregate wealth averages $6,000,000 apiece. That is $24,000,000,000 owned by 4,000 people. He said it was going to cause trouble. I think his head is level. It is going to cause trouble, and a deal of trouble, because they have stolen it, most of them. It was obtained by iniquitous laws in favor of classes and corporations, and against the masses, and there has got to be a reckoning some day.

I know you will laugh at me, but I got just a little bit frightened, and to keep from saying hard things in an unparliamentary way I took the precaution to prepare a little essay of my own. I hope that you will patiently listen while I endeavor to read it.

It is not saying too much, and I feel warranted in charging that the derangement in our finances and this cry about sound money and maintaining the credit and honor of the United States are all part and parcel of a damnable scheme of robbery, which had for its object, first, the utter destruction of silver as a money metal; second, the increase of the public debt by the issue of bonds payable in gold, and third, the surrender to corporations of the power to issue all paper money and give them a monopoly of that function.

After the enactment of the Sherman law in 1890 it was supposed that the price of silver would rise and the ratio between the two metals, as bullion, would be approximately restored to the legal ratio. That law has been defined by the Senator from Ohio as a "makeshift to keep down free coinage." The Democratic platform denounced it as a "makeshift" for free coinage, and the silver Republicans — mind you, instead of this Senate being divided up and down that way (indicating), it is getting divided across this way (indicating); thank God, for we have been on this side down below, under the heels, and we are glad to find that the "galled jade winces" west of the Mississippi, and that the collar of servitude which has been fastened around our necks and has been there for thirty years is beginning to make your shoulders raw — the silver Republicans, who had been bamboozled into accepting it as a compromise hoping that it would provide for the absorption of the entire American silver product, found themselves overreached and deceived. It can not be denied that the object of the law was to increase the price of silver and restore its parity, and this must be borne in mind when we come to discuss its provisions. While the struggle was going on in Congress between the silver and anti-silver forces and it was thought probable that the free coinage bill would pass, silver steadily rose in the markets of the world, and it did not begin to decline until a month after the passage of the bill, at which time it was 117, within 12 cents of the ratio of 16 to 1.

I desire to call especial attention to this fact as an answer to the assertion, so freely made and so oftened repeated by gold-bug papers and orators, that legislation does not affect the price of silver, and that we would sink to a silver basis alongside of Mexico, China and Japan, and have only 50-cent dollars, if silver were restored to its place alongside of gold. That is a stock argument. We have heard it this week right here in this chamber. It will come in here next week.

It will come in here whenever anybody gets up to speak on the other side.

But when it was seen that this country was still controlled by monometallists the price of silver began to drop, and went down, down, down, below even the price which ruled before the enactment of the Sherman law. There was still discrimination against the white metal; it did not have free coinage as gold, but it was a commodity, not a money. It was discriminated against by legislative enactment, and hence the fall. The silver Republicans of the West, who had deserted the silver Democrats of the South and accepted the compromise offered by Senator Sherman, may take warning as to what faith or trust they can put in any utterances or actions of the Senator from Ohio as to legislation in regard to our finances. If they are honest in their assertions that they feel the welfare of their States and the welfare of the masses of the people depend upon the restoration of silver to equality with gold, they should be prepared to cross the Rubicon and fight this battle to a finish, under whatever banner shall promise victory and relief. Partisan political affiliations and sectional feeling no doubt largely influenced their action in 1890. The time for another Presidential election approaches. They must understand that the election of any man to the Presidency who would veto a free-coinage bill means defeat. It means more; it means continued disaster to our industries and increased poverty to the masses of our people.

But let me return to the question of the conspiracy. An examination of the tables in the report of the Treasurer giving the net gold in the Treasury will show that under the Sherman law there was a diminution of the amount of free gold in a gradually decreasing scale, but not enough to cause any alarm. During the entire year of 1891 and the entire year of 1892 there was approximately as much gold as there was during the years 1884 and 1885. The exact figures are as follows:

Average for the twelve months of 1894, $135,951,036.

Average for the twelve months of 1885, $129,554,162.

Average for the twelve months of 1891, $133,824,344.

Average for the twelve months of 1892, $117,472,893.

If the secret history of the year 1892 shall ever be written, it will disclose the fact, which cannot be proven now, but of which I have not the slightest doubt, that the gold ring of New York, which embraces nearly all the bankers in the Eastern and Middle States and the stock gamblers of Wall street, controlled the Presidential nominations of both the Democratic and Republican parties and had an understanding with the managers or with both the candidates themselves in regard to what policy should be pursued toward our finances. They contributed money for the booming of Mr. Cleveland as the only available Democratic candidate, and they abused and ridiculed every other Democratic aspirant. Any one who was present during the Democratic Convention at Chicago, could see that there was a large band of organized boomers in the lobby of the Palmer House, where they kept up such a noise and racket that one would have thought that pandemonium had broken loose and all the demons of hell had collected in one group to shout for "Grover." Mr. Cleveland was undoubtedly very strong with the mass of the people, and his patriotic and sympathetic utterances during his first Administration in behalf of the agricultural classes gave him great strength, but there is no doubt that money was used lavishly and that there were pledges made in regard to the distribution of patronage as a means of controlling delegates and securing votes.

There was plain evidence to show that the President himself had weakened on the question of tariff reform, and the financial plank was cunningly drafted so as to satisfy both gold and silver men, with the intention that it should be interpreted, if Cleveland was elected, as meaning the cessation of silver coinage and the forcing of a gold standard upon the people. Interpreted according to the plain use and meaning of English words the platform means bimetallism, but there are conditions and ambiguous phrases which have afforded an excuse to the elastic

conscience of the bull-headed and self-idolatrous man who holds the reins of power to pursue the policy he has. Whether the scheme was agreed to by the President in person or not and whether he bound himself in plain terms or not will, perhaps, never be known. His course has been unswerving in the absolute contradiction of his public professions and letter of acceptance. The expectations and interests of the people have been forgotten and ignored. The party which elected him has been betrayed, and its banners which floated so triumphantly in the breezes of 1892, now trail in the dust of disgrace and defeat. The practical destruction of the party has been accomplished. As a proof of it, while the national convention is only six months off, there is no one prominently mentioned as its candidate for the Presidency. No one seems willing to offer himself as a vicarious sacrifice on the altar of a disgraced and dishonored party. The Republicans, who have been defeated by such an overwhelming vote at the last Presidential election, are now in possession of the other branch of Congress by a majority unknown to our history, except during and immediately after the war. They are there not because there has been an increase in the Republican vote, but because hundreds of thousands of disgusted Democrats have stayed at home and let the election go by default.

There was no trouble with the gold reserve and no hint of any loss of confidence in the national credit until about the time of the Presidential election. While the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Foster, was contemplating the probabilities of a deficit in the revenue, the raiding of the Treasury by withdrawing gold did not begin until after Cleveland's election.

There were withdrawals of gold in the regular order of business, but the endless chain had not begun to work.

We then, for the first time, got a glimpse of the conspiracy of which I have spoken. Mr. Foster gave the holders of greenbacks and Treasury notes the option of having Government paper cashed in gold or silver, and as they all demanded gold the gold in the Treasury rapidly ran down. The financial papers took up the cry of the country going to a silver basis, and the first premonitory breezes of the panic of 1893 swept over the land. While there were no reasonable causes to produce distrust, the conspirators fomented it by every means possible and set in motion the machinery of the newspapers which they control to terrorize the business interests of the country and make ready for the "object lesson" which Mr. Cleveland told us was coming. It was expected by the confiding Democracy that the installation of the new Administration would witness a change of policy. The trust in the President was very great, and, remembering how he had ship-wrecked the party in 1888 by his Quixotic tariff message and the emphatic indorsement which he had given to the platform adopted at Chicago, the silver Democrats had reason to expect that he had learned some wisdom and that the Government would exercise its option to pay its obligations in coin, either gold or silver, for its own protection.

The Republicans have stressed the fact in their arguments on this floor that the gold reserve never fell below a hundred millions until after Harrison vacated the Executive office, but it must not be forgotten that they had set the example, had broken the slender prop which had started the avalanche, and, instead of endeavoring to stem the tide of ruin and redeem the pledges of the Democratic party to give the people relief, President Cleveland lent aid and comfort to the conspirators by his utterances and official actions in continuing the policy of his predecessor.

The people by their votes had demanded a change from the Republican policy. A Democratic President gave them a change for the worse by encouraging his moneyed friends who controlled the newspapers and thus directed the current of public opinion to hurry up their operations of robbery by means of the panic and to accelerate the downward progress of the country. We had fondly hoped for relief.

I came up here as Governor of my State and stood out in the cold around here on North Capitol street for four hours, nearly frozen to death, to be present at the jollification and glorification upon the inauguration of a Democratic

President, with a Democratic Senate and Democratic House, and God forgive me for being such a fool. (Laughter on the floor and in the galleries.)

The presiding officer (Mr. Faulkner in the chair): The Chair would admonish the galleries that under the rules of the Senate manifestations of applause or dissent are not permitted and if it recurs the Chair will be under the necessity of enforcing the rules.

Mr. Tillman: Mr. President, I do not wish to have the Senate suspend its rules, and you, of course, must enforce them; but if you will just let me down into the bog and quagmire of Senatorial dignity, of nobody saying anything when I speak, I will get used to it after a while, I hope.

We, I say, we Democrats, had fondly hoped for relief. We elected a President to give the people bread and he gave them only stones. While it is familiar to every Senator, I must ask your indulgence while I quote the financial plank of the Chicago platform, but I suppose you have all heard it a hundred and fifty times here and know it by heart, and, therefore, I shall not read it, but just incorporate it in my remarks:

We denounce the Republican legislation known as the Sherman Act of 1890 as a cowardly make-shift, fraught with possibilities of danger in the future, which should make all of its supporters, as well as its author, anxious for its speedy repeal. We hold to the use of both gold and silver as the standard money of the country, and to the coinage of both gold and silver without discriminating against either metal or charge for mintage, but the dollar unit of coinage of both metals must be of equal intrinsic and exchangeable value, to be adjusted through international agreement or by such safeguards of legislation as shall insure the maintenance of the parity of the two metals and the equal power of every dollar at all times in the markets and in the payment of debts; and we demand that all paper currency shall be kept at par with and redeemable in such coin. We insist upon this policy as especially necessary for the protection of the farmers and laboring classes, the first and most defenseless victims of unstable money and fluctuating currency.

Now, here is an extract from the address of Mr. Cleveland in response to the Committee on notification:

Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen: The message you deliver from the national Democracy arouses within me emotions which would be well-nigh overwhelming if I did not recognize here assembled the representatives of a great party who must share with me the responsibility your mission invites. I find much relief in the reflection that I have been selected merely —

Merely —

to stand for the principles and purposes to which my party is pledged, and for the enforcement and supremacy of which all who have any right to claim Democratic fellowship must constantly and persistently labor.]

Again in the same speech, he said:

I shall not attempt to specify at this time other objects and aims of Democratic endeavor which add inspiration to our mission. True to its history and its creed, our party will respond to the wants of the people within safe lines and guided by enlightened statemanship. To the troubled and impatient within our membership —

I was one of them. Thank God, I did all I could to keep him from being nominated, but like a royal and true servant of the party, after he had got the nomination, fairly or unfairly, I went home and restrained those who were eager to join the Populists, and South Carolina polled only 2,400 votes for Weaver. I went in the ditch at Chicago with Tammany. Where now is the Chieftain of Tammany? I know he has a keen blade, and I do not intend to try to get up here and swipe my head off. I have seen him unhorse and penetrate the armor of so many since I have been here that I dread any encounter with him. Therefore you may consider that withdrawn. It is not in the manuscript of my remarks. (Laughter.)

I go back to Mr. Cleveland. He said:

I shall not attempt to specify at this time other objects and aims of Democratic endeavor which add inspiration to our mission. True to its history and its creed, our party will respond to the wants of the people within safe lines and guided by enlightened statesmanship. To the troubled and impatient within our membership we commend continued, unswerving allegiance to the party whose principles in all times past have been found sufficient for them, and whose aggregate wisdom and patriotism their experience teaches, can always be trusted.

In a tone of partisanship which befits the occasion, let me say to you, as equal partners in the campaign upon which we to-day enter, that the personal fortunes of those to whom you have intrusted your banners are only important as they are related to the fate of the principles they represent and to the party which they lead.

I watched for these utterances, because if he had convinced or shown any purpose of treachery I would have tried to deliver the vote of South Carolina to some other man. Therefore, feeling a personal grievance in the man's action, I am here to-day to arraign him before the American people for his misdeeds, and before the party for his treachery and to ask for a verdict.

There is not one word here which would warrant one to expect that the leader of the Democratic party, its head and guide, would ignore the platform and treat with contempt the trusted lieutenants whom the people had sent to the National Capitol to assist in shaping the party's policy. The language would lead us to expect the very reverse. How many of these reasonable expectations have been met? How many of you men grown old and gray in the service of the party and of the nation, men who were its trusted leaders before this man from Buffalo was ever heard of, how many, I say, have been called into his councils? Speak, if there be any here; I shall be glad to hear them. Where has this man sunk his personality? Whom has he consulted? Whom has he recognized? Whose advice has he followed? None but that of the bootlicks and syncophants who have crawled on their knees for the crumbs of patrouage and betrayed their constituents for the offices in his gift.

In the entire history of this country the high office of President has never been so prostituted, and never has the appointing power been so abused. Claiming to be the apostle of civil service reform, he has debanched the civil service by making appointments only of those whose sponsors would surrender their manhood, and, with bated breath, walk with submissive head in his presence. With relentless purpose he has ignored his oath of office to uphold and obey the law and has paid out gold instead of coin and issued bonds to buy more gold, by both actions overruling the law, and giving no heed to the interests of any but his moneyed friends — I might say his owners and partners.

Whatever claim of legality may be put forward for the redemption of Treasury notes in gold, there can be none as to the redemption of greenbacks in anything but coin; and the option was given him to redeem the Treasury notes in either gold or silver. While to this besotted tyrant coin has come to mean gold alone, he cannot by his mere "ipse dixit" change the law of this land and pervert the plain meaning of the English language. He has sold bonds to buy gold with which to redeem greenbacks when there was a large quantity of silver in the Treasury which, according to law, should have been used, and the law only authorized the sale of bonds for coin. His Republican partners in crime who set the unrighteous and unlawful example which he has so persistently followed, and encouraged him in it to the utmost extent, cannot escape the condemnation of the honest, working, business men of the country as equal partners in his guilt.

The repeal of the Sherman law, which was the first point of attack of this unholy alliance, was only accomplished through the aid and in conjunction with a majority of the Republican Senators, and this Democratic President accomplished what was not possible for any Republican Executive under the circumstances to have brought about. A change of the party in power had left a large number of offices in his gift with which to buy votes. Harrison would have had no such advantage. The Democratic party had demanded a repeal of the entire Sherman law as a makeshift for free coinage. But that would have cut this so-called endless chain. The parity clause was absolutely necessary to give excuse

and color to a demand for the retirement of the greenbacks as a means of stopping the "issue of unending bonds." So they repealed only so much of it as suited their purposes.

But let us consider what the honest meaning of "parity" in the Sherman law was and is. What is the meaning of "parity" as given in the dictionary? The language is:—

"To maintain the two metals on a parity with each other upon the present legal ratio or such ratio as may be provided by law."

Now, if I should lie down on this floor, my head and feet would be on a parity so far as the floor is concerned. If I stand up my body is still on the floor, but my head is up here and my feet down there. The head in this instance represents gold, the feet silver, and that is the parity which this paragon of Presidents has given us.

It did not say the parity of coin, mind you, meant the coined dollar. It said the parity of metals, the ratio of 16 to 1. The words could not mean that upon one metal was to be imposed the duty of holding up the other.

The object was to have them assist each other; to hold silver up by holding gold down, and an honest Secretary of the Treasury, who should have resigned his office rather than submit to the dictation of a besotted chief would have paid on silver to protect the Treasury from the gold gamblers and bond grabbers, as the law and his oath of office required. But, alas! the old breed of Southern statesmen like Calhoun, who, after a life spent in the public service, had to be buried at public expense and his debts paid by the State of South Carolina, is no more. No wonder the Senator from Massachusetts feels warranted in twitting us with the decay of Southern statesmanship and charging us with dishonesty.

Mr. Hoar: Mr. President, the Senator will pardon me. Does he allude to what I said the other day?

Mr. Tillman: Yes, sir.

Mr. Hoar: I made no such intimation. Another Southern Senator seemed to have understood me in the same way.

Mr. Tillman: I wish I had the Senator's words here. I did have them, but I did not imagine that anybody could misunderstand their plain and palpable meaning. If you will let me get through, perhaps you will be satisfied with what I am going to say.

Mr. Hoar: I should like to put myself right in this matter, because I said —

The Presiding Officer: Does the Senator from South Carolina yield to the Senator from Massachusetts?

Mr. Tillman: Certainly; I do not want to do any Senator injustice.

Mr. Hoar: I have not before me the exact language I used, but I said in substance, speaking wholly of the change of opinion, "What has become of the old Southern statesmen who were the especial champions of hard money?

Mr. Tillman: Wait a minute.

Mr. Hoar: Very well.

Mr. Tillman: Which is the harder of the two, silver or gold?

Mr. Hoar: That is another proposition. I wish to state what I said. I had not the remotest idea of intimating that there was any degeneracy or inferiority in the present Southern statesmen as compared with the past. I referred only to the change of opinion.

Mr. Tillman: If any Senator has the Record of January 3, will he please turn to the Senator's remarks for me, and I will read them.

Mr. Hoar: I will find it for the Senator.

Mr. Tillman: Well, sir, I want to do you exact justice.

Mr. Hoar: Go on. I will find it for you.

Mr. Tillman: No; I will stop right now. (A page placed a glass of water on his desk.) I never wet my whistle when I am talking, because I can not run a windmill on water. I will wait. (A pause.)

Mr. Hoar: I have the extract here, and I will read it.

Mr. Tillman: Very well.

Mr. Hoar: I said:

"What has become of the old Democratic party? What has become of the old statesmanship of the South? Whatever else we may have to charge against the people of that section in times past, if we have anything, one thing until lately it always stood for, freedom from debt, economy of expenditure, and sound and honest money, gold and silver. Now, I am sorry to say, with some honorable exceptions, the statesmanship of that part of the country seems to have abandoned all three."

Mr. Tillman: "Honest money!" You have chunked us with that infernal phrase until we have got raw under it. (Laughter.)

Mr. Hoar: If the honorable Senator from South Carolina will pardon me, what I rose to correct him in was not whether I used the phrase "honest money" accurately or not. That is another question. The charge that I imputed something of degeneracy or dishonor to the present representatives of the South on this floor, as compared with their predecessors, I absolutely deny. I have read the language, which will stand.

Mr. Tillman: I am very glad indeed to have the Senator withdraw any such imputation.

Mr. Hoar: I do not withdraw any; I never made any.

Mr. Tillman: It is a question of the interpretation of your language, and I interpreted in the way I have, and felt called upon to answer it in the way I did.

Mr. Hoar: If the Senator will pardon me, I propose to put my own interpretation on my own language, and I suppose the honorable Senator from South Carolina will accept my assurance of what I myself meant by it.

Mr. Tillman: I do. I exonerate the Senator from any intended insult to the Southern people, but we want to put our interpretation on the English language as to what "honest" means. The word "honesty," if you will pardon me, as applied to money nowadays, means that those of us who favor silver are dishonest. We deny it. The country has had silver since its birth as a part of its constitutional money up to 1873. Since the days of Abraham and Isaac and Jacob the two metals have been money until within the last twenty-five years.

I will go on, and I hope I will not tread on my aged friend's toes any more. (Laughter.) It seems impossible for South Carolina to get into this chamber without Massachusetts getting hold of her. At this time South Carolina got hold of Massachusetts, it seems. (Laughter.)

He charges it, however, in another connection and as aiding and abetting this Judas from Kentucky, who, after a brilliant career of twenty years and more as leader and champion of the silver forces, has, in his old age, come to this pitiful pass. And then to think that the indictment thus brought against a whole section should have so much color of truth and of fact to back it up in the apostacy from their principles of the two other Secretaries from the South in the Cabinet of a President who has so disgraced the name of Democracy!

The South bows its head in shame at this exhibition of moral cowardice and despises the renegades; but I must remind the Senator from Massachusetts that there is as yet only moral turpitude and treachery to be charged against these men. I would not have said this if the Senator had chosen his language more carefully. It is here, however, and in it must go. The Southern Congressmen and Senators who came here poor, are still poor. They have not become millionaires like some of their Northern brethren; and there is no Credit Mobilier steal, or Colfax scandal, or Belknap bribery chargeable to any Southern men. Let him remember these things and keep back his sneers and taunts.

So if the Senator wants to charge the Southern people, through their representatives here, with being dishonest, or if he does not want to charge them with it and chooses to withdraw the imputation to-day, let him remember these facts before he again makes such a statement.

If there has been one idea more persistently and prominently presented to the American people by President Cleveland than any other, it has been the iniquities of the tariff and the demand for its revision. In season and out of season, with "damnable iteration," he has sung this siren song in the ears of the farmers. Listen to this paragraph from his message of 1888:

"A century has passed. Our cities are the abiding places of wealth and luxury; our manufactories yield fortunes never

dreamed of by the fathers of the Republic; our business men are madly striving in the race for riches, and immense aggregations of capital outrun the imagination in the magnitude of their undertakings.

"We view with pride and satisfaction this bright picture of our country's growth and prosperity, while only a closer scrutiny develops a somber shading. Upon more careful inspection we find the wealth and luxury of our cities mingled with poverty and wretchedness and unremunerative toil. A crowded and constantly increasing urban population suggests the impoverishment of rural sections and discontent with agricultural pursuits. The farmer's son, not satisfied with his father's simple and laborious life, joins the eager chase for easily acquired wealth.

"We discover that the fortunes realized by our manufacturers are no longer solely the reward of sturdy industry and enlightened foresight, but that they result from the discriminating favor of the Government, and are largely built upon undue exactions from the masses of our people. The gulf between employers and the employed is constantly widening, and classes are rapidly forming, one comprising the very rich and powerful, while in another are found the toiling poor.

"As we view the achievements of aggregated capital, we discover the existence of trusts, combinations and monopolies, while the citizen is struggling far in the rear, or is trampled to death beneath an iron heel. Corporations, which should be carefully restrained creatures of the law and the servants of the people, are fast becoming the people's masters."

Here I pause to interpolate again the assertion of my belief that during the four years that he was President, from 1885 to 1889, and since he came in again in 1893, he has never had by the hand a simple, square, straight, honest toiler in the field. He knows nothing about farmers, and, more's the pity, he cares nothing about them.

And listen to this:

"Our farmers, long suffering and patient, struggling in the race of life with the hardest and most unremitting toil, will not fail to see, in spite of misrepresentations and misleading fallacies, that they are obliged to accept such prices for their products as are fixed in foreign markets, where they compete with the farmers of the world; that their lands are declining in value, while their debts increase; and that, without compensating favor, they are forced by the action of the Government to pay, for the benefit of others, such enhanced prices for things that they need that the scanty returns of their labor fail to furnish their support or leave no margin for accumulation."

I will pause for a minute here to change the phraseology of the above paragraph, so that it will illustrate with telling emphasis the argument I will use. Let it read as follows:

"They, the farmers, are forced by the action of the Government to receive, for the benefit of others, such low prices for the things they sell that the scanty returns of their labor fail to furnish their support or leave no margin for accumulation."

They are burning our candle at both ends, robbing us on one hand with the tariff and robbing us on the other hand with the gold standard, and they have asked us, like beasts of burden, like dumb driven cattle, to bear these things and say nothing, but to vote the party ticket.

The gold standard is responsible for it, and no honest or sane man can deny it.

In reading these eloquent and truthful words we farmers were lost in admiration of this man's honesty and courage, for they were true and doubtless honest when uttered. And listen to this from his message of 1887:

"In the present state of legislation the only pretense of any existing Executive power to restore, at this time, any part of our surplus revenues to the people by its expenditure, consists in the supposition that the Secretary of the Treasury may enter the market and purchase bonds of the Government not yet due, at a rate of premium to be agreed upon. The only provision of law from which such a power could be derived is found in an appropriation bill passed a number of years ago; and it is subject to the suspicion that it was intended as temporary and limited in its application, instead of conferring a continuing discretion and authority. No condition ought to exist which would justify the grant of power to a single official, upon his judgment of its necessity, to withhold from or release to the business of the people, in an unusual manner, money held in the Treasury, and thus affect, at his will, the financial condition of the country; and if it is deemed wise to lodge in the Secretary of the Treasury the authority in the present juncture to purchase bonds, it should be plainly vested, and provided, as far as possible, with such checks and limitations as will define this official's right and discretion and at the same time relieve him from undue responsibility."

I quote it for the purpose of pointing out the evolution of a tyrant and of showing the transition from a conscientious law-abiding Chief Magistrate to an arrogant and obstinate ruler who ignores the law and issues bonds at will, and issues them under a statute that is "subject to the suspicion that it was intended to be temporary and limited in its application instead of conferring a discretionary authority." He not only issues them, but does it secretly, with his law partner as a witness to the contract, and has created the suspicion in the minds of millions of his countrymen that a President of the United States can use his high office for private gain.

The suspicion, like a "damned spot," has been burned into the brains of the people, and will no more "out" than Duncan's blood could be washed from the lily hands of the demented Lady Macbeth. And here let me remark, in passing, that this last of the Democratic Presidents (for, mark my prophecy, he is the last that party, as now organized, will ever elect), will go down in history and his two administrations will be remarkable; the first as having to deal with a large and unwieldy surplus, which entailed the necessity, as he contended, for the purchase of undue bonds at an exorbitant premium, while his last has been signalized, after a persistent adherence to his pet schemes of finance and taxation, by a deficit, by the issue of bonds, contrary to the law, to pay the current expenses of the Government, and an infamous attempt to increase the bonded debt of the country more than $500,000,000 and the surrender to those same corporations of the absolute control of our paper currency.

The Democratic party elected him and re-elected him, and would have no other leader. It must bear the odium of his official misdeeds, his utter lack of leadership. He has never been a Democrat, measured by the standard of Jefferson and Jackson. His opinions and policy on finance have been those of Sherman, who is not a Republican, measured by the standard of Lincoln. He differs from the Republican party only in the one particular of the tariff, and on that he has blown hot and cold as his pet hobby, and will go down in history as the most gigantic failure of any man who ever occupied the White House, all because of his vanity and obstinacy.

Now, to make good this charge, I will recall the fact that when he came to power in March, 1893, and could have called the Senate and House together (Democratic for the first time since the war) to carry his policy into effect, what did he do? Did he call an extra session to give tariff reform to the people — the overburdened and downtrodden people whose wants and woes he had depicted in so many speeches and messages? Oh, no. The policy of gold monometallism, of more bonds, of the substitution of national bank currency for greenbacks and silver certificates, the scheme which was nearest his heart, first enlisted his care and energetic action. He called Congress together to stop the coinage of silver, and here is his explanation of the trouble and the remedy proposed:

"To the Congress of the United States:

"The existence of an alarming and extraordinary business situation, involving the welfare and prosperity of all our people, has constrained me to call together in extra session the people's representatives in Congress, to the end that, through a wise and patriotic exercise of the legislative duty with which they solely are charged, present evils may be mitigated and dangers threatening the future may be averted.

"Our unfortunate financial plight is not he result of untoward events nor of conlitions related to our natural resources; ior is it traceable to any of the afflictions which frequently check national growth and prosperity. With plenteous crops, with abundant promise of remunerative production and manufacture, with unusual nvitation to safe investment, and with satisfactory assurance to business enterprise, suddenly financial distrust and fear have sprung up on every side. Numerous moneyed institutions have suspended because abundant assets were not immediately available to meet the demands of frightened depositors. Surviving corporations and individuals are content to keep in hand the money they are usually anxious to loan, and those engaged in legitimate business are surprised to find that the securities they offer for loans, though heretofore satisfactory, are no onger accepted. Values supposed to be fixed are fast becoming conjectural, and oss and failure have invaded every branch of business.

"I believe these things are principally chargeable to Congressional legislation touching the purchase and coinage of silver by the General Government.

"This legislation is embodied in a statute passed on the 14th day of July, 1890, which was the culmination of much agitation on the subject involved and which may be considered a truce, after a long struggle, between the advocates of free silver coinage and those intending to be more conservative.

"Undoubtedly the monthly purchases by the Government of 4,500,000 ounces of silver, enforced under that statute, were regarded by those interested in silver production as a certain guaranty of its increase in price. The result, however, has been entirely different, for immediately following a spasmodic and slight rise the price of silver began to fall after the passage of the act and has since reached the lowest point ever known. This disappointing result has led to renewed and persistent effort in the direction of free silver coinage.

"Meanwhile not only are the evil effects of the operation of the present law constantly accumulating, but the result to which its execution must inevitably lead is becoming palpable to all who give the least heed to financial subjects.

"This law provides that in payment for the 4,500,000 ounces of silver bullion which the Secretary of the Treasury is commanded to purchase monthly there shall be issued Treasury notes redeemable on demand in gold or silver coin, at the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, and that said notes may be reissued. It is, however, declared in the act to be 'the established policy of the United States to maintain the two metals on a parity with each other upon the present legal ratio or such ratio as may be provided by law.' This declaration so controls the action of the Secretary of the Treasury as to prevent his exercising the discretion nominally vested in him, if by such action the parity between gold and silver may be disturbed. Manifestly a refusal by the Secretary to pay these Treasury notes in gold, if demanded, would necessarily result in their discredit and depreciation as obligations payable only in silver and would destroy the parity between the two metals by establishing a discrimination in favor of gold.

"Up to the 15th day of July, 1893, these notes had been issued in payment of silver bullion purchases to the amount of more than $147,000,000. While all but a very small quantity of this bullion remains uncoined and without usefulness in the Treasury, many of the notes given in its purchase have been paid in gold. This is illustrated by the statement that between the 1st of May, 1892, and the 15th day of July, 1893, the notes of this kind issued in payment for silver bullion amounted to a little more than $54,000,000, and that during the same period about $49,000,000 were paid by the Treasury in gold for the redemption of such notes.

"The policy necessarily adopted of paying these notes in gold has not spared the gold reserve of $100,000,000, long ago set aside by the Government for the redemption of other notes, for this fund has already been subjected to the payment of new obligations amounting to about $150,000,000."

Here was the dread alternative if the Sherman law was not repealed:

"Unless Government bonds are to be constantly issued and sold to replenish our exhausted gold, only to be again exhausted, it is apparent that the operation of the silver purchase law now in force leads in the direction of the entire substitution of silver for the gold in the Government Treasury, and that this must be followed by the payment of all Government obligations in depreciated silver."

If the alternative was that if we did not repeal the Sherman law we would issue bonds, there was an implied promise or prophecy that if we did repeal it we should not have to issue any bonds.

The cry was, "Stop the purchase of silver, stop diluting our currency, and confidence will be restored." He had waited until the "object lesson," the panic manufactured to order by his fellow-conspirators, had swept like a cyclone over the country, prostrating all business enterprise and industries, and the newspapers had howled in chorus in the ears of the people that the coinage of silver was the cause of the momentary crisis. In the meantime active agents had been at work arranging for the control and manipulation of the Democrats in the House and Senate when Congress should assemble. Congress met, and so well timed had been the date of its assemblage and so cogent the arguments brought to bear that the so-called representatives of the people were swift to obey orders. The party platform and its pledges were thrown to the dogs. Democrats pledged to the rehabilitation of silver surrendered their manhood and their principles at the behest of the money power and its representative the President and the purchasing clause of the Sherman law was repealed by the House with indecent haste. Democrats and Republicans vied with each other in the furtherance of the policy which had been formulated and steadily pursued by the Senator from Ohio. If he were here I would take off my hat to him, if I had it on my head, and I do it now typically, as the victor of victors in this financial struggle of a quarter of a century. He has the prond satisfaction of knowing that he has brought the party which he so hates to its knees, and has lived to see many of his old antagonists enlisted under his banner of monopoly and class privileges. They sit at his feet and acknowledge his leadership.

When the Senate met there was an acknowledged majority of men open and outspoken in their determination to stand by the white metal, and who were elected on that issue. But the process of debauchery began. "Vote according to my will or you will have no offices." "Vote according to my will, and if your people do not like it I will take care of you." The newspapers raved and abused the Senate. Bankers telegraphed and wrote. Chambers of commerce passed resolutions, and slowly the Senate yielded. In ninety days the deed was done, and the chains were riveted on the wrists of the toiling millions. Did the raid on the Treasury stop? Was confidence restored? Did prices rise? Did prosperity return? All these things had been promised by this prophet, yet none of them came to pass.

Congress convened in regular session and the farce of tariff reform began. The demoralized and dispirited House, under the whip and spur of the Executive, passed a tariff bill, and hoping to lay a pontoon bridge by which to pass back to their outraged constituents, they passed a bill providing for the coinage of the seigniorage. They wanted to bamboozle the dear farmers by saying: "While we repealed the Sherman law, we coined $50,000,000 of silver," but the President would none of it; and while he attempted to bulldoze the Senate into accepting the tariff measure without amendment, in spite of his simulated vehemence and indignation, the tariff bill was modified in many particulars. It passed finally, and we have had an experience with this measure of tariff reform a la Cleveland.

It is true he did not sign it and allowed it to become a law without approval. But here again we have a spectacle of charlatanry and a hypocritical assumption of superiority to his party which has always marked his career. The tariff law which he repudiated as unworthy, involving "party perfidy and party dishonor," is the sheet anchor to which he now clings.

It is not what the President champion would have given us (so he says); but when we recollect that his managers at Chicago, who controlled the convention and the committee on platform, presented a tariff blank which the convention indig-

antly refused to indorse, because it was, in the language of Henry Watterson, a 'disgraceful straddle," we are forced to conclude that all the hurrah and eloquence emanating from the President on this question has been a blind, used in a Pickwickian sense, so to speak, and that there have been hypocrisy and double dealing in his treatment of this question. If he was honest at the start (and I am willing to grant that much) his associations with Wall street and his connection with wealthy men have debauched his conscience and destroyed all sympathy with the masses. He would not sign the bill, and lectured the Senate as recreant; but if his scheme, carried out only in part, has caused so large a deficit in three years and required the issue of bonds to meet current expenses, what would have been the result had he had his way? He and his Republican allies refused persistently to see that all the trouble was caused by the warfare on silver and the mismanagement of our finances, and that the remedies proposed would only aggravate the disease preying on the body politic.

The fall in prices on all farm products, which are our principal articles of export, has brought disaster and ruin on the producing classes who farm — one-half of our entire population. The impoverishment of the farmers has destroyed their ability to purchase on the one hand, while the decreased price of their products of export in European markets has left our debts for imports and interest on our obligations abroad unpaid. Hence the export of gold to meet those obligations. The boasted "home market" for which the protectionists clamor can no longer purchase the products of our home factories except in largely decreased quantities. The basis of all wealth, agriculture, being depressed and pauperized, all other interests resting upon it are depressed and injured. The Englishman chuckles, as shown by the Senator from Colorado, at the cheapness of the exports which we send him. I will take the liberty, with the Senator's permission, to append as a footnote the figures furnished from that English paper the other day in regard to the profit of one year's purchase of cotton and wheat, as showing the cause of this deficit requiring the export of gold.

Rothschild and his American agents graciously condescend to come to the help of the United States Treasury in maintaining the gold standard which has wrought the ruin, and only charges a small commission of ten millions or so on one little transaction.

Great God! that this proud Government, the richest and strongest on the face of the globe, should have been brought to so low a pass that a London Jew should have been appointed its receiver, to have charge of the treasury, with an option on any additional issue of bonds, and presumes to patronize us and promises to take care of our great country! Is there a man here who can think of it without blushing?

I ask in this connection the right to insert as an appendix this infamous contract with Stetson as witness. I wish to insert also a rehearsal from the Democratic campaign book of 1888, setting forth the history of the purchase of the bonds with that surplus which used to keep this man awake at night. Let me read a headline: "Giving small holders a chance." He did not call for a syndicate to sell bonds. He said, "Anybody who wants to take money in place of bonds bring them in at any premium you have a mind to charge — 125 or 130, along there." They were undue, and he spent a hundred million dollars or so — I do not know the exact amount — in buying those bonds. I have it here. It must be authentic, as it comes from the Democratic Campaign Committee. (Laughter.) I wish to put the two cheek by jowl — in juxtaposition.

In this connection, before I leave the subject of greenbacks, I wish to read just a brief paragraph from that campaign speech, that keynote speech of the 3d of January, delivered by the Senator from Ohio (Mr. Sherman), when he thrashed the old straw over again:

"I believe that under existing law the aggregate sum of United States notes and Treasury notes issued under the act of 1890, amounting to about $460,000,000, can be easily maintained at par with coin if the two amendments I have mentioned

are adopted by Congress. These notes are a legal tender for all debts, public or private. They are a debt of the United States without interest and without other material cost to the Government than the interest on the cost of the coin or bullion held in the Treasury to redeem them. They are preferred by the people to any other form of paper money that has been devised. They have all the sanctions of law and all the security that has been or can be given to our bonds. They have the pledge of the public faith that they will be redeemed in coin. The substitution of these notes for State bank paper money was one of the greatest benefits that has resulted from the civil war. These notes have all the sanction, protection and security that has been or can be given to our national bank notes, with the added benefit that the large saving derived from them inures to the people of the United States instead of to the bankers."

I left this out awhile ago, intending to put it in the opening part of my speech, when I was discussing the relative value and desirability of greenbacks and bonds. One, a promise of the Government bearing no interest, the other also a promise, the difference being that it bears interest and is a mortgage on the people. Here we have the apostle of Republican finance, the apostle of gold, the one before whom you Republicans all bow down and worship as the keenest, shrewdest manipulator in behalf of class privileges and monometallism that ever lived, or that ever will live, I suspect — here are his words in testimony as to the substantial nature of those notes and their value. Now the trouble is that the country is already drying up, is atrophied, palsied in its extremities for want of blood, the circulating medium, money. The heart at Boston and New York is congested, and they say "We have plenty of money; we do not want any more money." And yet you stand committed to the proposition that those extremities shall dry up and die, rot, be pauperized, and you will not give any relief. Your scheme is not different from that of the President.

I have an interesting book here and ask the Secretary to read some extracts from it, being excerpts from letters from John Sherman during and just after the war, commencing at page 150. There are five of them.

The Presiding Officer: "If there be no objection, the Secretary will read as indicated."

The Secretary: From a letter dated Senate Chamber, Washington, May 19, 1862:

"Even under terrible financial pressure and drain of active war, the country is flourishing. Our bonds are above par, trade is active and produce bears a good price. Much of this may be induced by the inflation of paper money, but gold is abundant, foreign importations active and foreigners are making investments here heavily. In my experience in public affairs I have never known times more easy."

From a letter dated Mansfield, O., May 7, 1863:

"One tendency I noticed — nearly every man in debt is paying off his debts. The inflation of the currency and the rise of property makes this easy. Unluckily for me, most of my means is or was 'in bills receivable.' These are paid, or will be, and so I find myself with plenty of money, but cannot buy anything at reasonable prices. This is the general rule of creditors, and perhaps it is better so for the community, as the creditor class can more easily bear the loss of inflation."

From a letter dated Mansfield, O., Nov. 14, 1863:

"The wonderful prosperity of all classes, especially of laborers, has a tendency to secure acquiescence in all measures demanded to carry on the war. We are only another example of a people growing rich in a great war. And this is not shown simply by inflated prices, but by increased production, new manufacturing establishments, new railroads, houses, etc. Indeed, every branch of business is active and hopeful. This is not a mere temporary inflation caused by paper money, but is a steady progress and almost entirely upon actual capital. The people are prospering and show their readiness to push on the war. Taxes are paid cheerfully."

From a letter dated United States Senate, Jan. 29, 1864:

"The currency is awfully inflated, and our ability to borrow and pay interest has a limit. If the war continues two years longer we shall be terribly embarrassed. Still we have the sure foundation of public credit, a great country, and a large and active population."

From a letter dated United States Senate Chamber, Washington, Nov. 10, 1865:

"The truth is, the close of the war with our resources unimpaired gives an elevation, a scope, to the ideas of leading capitalists far higher than anything ever undertaken in this country before. They talk of millions as confidently as formerly of thousands. No doubt the contraction that must soon come will explode mere visionary schemes, but many vast undertakings will be executed. Among them will be the Pacific Railroad and extensive iron works like some in England."

Mr. Tillman: Now, again I regret the absence of the Senator from Ohio (Mr. Sherman), because if he were present I should ask him this question, and if he deems it worth while he can answer it hereafter: If, as I have said, with only 22,000,000 people at that time floating the enormous amount of currency issued to carry on the war, with 1,000,000 men or more withdrawn from productive industries to be marshalled under the Stars and Stripes for the maintenance of the Union, the country was so prosperous, with industries thriving, no tramps, no beggars, what did it? Enough money; perhaps too much money, but still enough.

If in 1878, I believe it was, when Congress in obedience to the orders of the people declared that those greenbacks should not be retired, but should be reissued, we could float that much paper money before we had any gold or silver basis, in the name of common sense and the idea of prosperity, which seems to have departed from this legislative assembly, why can we not now put out six or eight hundred million dollars of greenbacks? Give us the double standard and we can float that many greenbacks at par with gold and silver any day in the year, and there will be no more talk of the public credit and of the honor of the nation. The struggle, and the only struggle, is whether we shall have all Government paper or all national bank paper, and if under the behests of the gold ring we are to go to a monometallic standard and to national bank notes alone, I ask some man to answer why the Government's primary notes are not so good as its secondary notes. You have your 4,000 millionaires; you want a few thousand more, with about 60,000,000 paupers.

And what are the peoole going to do about it? Why are these iniquities permitted and the outrageous and unlawful actions of the Executive unchecked? No man here denies the assertion that it is unlawful to issue bonds to pay the current expenses of the Government, and yet it has been done. There has been a lame explanation attempted, that redeemed greenbacks had to go into the general fund and be reissued, but if they were secured for the gold which the bonds have been issued and that they were not used to pay current expenses, where are they? The responsibility of providing revenues and looking after the solvency of the Treasury, which rests with Congress, has been usurped by the President.

Now comes the crucial question for the Republican party. Why have you not impeached him? You have nearly a three-fourths majority at the other end of the capitol, which alone can formulate articles of impeachment. Why have you not impeached him?

Mr. Hawley: How was it with the last Congress? The last Congress was Democratic.

Mr. Tillman: I have already paid my respects to the last Congress, and I hoped to have been able to say better things of the one the people sent here, but they are both of a kind, a majority of them cowards and tools of monopolies. Why is he not impeached? Because he is carrying out Republican policies and the majority in the House of Representatives feel safe, the Senators over here feel safe and you all believe that the Republican party is certain to elect the next President and obtain control of the Government.

You are willing to load down the incompetent or dishonest Democracy — I use the words of the Senator from Colorado (Mr. Teller), and I put it incompetent and dishonest Democracy — you are willing to load them down with the odium of the misgovernment, to lend your help by acquiescence in wrong-doing. The policy is to do nothing — "to preserve a masterly inactivity" — and only obstruct where relief could be given. But there is many a slip betwixt the cup and the lip, and in this dark and dismal hour the words of Lincoln, the great and noble martyr — Lincoln, whose Republicanism was Democracy of the purest type compared with that of Cleveland — come like a promise from the grave. This greatest American of the Nineteenth Century said: "You can fool all of the people part of the time, and you can fool part of the people all of the time; but you can never fool all of the people all of the time." Unless that grand inspired pledge to which he consecrated his auditors at Gettysburg is to be forgotten and come to naught, "that government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth," the people must shake off their lethargy and arouse themselves.

The money changers are in the temple of our liberties and have bought the sentinels on guard. It may be too late. God grant it be not so; but this great republic can only be saved from the miseries of revolution and internecine strife in the near future by its citizens casting aside blind allegiance to party and marshaling themselves under the banner of Jefferson's Democracy and Lincoln's Republicanism, determined to restore the republic to the form in which it was left to us by the fathers. The encroachments of the Federal judiciary and the supineness and venality — corruption, I may say — of the representative branches of the Government, are causes of deep concern to all thinking and patriotic men. We are fast drifting into government by injunction in the interest of monopolies and corporations and the Supreme Court, by one corrupt vote, annuls an act of Congress looking to the taxation of the rich.

Sir, the struggle from 1861 to 1865, which drenched this fair land in blood, was to emancipate 4,000,000 black slaves.

We are fast approaching a condition which will place the collar of industrial bondage around the necks of ten times that many white slaves. I would not predict revolution or war if I did not feel that relief must come either by the ballot or that an effort will be made in a few years to obtain it by bullets. You may look upon me as an enthusiast, as an alarmist, or an anarchist, but with the sober convictions of common sense I tell you that the teaching of all history is belied and we must surrender the belief that like cause produce like effects if men expect that the millions now out of employment and the other millions who are working out a hopeless existence of toil year in and year out, the women "stitching in poverty, hunger and dirt," depicted this morning by the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Kyle), the men bearing their hopeless burdens of debt, all directly traceable to bad government, will not some day have a reckoning.

You all remember Macaulay's prediction that some day a government would be put in charge of this country by the commune. When that time comes, God have mercy on you millionaires who have stolen so much of the people's money.

I listened the other day to the impassioned eloquence of the Senator from Maine as he appealed for sympathy for the unfortunate Christians who are being butchered by the Turks in Armenia. As he portrayed the ruthless murders and infamies perpetrated on those defenseless people, and called on us to extend the strong arm of the United States to give help, I could but think that he stands here as an ardent supporter of that English policy of finance which has brought untold misery and means absolute pauperism for the masses of our people. And I recall an incident which I read long since in the "Life of John Randolph, of Roanoke." It was during the Greek revolution, when the sympathy of all civilized peoples went out to the struggling descendants of the glorious old Greeks who were trying to throw off the Turkish yoke. In many parts of this country efforts were made to raise money to send to the Greeks to help them in their fight for freedom. A lady who lived near Randolph was deeply interested and

had a subscription list which she presented to Mr. Randolph one day as he was mounting his horse after a friendly call. She depicted with glowing eloqnence the claims of the struggling Greeks for aid. As on all large Southern plantations at that time there were a nnmber of negro children arouud the house, and these had gathered in a row in their scant clothing on the roadside near by to look at the strange gentleman. I have seen them in my boyhood; I have got up on the fence with them. They gathered in a row in their scant clothing — one little cotton garment in the summer — on the roadside near by to look at the strange man. After hearing what their mistress had to say, the eccentric Virginian, with a wave of his hand in the direction of the little negroes, remarked: "Madam, the Greeks are at your door," and with a deep bow he rode off.

I say to the Senator from Maine and to the other Senators who stand here as exponents of the creed which would enslave the American people by the consummation of the scheme to which they are committed: The Armenians are here at your doors. In every city and hamlet and county of these United States they can be found, and I warn you that they will not be held down for all time by the Turks who now oppress them. A day of reckoning will come, unless there is no longer a just God in Heaveu, and when it does come, woe be unto those who have been among the oppressors of the people. The present struggle is unfortunately too like that which preceded the late civil war, inasmuch as it is sectional. The creditor and the manufacturing States of the North and East, those which have grown inordinately wealthy at the expense of the producing classes of the South and West, are urging this policy with the besotted blindness of Belshazzar. The old slaveholders of the South were not more arrogant of more determined. "The sordid despotism of wealth," to use the apt phrase of Justice Brown, is already felt throughout the land.

You have already been told in glowing language by the eloquent Senator from Missouri that the conflict is "irrepressible," and it is easy to see from the temper and feeling of the equally distinguished Senator from Colorado and other Western Senators that the struggling for the new emancipation has begun. And the new Mason and Dixon's line which is drawn, not by the surveyor, but by the denial of the natural and inalienable "right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," to a large majority of citizens, will sooner or later bring together in the bonds of union the toiling and now downtrodden masses of the cities and the equally desperate masses of the country; agrarianism and communism will join hands. There are millions now on the march, and they tramp, tramp, tramp; tramp the sidewalks hunting work and tramp the highways begging bread. Unless relief comes they will some day take a notion to tramp to Washington with rifles in their hands to regain the liberties which have been stolen from them or which their representatives have sold; and the hitherto conservative force of the Republic, the well-to-do agricultural class, will lift no hand to stay the march, but join it. God grant that our country may be spared the enactment of such scenes as were witnessed in Paris in 1789. But the fair flower of liberty planted by Jefferson in the immortal declaration of the 4th of July, 1776, watered by the blood of our Revolutionary sires under Washington, can not be uprooted or smothered by the noxious weeds of monopoly and class privilege without bloodshed; and a cataclysm which will give us a military despotism or leave the Republic redeemed, regenerated, and disenthralled is just as sure to come as yonder sun shines in the heavens, unless we do our duty here and take the hands of these conspirators off the people's throats and give them an opportunity to breathe, to work, to live.

THE TREASURY IN THEIR HANDS.

Bond Syndicate Cornering Gold for Another Bond Deal.

CHICAGO, ILL., May 8. — The *Post* prints a special from Washington, calling attention to the efforts of the bond syndicate to corner the gold market. It says that brokers representing the Rothschilds-Morgan syndicate have been paying a premium for the refined gold output of the private refineries throughout the West during the past two months, and that they are accumulating fine gold at the rate of $2,500,000 to $3,000,000 per month, which represents fully two-thirds of the entire gold output of the United States.

The attention of officials of the Treasnry department was first attracted to peculiar business by the sharp falling off in the deposits of gold at the mints, and inquiry soon developed that private parties were buying the product of the refineries.

Further inquiry revealed that the metal was purchased and was drifting to New York, where it is being put in store to the credit of the Morgan-Rothschild syndicate. In order to divert the stream from its nsual channels leading into the United States mints, the private purchasers have been obliged to pay a premium of 1¼ to 1½ cents.

The premium paid for most of the gold was 18 cents, but so anxious have been the buyers to increase their lines and get everything in sight that they have marked up their quotations during the last few days.

At the present time they are getting practically the entire output of the United States except for the extreme Western coast. Many long-headed men in Washington and Wall street, who are familiar with the methods of the parties composing the syndicate, have jumped to the conclusion that the foundation is being laid for another bond deal before Congress meets again.

The last bond deal of $62,000,000 has been pretty well closed out, over $51,000,000 in gold having been paid out of the $62,500,000, and it is generally believed that the entire deal will be cleaned up before the first day of August. Under the terms of contract with the Treasury Department, the Morgan-Rothschild syndicate has an option on any new bonds that may be issned by the Government prior to October 1 next.

The Treasury is absolntely in their hands until that date. If from natural causes or throngh chicanery and manipulation the administration is obliged to issue another batch of bonds to maintain the gold reserve, the sale must be made to the syndicate that took the last one. There is no escape from such action. It was nominated specifically in the contract signed by direction of the President. The clause in which the syndicate agrees to maintain the Treasury reserve leaves the syndicate to be the judge as to what it can do in the premises or to what methods it shall adopt. If in the carrying out of that moral obligation the syndicate shall decide that the Government must issue another $100,000,000 or $50,000,000 in bonds the administration will have nothing to do but comply with the terms.

If the President does not want to issue any more bonds at the dictation of the syndicate the reserve can practically be wiped out in ten days, and then if he should decide on self-protection to put out more bonds he must sell them to the Morgan-Rothschild people and nobody else.

The new bonds are selling to-day in open market at 121 1-2. They cost the syndicate 1.04 1-2, which would show a profit of 17 per cent in the operation, amounting in all to $10,504,000. It would not be fair to say the syndicate made that much out of the operation, but it is very safe to estimate its profits at $8,000,000. The syndicate is hnrrying the completion of its present bond deal with the Government. It deposited over $1,000,000 to-day, which will bring the reserve up to very nearly $93,000,000. It will not have to complete these payments until the 1st of August, but the operation may be closed up within a few weeks. That will leave the syndicate a free field.

Gov. Boies on the Political Situation.

CONGRESS IS AUTHORIZED TO CREATE MONEY, NOT TO DESTROY IT.

Gov. Boies of Iowa made a remarkable speech in Kansas City last Wednesday night on existing conditions in the United States and the political problems that present themselves for settlement in the approaching national campaign. The speech is a noteworthy contribution to current discussion, and for the benefit of its readers the Sunday *Post-Dispatch* publishes it in full. The speech was as follows:

Fellow Citizens — While the subject upon which I have been invited to address you to-night is one of universal interest to all, it will be my particular purpose to present it in what seems to me its vastly important bearing upon the fortunes of the Democratic party as a political organization, because of the directly opposite views which so many of its great leaders have taken of the question it presents and the entire sincerity with which each of these factions maintain that its own view is unqualifiedly correct and that of its opponent entirely wrong.

This contention has reached a stage where compromise among party leaders seems no longer possible, and where each class must appeal to the sober judgment of the masses of the party and be content to abide by their judgment when fully and fairly expressed.

I wish, therefore, in what I have to say to advise with you as Democrats and "with charity for all and malice toward none," endeavor to show you that the party to which we belong is already committed to a definite and clearly expressed policy on the subject of my address; and further, that the position so assumed by it is absolutely and unmistakably right.

It is too well understood to require extended repetition here that the important question involved is the question of whether or not the United States should reopen its mints to the free and unlimited coinage of silver as money of final redemption without reference to the action of other nations.

You all understand that the existing controversy arises over an effort on one side to fasten upon the people of this country a measure of values regulated and controlled by gold alone, so long at least as foreign countries that have adopted that standard adhere to it, and an equally energetic effort on the other to return to the original system adopted by the fathers of the Republic, by which gold and silver alike, to be coined at a ratio established by law, was made the basis of its financial system, and equally, when coined, money of final redemption.

WHAT THE CONSTITUTION SAYS.

Let me call your attention first to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States on this subject, and remind you in this connection that it (the Constitution) is the supreme law of the land, which no man and no body of men in or out of office, high or low, can rightfully revoke, modify, change or ignore, except that it may be changed in one manner explicitly pointed out in that instrument for its own amendment.

If you will examine this instrument, you will see that it provides:

First. "That Congress shall have power to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coins."

Second, that it provides: "That no State shall coin money."

Third, that it provides: "That no State shall make anything but gold and silver coin a legal tender in payment of debts."

The theory upon which the Constitution was adopted, as defined by repeated decisions of our highest judicial tribunals, was that the States as independent sovereign bodies surrendered to the general Government all powers expressly conferred on Congress, and reserved to themselves all legislative power not so expressly conferred upon the general Government.

It follows, therefore, that when the power to legislate upon a subject essential to the welfare of the people at large is conferred upon Congress and thereby taken away from the States, an obligation on the part of Congress to exercise that power and supply needed legislation upon the subject referred to its jurisdiction clearly and imperatively exists; for, otherwise, the country, through a mere failure of Congress to act, could be deprived of all legislation upon subjects absolutely essential to its existence.

Applying these self-evident principles to the subject under consideration it follows, to my entire satisfaction at least, that if Congress, being clothed with the only power that exists under our form of government to coin money, can rightfully fail to provide for the coinage of one of the metals mentioned in the constitution as money, that is, real money or money of final redemption, it can as lawfully and rightfully fail to provide for the coinage of the other; and if failure in one case is no violation of that instrument, failure in the other or failure in both would not be, and if this is true the States in their sovereign capacity have surrendered a power absolutely necessary to the existence of a government of civilized people and have exacted no legal obligation from the general government that it will exercise that power.

This has never been conceded by anyone so far as I know whose opinions are entitled to weight in the discussion of so grave a question.

As early as 1836, Daniel Webster, the world-famed Senator from Massachusetts, whose peerless standing as a constitutional lawyer and most able statesman has never been eclipsed by a living American, and never will be, declared in a public address: "I am clearly of the opinion that gold and silver at rates fixed by Congress are the legal standard of value in this country and that neither Congress nor any State has authority to establish any other standard or displace this standard." Mark his words, "Neither Congress nor any State has authority to establish any other standard or to displace this standard."

On another occasion he said: "I am clearly of the opinion that neither Congress nor any other authority can legally demonetize either silver or gold. If one coin can be dethroned as money then the other can be, and thus the constitution can be disregarded; yes, overthrown. The command to Congress is to coin money, not to destroy it, to create legal tender money for the use of the people, and the grant of authority to create money cannot be construed to mean authority to destroy money."

If this great man, great as ever lived in this or any other country on earth, was right, then every gold standard advocate in the United States is clearly and absolutely wrong. Nay more; he is criminally wrong, for he is counseling a breach of one law that lies at the base of every other; a law that to undermine in one essential particular is to shatter the foundation of the republic itself, and invite similar assaults and similar catastrophes as often as the selfishness of classes suggests them.

I will not believe my countrymen, comprehending the importance of this legal question, are ready to ignore a plain mandate of the constitution of this republic.

I want to hear some one who deems himself equal to the task, stand up before the American people and answer Daniel Webster if he can. I have searched for such an effort on the part of some one, but have never found it.

When in 1873 the Congress of the United States demonetized silver and declared that henceforward the unit of value in the United States should be a

gold dollar containing twenty-five and eight-tenths grains of standard gold, it did so far as it had power to do, establish a standard at variance with that provided for in the constitution, and the supreme question of the present hour is, will the people in their sovereign capacity indorse this?

For the first time since the perpetration of that great wrong the appeal is made directly to them, in language they cannot fail to understand, and they must answer it.

Political leaders can no longer hide it under meaningless phrases that may be read in any way to suit the locality in which they are quoted.

He who is not for bimetallism is against it. Let us stand up in a manly way and be counted on one side or the other.

DEMOCRATIC PARTY TRADITIONS.

I want next to invite your attention to the history of the action of the Democratic party on this subject, and assure you that I for one am in favor of bimetallism, because I believe my party by its traditions, its declarations in State and National conventions, the action of a majority of its representatives in Congress through all the years that the question has been agitated, is committed to it in a way that it cannot now without dishonor and without a violation of its oft-repeated pledges abandon it, and adopt as one of its political tenets a single gold standard instead.

The Democratic National platform of 1880 declared for honest money, "consisting of gold and silver and paper, convertible into coin on demand." Not gold coin on demand, but "coin on demand."

In 1884 the platform of the same party declared, "We believe in honest money, the gold and silver coinage of the constitution, and a circulating medium convertible into such money without loss." Mark the words, honest money, the gold and silver coinage of the constitution; not gold coinage alone, but gold and silver coinage, and a circulating medium convertible into such money, that is, gold and silver, without loss.

In the platform of the same party in 1888 it was declared: "The Democratic party of the United States in national convention assembled renews the pledge of its fidelity to Democratic faith, and reaffirms the platform adopted by its representatives at the convention of 1884," — the financial plank of which I have just quoted.

In 1892 our last national convention, the same party in its platform declared: "We hold to the use of both gold and silver as the standard money of the country, and to the coinage of both gold and silver without discrimination against either metal or charge for mintage, but the dollar unit of coinage of both metals must be of equal intrinsic and exchangeable value, or be adjusted through international agreement, or by such safeguards of legislation as shall insure the maintenance of the parity of the two metals, and the equal power of every dollar at all times in the markets and in the payment of debts, and we demand that all paper currency shall be kept at par with and redeemable in such coin."

Redeemable in what coin? Gold coin or silver coin is what it says.

What was it, that the party declared *it* held to the use of as standard money? Was it gold alone, as our gold standard friends now insist on? Not at all. It was to the use of both gold and silver as standard money of the country, and to the coinage of both without discrimination against either metal.

Had the gold standard advocates in or out of the party permitted the redemption of that pledge? Instead they have compelled its violation, both in letter and spirit.

Not a dollar in silver is being coined, although there is stored in the vaults of the treasury tons upon tons of this metal, the sole property of the nation.

Not a dollar already coined is used as standard money in the redemption of other money or in the payment of our bonded indebtedness if the holder of these claims demands gold instead.

Is this the use of both gold and silver as standard money without discrimination against either for which the party declared in its last national platform? If so, tell me what would amount to a violation of its pledge in that respect.

If we turn from a perusal of the national platforms of the party to a history of the action of its representatives in Congress upon the same subject, we are even more forcibly reminded that the party as such is unequivocally committed to bimetallism, and that to abandon it now is to reverse a policy that has been faithfully and unflinchingly adhered to from the day this question became a subject of controversy in that body.

VOTES IN CONGRESS.

In the lower house of the Forty-fourth Congress, in which for the first time in many years there was a Democratic majority, a bill for the free coinage of silver was introduced, and 110 Democrats voted for it to 16 against it, and afterwards in the same Congress 123 Democrats voted for and passed a like bill to 17 against it.

In the Forty-fifth Congress in the lower house 97 Democrats voted for and helped to pass a free coinage bill to 10 against it.

A Republican Senate struck out the free coinage clause and substituted a bill providing for the purchase and coinage by the Government of a limited amount of silver.

In the Forty-sixth Congress 100 Democrats voted for a free coinage bill to 9 against it, and 107 voted for an amendment to a bill to compel the Secretary of the Treasury to pay out standard silver coin the same as gold in payment of coin obligations of the Government to 4 against the amendment.

In the Forty-ninth Congress 96 Democrats voted for to 70 against free coinage, and in the Fifty-first Congress 101 Democrats in the House voted for to 12 against a resolution to recommit the Windom silver purchasing bill with instructions to the committee having it in charge to report a bill for the free and unlimited coinage of the standard silver dollar, and in the Senate a free coinage substitute was voted for by 27 Democrats to 3 against it, and in the House the same substitute received 113 Democratic votes for to 22 against it.

In the Senate in January, 1891, 24 Democrats voted for free coinage to 1 against it.

In the Fifty-second Congress, in the Senate, 20 Democrats voted for to 9 against free coinage, and in the House a motion to take up and consider the Senate free coinage bill received 118 Democratic votes to 64 against it.

In the fifty-third Congress, in the Lower House, 101 Democrats voted for a free coinage amendment to the bill for the repeal of the Sherman law to 116 against it, and in the Senate 18 Democrats voted for to 18 against the same amendment.

Many of you will remember that this vote was had when the panic of 1893 was at its height, and when the whole power of the Administration was used to bring about the repeal of that law, because as it was urged, it was chiefly responsible for the panic then existing.

In March, 1894, a bill for the immediate coinage of the seigniorage or profit on the bullion purchased under the Sherman law received 136 Democratic yeas to 56 Democratic nays, and in the Senate 30 Democratic yeas to 10 Democratic nays.

The bill passed both Houses, was vetoed by President Cleveland, and in the House 118 Democrats voted for the passage of the bill over his veto to 55 against.

In the present Congress 22 Democrats in the Senate voted for the unlimited coinage of silver to 13 against it, and in the House 56 Democrats voted for to 31 against the same bill.

I have taken these figures almost literally from the exhaustive and unanswerable argument of your own Senator Cockrell delivered in the Senate of the United States on the 13th of last month.

THE MONEY OF THE MASSES.

I am opposed to a single gold standard on broader grounds than those of a purely partisan nature. I want silver made as good as gold, because silver is the money of the masses and always has been and always will continue to be.

Gold as a medium of exchange is practically unknown to the poor and almost equally so to the great middle classes of our people. It is here as everywhere the money of the rich. It supplies a most limited part of the active circulating medium of the country.

It is not strange that in monarchical governments where the influence of the

wealthy classes substantially controls legislation it should be given a place in their financial systems superior to silver, for there it is the money of the classes who make the laws. But here, thank God, every citizen is a sovereign equal before the law to every other, and there is no reason that I can conceive of why the principal money of an overwhelming majority of all our people should be assigned a secondary and inferior place in our financial system.

It is law and law alone that gives to either metal the character of money. Without it one would be a commodity in the markets as much as the other. Without its use as money one would depreciate in value in these markets as quickly and as certainly as the other.

Here the people make the laws. Why in their own statutes should they assign a secondary position to a metal the great majority of them use, and elevate another they seldom see to a position of superiority over it? I am opposed to this discrimination, because I believe that, left to themselves, a vast majority of the people of this nation, as a body, are the steadfast friends of silver.

This has been proved in many ways.

They have stood like the immovable hills against the whole power of Republican and Democratic Administrations, exerted to the utmost limit of their ability to commit the Government to a single gold standard by making some form of its obligations payable in gold alone.

They have manifested their abiding faith in the financial system of the fathers of the Republic by cheerfully according to silver money a place in their confidence equal to that of gold.

On September 18, 1880, the then Secretary of the Treasury, Senator Sherman of Ohio, gave notice that Treasury officials would exchange silver certificates for gold, and by his subsequent report it appears in the month of October following there was paid into the Treasury in exchange for these certificates $3,485,000 in gold, and in his report of December, 1881, he said: "The department has issued silver certificates at the several Sub-Treasury offices, upon a deposit of gold coin in like amount with the Assistant Treasurer at New York, and through this means certificates have been issued for nearly all the silver held by the Treasury. These certificates amount to about $66,000,000 and are now outstanding."

Afterwards, and on the 1st of November, 1884, the same secretary issued the following order: "Until further notice the exchange of silver certificates for gold coin deposited at the office of the United States Assistant Treasurer at New York will be suspended, and department circular numbered seventy-five of September 18, 1880, is hereby modified accordingly." Subsequently this order was suspended for a time, and a further sum of more that $14,000,000 of gold was exchanged for silver certificates at par. The privilege was finally withdrawn in January, 1885.

Eighty millions of gold exchanged at par for eighty millions of silver certificates by the people of the United States, and that too more than ten years after silver had been demonetized and gold alone had been declared our sole standard of value does not look as though the masses discredit silver.

INCREASED BURDEN OF THE NATIONAL DEBT.

I am opposed to a gold standard because it is in conflict with every written obligation by which the Government of the United States has become indebted to any of its creditors, and because to maintain it greatly adds to the burdens of the people in providing means for the payment of these obligations.

The national debt at the present time consists of outstanding national notes or greenbacks amounting to nearly three hundred and fifty millions of dollars. Of Treasury notes issued in payment of silver bullion purchased under an act of Congress authorizing the same and payment therefor with notes amounting to about one hundred and thirty-six million dollars. Of outstanding bonds of the United States heretofore issued to refund the national debt and of recent bonds issued to replenish and maintain a gold reserve on one hundred million dollars in the Treasury of the United States. The precise aggregate of this indebtedness I am not now able to state, but am sure

that it is more than a round billion of dollars.

Not a single dollar of this vast sum is by the terms of the contracts by which it is secured payable in gold, but every dollar is at the option of the Government if it so elects, payable in either gold or silver.

The national notes or greenbacks contain the following stipulation: "The United States will pay the bearer —— dollars," the blanks being filled with the number denoting the denomination of the bill.

Their payment is governed by an act of Congress, passed March 18, 1869, which reads as follows: "The faith of the United States is solemnly pledged to the payment in coin or its equivalent of all the obligations of the United States, not bearing interest, known as United States notes, and of all the interest-bearing obligations of the United States except in cases where the law authorizes the issue of any such obligation has expressly provided that the same may be paid in lawful money, or other currency than gold and silver."

The following is copied from one of the outstanding bonds of the United States, and is the same in substance that is contained in all issued to refund the national debt except as to the time of payment:

"This bond is issued in accordance with the provisions of an act of Congress entitled an act to authorize the refunding of the national debt, approved July 14, 1870, amended by an act approved January 20, 1871, and is redeemable at the pleasure of the United States after the first day of July, 1907, in coin of the standard value United States on said July 14, 1870, with interest in such coin from the day of the date hereof at 4 per cent per annum."

On the 14th day of January, 1870, silver as much as gold was money of redemption. So far, therefore, as our outstanding bonds issued to refund the national debt are concerned they are by their own express terms and the law in force when they were issued, payable in silver as much as gold and to grant to any holder of these bonds the right to exact gold alone in payment of them is in conflict with the law under which they were issued and with the express terms of the instruments themselves.

I do not say this upon my own responsibility, for we have the authoritative statement of the Congress of the United States to the same effect.

In January, 1878. Stanley Mathews, a leading Republican member of Congress from Ohio, introduced a concurrent resolution that passed both Houses in the following words:—

"That all the bonds issued or authorized to be issued under the said acts of Congress are payable, principal and interest, at the option of the Government of the United States in silver dollars of the coinage of the United States containing 412½ grains each of standard silver, and that to restore to its coinage such silver coin as a legal tender in payment of said bonds, principal and interest is not in violation of the public faith, nor in derogation of the rights of the public creditor."

In the Senate 23 Democrats, 18 Republicans and 1 Independent voted for the resolution, and 7 Democrats and 15 Republicans against it, and in the House 116 Democrats and 73 Republicans voted for it and 23 Democrats and 56 Republicans against it.

These contracts have never been changed. They never can be except by the joint consent of the Government on one side and the holders of the same on the other.

The treasury notes of the United States were issued under an act of Congress passed Febuary 28, 1878, directing the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase not less than two million nor more than ten million ounces of silver bullion per month, and canse the same to be coined into silver dollars as fast as purchased.

By their terms, as anyone can see by reading one of them, they are payable in coin — not in gold coin, but in coin — and by the very act authorizing their issue the silver dollar was made a legal tender in payment of all claims, public and private alike.

There is the law. By its plain, express and unequivocal terms all of the outstanding indebtedness of the nation is payable in coin, not gold coin alone nor

silver coin alone, but in either coin at the sole option of the government.

When President Cleveland considered it necessary to issue government bonds to replenish the gold reserve in the Treasury he asked Congress to change the law so that the Secretary of the Treasury could issue bonds payable in gold, and he urged, and truthfully too, that such bonds could be sold at a higher price than coin bonds, which at the option of the government could be paid in either gold or silver. But Congress absolutely refused to grant that privilege and coin bonds were put upon the market and sold for millions of dollars less than they would have brought if Congress had consented that they should be made payable in gold alone.

Notwithstanding these repeated acts of the Congress of the United States, clearly and explicitly affirming the purpose of the government to retain its right to meet its obligations with silver as much as gold, Secretary Sherman, while acting as Secretary of the Treasury, without any law requiring it, assumed the responsibility of setting aside one hundred millions of dollars in gold coin in the Treasury with which to redeem outstanding national obligations that were clearly payable in either gold or silver at the option of the government.

No reserve fund of silver was set aside for that or any other purpose.

The action of Secretary Sherman was followed by Secretary Foster, another Republican Secretary of the Treasury, in 1891, who carried the policy to its legitimate result by directing the redemption of treasury notes with gold alone whenever gold is demanded. And this policy, I regret to say, is now followed by a Democratic Secretary of the Treasury, who has completely surrendered the option which the law in express or clearly implied terms confers upon him to redeem national currency with either gold or silver.

The law having provided that National notes or greenbacks shall be re-issued when paid into the Treasury, the plainly apparent result of the policy pursued has been to enable a horde of unscrupulous speculators to raid the Treasury and deplete it of its gold over and over again as fast as they could gather up these notes, until within the limited period of about two years it has cost the nation $262,000,000, secured by interest-bearing bonds, which have been sold and are now outstanding to provide gold with which to redeem notes, the payment of which with silver was as legally and morally right as their payments in gold was, and that too when all that was required to stop these raids at any moment was the exercise of the Government's legal right to pay them with silver.

It is hard to be temperate in the use of language while considering this terrible mistake, this egregious blunder, this national wrong, and reflecting that it all came about through the abandonment by Secretaries of the Treasury of a discretion which the law wisely and explicitly placed in their own hands for the protection instead of the depletion of the Treasury.

What does the continuance of our present gold standard mean? It means that every dollar of our national indebtedness, principal and interest, shall be paid in gold if gold is demanded. It means that nearly five hundred million of non-interest-bearing national currency, every dollar of which is secured by a pledge of all the property of this great nation shall be retired, and five hundred million of interest-bearing bonds, to be paid by our children's children, shall be issued in lieu thereof, that national banks may be able to do business on interest-bearing capital.

It means the surrender by the Government of its rightful powers of sovereignty over a subject of the most vital interest to this nation, and the placing of the power so surrendered in the hands of private corporations to be exercised by them in a way to promote their personal interests instead of the welfare of the nation at large.

THE INCREASE IN VALUE OF GOLD.

I am opposed to the gold standard, because I believe experience has already demonstrated that its effect is to greatly enhance the value — that is, the purchasing power — of the gold dollar and correspondingly diminish the price of every other form of property that it measures, and to the same extent diminish the debt-paying power of other property.

It seems to me entirely logical that this should have proved true.

Until 1846 gold and silver alike had constituted the money of the civilized world. This use produced an unlimited demand for both metals and coinage laws fixed a stable value for coins of each.

In that year England demonetized silver, but the other great nations of the world continued its use as money of final redemption.

England's action, therefore, had little influence upon the market price of silver, for the demand for it as a money metal to be coined at a value fixed by law was still equal at least to the supply.

In 1873, the United States demonetized silver; Germany followed in 1874, then France, Belgium, Holland, and some other nations.

The demand for it was thereby greatly limited in these nations.

Coinage laws no longer fixed its market value, and obeying the inexorable law of supply and demand, that always fixes the price of every commodity in all markets, it soon began and has since continued to decline in price when measured by gold, because the market value of gold being still entitled to free coinage in all these countries on the same terms accorded it before silver was demonetized, did not change if measured by the law providing for its coinage.

A question of most serious and far-reaching importance has arisen between advocates of these different standards, one claiming that the change in the relative value of the two metals since silver was demonetized results from a depreciation in the value of silver, and the other that it results from an appreciation in the value of gold.

This is a wide and irreconcilable difference of opinion on a point of very great importance, for if it is true that silver, when measured by a fair and just standard, has actually depreciated in value, then the claim that it should not now be coined at a ratio existing before its depreciation occurred is certainly well founded; and on the other hand, if it is true that the demonetization of silver has increased the value of gold so that the change in their relative value has resulted from that fact then it is equally true that silver should be remonetized and the old ratio of value between money and all other forms of property be re-established with us without reference to what other nations may consent or refuse to do.

That the quantity of metal available for use as money of redemption before silver was demonetized was practically reduced one-half by that act is an undeniable fact.

That the demand for metal for use as money of redemption was not in the least diminished is an equally undeniable fact.

We therefore have a condition in which the supply of an essential article for the use of man is reduced one-half and the demand for it in no degree diminished.

What is it reasonable to suppose would be the natural effect? What would it be if the same conditions were applied to any article of universal use? Could it possibly happen that the market value of the article limited one-half in quantity while the demand for it remained unaffected could do otherwise than advance in market value?

Certainly not, unless there is some fact that exempts it from the operation of the natural law of supply and demand that the whole world over controls all markets.

But the bimetallist does not stop with theory alone. He has an object lesson to support his contention even more conclusive than any mere theory that the ingenuity of man can invent.

He takes the great staples of industry, the essential and necessary commodities in use by the human family that are provided by the labor of man and shows from the price list of these that here in the United States when measured by the present market value of the number of grains of silver in a coined silver dollar, they have not materially depreciated in value since 1873, but that measured by the number of grains of gold in a gold dollar these commodities have fallen in price nearly or quite one-half, or as much as silver itself has fallen when measured by gold.

In 1873 wheat was worth in the markets of the United States $1.24 per bushel. The uncoined bullion necessary to make

a silver dollar could be exchanged for substantially four-fifths of a bushel of wheat. At the present time the same grade of wheat is worth in the same markets about 63 cents. The bullion necessary to make a silver dollar can be exchanged now for substantially the same amount of wheat that it could in 1873.

In 1873 cotton in the markets of the United States was worth about 22 cents a pound. The bullion necessary to make a silver dollar could be exchanged for nearly five pounds of cotton. At present prices the bullion necessary to make a silver dollar can be exchanged for more pounds of cotton than it could in 1873.

The owner of a gold dollar in 1873 could purchase with it substantially four-fifths of a bushel of wheat. To-day he can purchase with the same dollar twice as much.

The owner of a gold dollar in 1873 could buy with it four and a half pounds of cotton or a little more. To-day he can purchase with the same dollar nearly or quite twelve pounds.

The farmer who owed a thousand dollars in 1873 and had in his possession 806 bushels of wheat could sell it for enough to pay his debt. To-day the same farmer owing the same debt would be compelled to sell twice as much wheat to meet his obligation.

In 1873 the cotton planter owing a debt of one thousand dollars could liquidate it with little more than the avails of 4,000 pounds of cotton. To-day the same planter to pay the same debt would be compelled to sell more than 11,000 pounds.

And so we could continue the comparison of prices between 1873, when silver was demonetized, with present prices, and show that the silver bullion in a silver dollar will buy substantially as much of the great staples of industry as it would in 1873, and show also that the gold in a gold dollar will purchase of the same staples nearly or quite twice as much at this date as it would when silver was destroyed as money of redemption.

If it is possible to demonstrate anything by experience these facts, it seems to me, prove beyond intelligent controversy that silver when measured by a just standard has not depreciated materially, but that gold has appreciated to an enormously unjust extent.

They prove another most startling fact. They show that by the legislation of our own people we have doubled the value of the fortunes of those whose property consists of money or obligations for the payment of money, and that by the same process we have reduced nearly one-half the fortunes of those whose property consists of almost every other form of property.

Is it unjust; is it unfair to strive to restore the old equilibrium between the value of money and the value of other kinds of property by the same process through which they have been so widely separated in value?

The people of whom you are a part must answer.

LABORING MEN AND FARMERS.

I never look at the Democratic platform of 1892 and read its financial plank in the light of the practical interpretation that has been given it wherein it declares that the policy outlined in that plank is demanded in the interest "of our farmers and laborers, the most defenseless victims of an unstable currency," without feeling that as a Democrat I am disgraced thereby.

I hate fraud. And I hate it as much in a political party as I do in any one else.

I know this language was never suggested by a farmer or laborer. I know it was not intended for the benefit of either. I know it was suggested by the money lenders of this nation or their representatives in that convention, and I know it was intended for their benefit, and therefore I know it was designed to mislead for the purpose of obtaining votes.

But even now there are hundreds of men in and out of Congress who are daily repeating this stale and odious falsehood that a gold standard is demanded in the interest of farmers and laborers.

We have only to open our eyes to see on every hand that the prices of the products of labor have declined, enormously declined, since silver was demonetized.

But advocates of a gold standard say to the laborer your wages have not declined, and with the price of a day's labor you can purchase nearly twice as much of the necessaries of life as you could in 1873. This is true, but prior to the panic of 1873 the great army of laborers in the United States could obtain two days labor where now it can obtain but one.

The American tramp is the product of the years that have intervened between 1873 and this date. Now you find him in every city and village of the land begging for bread because no one can be found to give him work with which to buy it.

It is true, as it ought to be, that in all seasons of declining prices labor is one of the last things to be affected, otherwise than in a reduced demand for it.

Men adhere tenaciously to established customs of every kind, and especially to established prices for their labor, but the law of gravitation itself is not more certain in its effect than the fact that in time in the final end when the business of a country finds a solid basis, whatever that may be, the prices of labor must be adjusted to and correspond with the prices of its products.

If foretold by the inspired prophets and written in the great book of truth, the prediction would be no more certain of fulfillment than it now is that adherence to a measure of values maintained by the commercial countries of the Old World means in the end submission to the scale of wages prevailing in those countries.

If any laborer is ready for this, he belongs in the ranks of a gold standard party. If he is not, and is here to night, then I beg of him to go to the primaries and see that no man is sent to your State convention who will help maintain a financial policy that is absolutely certain in the end to place him on a level with the poorly paid laborers of the Old World

THE NATION'S CREDIT.

I have already called your attention to the fact that every dollar of our greenback currency was issued when silver was money of redemption as much as gold, and shown you that it follows upon the plainest principles of both morals and law that the government will perform its full obligation if it redeems these notes with the same kind of redemption money in existence when they were issued.

I have called your attention also to the fact that when the national debt was refunded and bonds issued and sold to provide means for its payment the Government expressly stipulated on the face of these bonds that they should be redeemable in coin of the standard value of the United States on the 14th of July, 1870, and that this meant silver coin as much as gold.

I want also to remind you again that the whole power of both Republican and Democratic administrations, led by the ablest and most influential men in both of these parties, has been insufficient to procure the issue of a single obligation for the payment of a single dollar of national indebtedness that by its terms is made payable in gold.

Failing to secure through Congress the end they desire the money tenders of the country, backed by the gold standard advocates in it, now appeal directly to the people themselves and ask them to determine, that the financial system of this country shall be permanently established on a gold basis, and thereby that every dollar of indebtedness, public and private, shall be made payable in gold or other money equivalent in value with gold, because redeemable with gold.

The argument in support of their claim briefly stated, is this: They say gold is now the standard money of the principal commercial countries of the globe. That it is, therefore, the best money — the only sound money. That silver is cheap money — a debased money. That for this Government to insist on paying its obligations, although legally it may have the right to do so, with silver would be a dishonorable act that would ruin its credit in the eyes of the financial world.

This is the first time I have ever heard claimed it was dishonorable on the part of any party to a contract fairly and honorably made to insist on its performance according to its terms, and the first time within the limits of recorded history, so far as I have any knowledge, when a creditor has felt at liberty to demand the payment of a written obligation, clearly understood when it was entered into, in any other manner than that stipulated in the contract itself.

Even the Prince of Shylocks in the

hour of his supreme greed demanded that alone which was "nominated in the bond," his "pound of flesh," but, because the bond did not provide for the shedding of blood and he could not cut away the pound of flesh without spilling it, a righteous Judge denied him even that which was promised by the bond itself, and no critic of that decision upon the ground that it was dishonorable has yet appeared, so far as I have any knowledge.

To pay the nation's obligations with silver, measured by its present purchasing power of the products of labor, is to pay every farthing that is promised by them and the full limit of value that the Government received in exchange for them, with the possible exception of bonds that have lately been sold to replenish the gold reserve in the Treasury.

To pay its obligations, other than those last named, with gold measured by its present purchasing power of the products of labor is to pay double the amount promised, and every farthing of this double amount is an added burden laid upon the bent and aching shoulders of labor, for labor alone can supply the means for their payment.

And in the same manner, varying only in degree, if we adhere to a gold standard, has the burden of State, municipal, corporate and individual indebtedness been increased.

From the time of the demonetization of silver the country has been doing business under conditions of almost continuously falling prices; and this has gone on until one long cry of business distress fills the world with its appeal for help.

And what is the help that gold standard advocates propose? A tightening of the bands that have held the great centers of industry in their heartless thraldom for nearly twenty years. A spreading of the tentacles of a devil fish on land until they encircle the world in their slimy grasp. A reduction of the financial system of all the nations and all the peoples upon the footstool of God to a single standard of gold. The doubling of the value of money by diminishing the volume of supply to correspond with the meager amount of a single metal that can be furnished for that use.

The cutting in twain of the price of the great staples of industry by applying to them a measure of values invented by the moneyed aristocracy of England and more and more contracted as nation after nation has followed their selfish lead.

In all these years of business lethargy there has been one class and one alone that is enriched by the depression that has fallen upon every other.

The money-lenders, the richest of all the people on all the earth, the one class capable of caring for themselves with or without the aid of human laws, have gorged their selfish appetite for more, while struggling millions of men have pleaded for work and often begged for bread.

An honest dollar, a sound currency is the shibboleth of this meager band, insignificant in number when compared with all the rest, but mighty in power.

An honest dollar, that in all the markets of the world will buy two dollars' worth of the products of the toiling millions of men.

An honest dollar that to obtain it robs the farmer of half the products of his land, the manufacturer of all the profits of his business, the toilers of the world on land and sea of half the means they earn with which to feed and clothe their helpless ones.

An honest dollar doubled in value by human laws; sent forth into the world to paralyze instead of stimulate business; to crush instead of encourage hope; pauperize instead of enrich every man in the country except the one man that has to lend at the highest rate of interest he can obtain.

No, my hearers, the dollars for which these men plead are the most dishonest dollars ever contrived by the ingenuity of man, the currency they defend the most unsound that selfishness could conceive or avarice invent.

It is not a more valuable dollar that the imperative needs of the business world demand. Instead of this it is a cheaper dollar; a dollar the intrinsic value of which is regulated by that divine law of an omnipotent God which decreed that in the bowels of the earth for those who delve should be found gold and silver equally designed for use as money and largely valueless for any other essential purpose, one of which a currency could be made fair and just to those who lift it from the mine and those who use it. A dollar that will exchange anywhere in all the world for an honest dollars' worth of the products of human toil. A dollar sufficiently plentiful to start the wheels of industry, to enable the manufacturer to keep his machinery in motion, the farmer to cultivate the soil, the debtor to meet his obligation to pay, the laborer to earn enough to feed and clothe his wife and little ones, and sufficient in volume to furnish this whole great country of ours with a currency born of the goodness of the Creator, when he filled our mountains with the two precious metals out of which he intended that money should be made.

Which is the dollar we want — the dollar of the Creator, the dollar of the Constitution, the dollar of our fathers or the dollar of the present, born of the avarice of selfish men?

This is the great question that overshadows every other, that will never down until selfishness is curbed, or hope for the masses is lost.

But our gold standard friends tell us that if we restore silver to its original right of free coinage as standard money we will drive six hundred millions of gold out of circulation and flood the country with the cheap silver of the whole world.

As to gold we have no six hundred millions in circulation, nor any other considerable sum. What we have is largely locked up in the Treasury of the United States and the vaults of national banks, and kept there for their use as money of redemption whenever it becomes necessary to so use it, and so far as adding to the actual circulating medium of the country in ordinary times is concerned it might as well be anchored at the bottom of the sea.

It is useful for the purpose for which it is principally held, but silver restored to its rightful place as money of redemption would be equally useful for the same purpose, and we would be able to obtain it in sufficient quantities for that use without issuing bonds every few months and selling them in the world's markets to replenish a gold reserve.

We need not fear that the free coinage of silver will drive our gold out of existence if it should, as our friends on the other side insist, drive it out of active circulation.

It would still be here in the hands of its owners precisely as it now is. They would not destroy it nor give it away.

It would be within the realm of every one that requires it for use, and even if at a premium over other forms of money it would cost less to obtain it than it costs now. It is the world's markets and not our own that regulate the value of gold. In these markets it is always taken by weight. The stamp of a mint of a foreign country adds nothing to its value.

Our gold coins to-day are worth in foreign markets precisely the price of the pure gold they contain, and they pass for that price only in such markets.

The free coinage of silver as money of redemption would not affect the value of gold except in so far as it lessened the demand for it, and thereby reduced its value.

Let us dismiss the fear that we will destroy gold or put it beyond the reach of those who require it by restoring silver to the right of free coinage.

THE FLOOD OF SILVER.

In his recent great speech Senator Cockrell completely demolished this, the greatest and most effective of all the scarecrows that gold standard advocates have been able to stand up with which to frighten conservative men.

He shows that two-thirds of all the people in the world are yet using silver as real money; that is as money which is not redeemable with some other kind of money. They cannot, as he says, spare their silver. If they did it would rob them of their money and they would be without a currency for the transaction of business. No flood can come from that source.

He also shows that in every gold standard country of the world silver is used as token money to a very large extent. We use it. England uses it. So does France and Germany and all the rest of the

countries of the globe, I believe, that have adopted a gold standard.

It is absolutely necessary in all of these countries to meet the demands for change and supply a currency fit for use in the small transactions of the people. These countries have no more of this money than they actually need. They cannot send it here to be coined into our standard silver dollars, for they cannot spare their own coin.

There are but two other sources of supply as the Senator shows.

Large quantities of silver are used in manufactures and in the arts. To put it into its present shape in these lines has cost time and money. To melt it in our mints would destroy all of this added value and make it worth precisely what it was worth in its original condition when dug up from the bowels of the earth.

Look at the silver on the tables of the rich, at the various ornaments and manufactures that are made from it, and tell me how much of it used for these purposes would be dumped into the melting pots of any mint and reduced to its original condition of bullion alone. Not much we may feel absolutely certain.

The next and last source of supply is free silver bullion. Of this we have several hundred tons stored away in the treasury, but largely represented by outstanding paper currency in the form of treasury notes or silver certificates.

If we coin this into silver dollars, we must redeem and retire the treasury notes. We could add the profit which the government made on the purchase of this bullion. That is the difference between its cost price and the sum it would produce if coined into standard dollars, which would be, I believe it is estimated, about fifty-seven millions.

To this extent we would flood the country with silver now on hand. Would we feel it? Would we know there was a flood of any kind from such an insignificant source? Not at all.

Then we must go to the owners of silver bullion who could make more by bringing their product to our mints and having it coined into silver dollars than they can to dispose of it for any other purpose. Who are these owners? Largely the men who dig it or cause it to be dug out of the earth. They do not store it. It is not dumped into elevators or warehouses like wheat or cotton and held for a rise in the market.

There is no over-supply of it on hand anywhere except the comparatively meager amount in the Treasury of the United States.

Whether coined or not, the demand for it in manufactures and the arts will continue to absorb vast quantities of it.

It cannot be furnished in excessive supply from the bowels of the earth, for he who designed it for the use of man was not wastefully extravagant in providing the sources of supply. It has never yet been mined in quantities beyond the legitimate uses to which it can be applied, and it never will be.

There is no room in this country for two gold standard parties.

The boast of the Democratic party in all the years of its history has been that it is the party of the common people: the champion of their rights. It has never espoused the cause of classes of any kind as against the masses of the people. It is too late to do so now. It cannot climb upon a gold standard platform without trespassing upon ground already occupied.

The Republican party is in full possession there and has been ever since Senator Sherman set aside a gold reserve in the Treasury with which to redeem the paper national currency of the country, and thereby planted the flag of that party in the gold standard camp.

The statute of limitations has run against all other parties on this subject. They could not steal the thunder of the Republican party on that question if they should try.

To follow Senator Sherman into the same camp would not add a vote to the Democratic party. It would drive away millions of as loyal Democrats as ever cast a ballot.

Those who urge it have not counted the consequences of what they propose. If they could succeed in a party sense they would "sow to the wind and reap whirlwind."

FACTS FOR FREE SILVER MEN.

To the Editor of the Post-Dispatch.

There are two or three mistakes which you silver people make, and I think it would be highly beneficial to your own cause if you would rectify them.

1. It is a mistake to acquiesce in the deceptive and alluring names which the goldbugs so ingeniously give their own money. The fancy titles "sound money" and "honest money" seem to indicate that silver money is the reverse. Do not allow yourselves to be placed in this false position, and do not allow this impudence to go unchallenged.

2. When goldbugs talk of the good times that will follow gold money, why not remind them of the fact that this country has now been on an exclusive gold basis for three years — ever since the repeal of the Sherman law, in fact — and that times have constantly got worse. When the repeal of that law was pending Senator Sherman got up in the Senate and said: "Repeal the Sherman law and within ten days the hum of manufacturing industries throughout the land would be heard." Senator Teller, with tears in his eyes, said: "Repeal the law, and instead of improvement you will see times rapidly grow worse." Which of the two has experience shown to be correct.

Why not, also, point to the fact that nearly all the gold countries of the world are in the throes of poverty, while the silver countries are prosperous.

3. When the goldbugs threaten us with a panic if silver is remonetized, why not point to the fact that even if this were to prove true (which it will not,) that we cannot be any worse off than we are now, for are we not enjoying under this gold regime harder times than in 1893 — in fact, the hardest times ever known in America?

4. When the goldbugs threaten that if silver is remonetized all the gold will leave the country, why not point to two indisputable facts in reply (please emphasize that word indisputable sir) viz., that all the gold now here is hoarded and out of circulation, and therefore might as well be out of the country as in it; and secondly, that instead of gold going out of the country if silver is remonetized that history proves directly the opposite. It was during the silver days that gold in ever increasing quantities flowed into this country, spreading throughout the channels of trade. Does this surprise any one? Let him look at the records and he will find that gold came to America in larger lumps and quantities than it is now leaving it.

5. The goldbugs tell us that the minute we go on a silver basis that Europe will send back to us all our bonds, stocks, securities, etc. This is rubbish. Since the depression in America (caused by gold monometallism) became so great that three-fourths of all the railroad mileage in the United States is in receivers' hands Europe has done nothing but dispose of American securities, and at this time holds scarcely any, and wishes less. Under a silver basis, with its attendant prosperity. The reverse would be the case. The New York Financial Record and Investors' Manual of March 18, 1896, page 1, in speaking of Mexico (a straight-out silver country) says:

"The condition of Mexico is very bright compared with the United States. * * * Mexican silver bonds have reached a quotation in Europe approximating those of Mexican gold sixes."

The paper adds that the Mexican silver bonds have no other guarantee than the faith of the Government, and says it is believed that the entire debt could be placed on a silver basis.

Thousands of people are now deluding themselves with the hope that "when the Republican platform comes out for gold," or "when McKinley is elected on a 'sound money' platform," times will get better.

Nothing of the kind. They will get worse. Restore silver and with it will come the prosperity of the old silver days. Retain gold, and with it there will remain a continuance of the present gold regime hard times, which latter are only a duplicate of the condition of every existing gold country in the world.

P. L. G.

St. Louis, May 4.

FREE SILVER IN JAPAN.

How it Has Fostered Manufacturing in That Country.

"How long did you reside in Japan?" asked a Post-Dispatch reporter of Mr. R. Van Bergen, why represents a syndicate of American newspapers in the capital of that country.

"I lived there from 1869 to 1875, and returned to give an account of events during the war."

"What struck you as most occupying our people since you returned?"

"What do you mean? In politics? O, undoubtedly the silver agitation, and I think it is but right that such a vital question should be decided at the polls next November."

"In what way?"

"Why, when I left the United States I was wholly in favor of the gold standard, but actual facts as seen in the far East have thoroughly converted me, as they have every resident there, no matter to what nationality he belongs."

"What is the cause of this conversion?"

"The facts, as they are daily paraded before our eyes. What do you think enabled Japan, an impoverished country without credit at home or abroad, only ten years ago, to borrow respectively thirty millions, fifty millions and one hundred millions of yen (dollars) from her own people? Nothing but the fact that both Europe and the United States had confined themselves to a gold standard."

"How do you explain that?"

"Why ten years ago, that is before gold attained a fictitious value, there was no factory in Japan. It is essentially an agricultural country, and the Japanese were satisfied in exporting tea, silk and curios, and buying of other countries what they needed of manufactures. But when silver began to go down, when the Japanees dollar, intrinsically worth more than the dollar of our daddies, went down in value, and they were compelled to pay as much as two yen and five sen for every dollar's worth, they thought it was about time to manufacture their own goods. And what is the consequence?

"Prior to the time I speak of the cotton spinners of Lancashire, England, found a ready and remunerative market in China and Japan, and the aboriginal hand-spinning gradually disappeared since cotton goods could be imported more cheaply. But gold assumed a fictitious value ten years ago, and while for gold countries prices remained identical, those nations where silver was the medium of payment were compelled to pay a premium which was severely felt in importing goods. Enterprising Japanese established a modern cotton-spinnery with 800 spindles in Osaka. To-day 600,000 spindles are at work day and night. In Osaka alone there are 800 factories with chimneys 200 feet high and 200 with chimneys 250 feet high."

"Then you do not ascribe Japan's prosperity to low wages?"

"Wages are, of course, a factor. But wages have risen in Japan 100 and 200 per cent. Remember, they are paid in silver, which is the standard of value, and buys as much as it ever did. But those wages, because they are in silver, represent only one-half the value in gold, and consequently, suppose the workingman there receives the same wages as his fellow worker here (which he does not), even then the expense to the manufacturer would be only one-half of what the employer pays here, because the latter pays in gold."

"Then you do not ascribe Japan's prosperity to protection?"

"Japan, by the treaties, is limited to a 5 per cent duty ad valorem, so as far as tariff is concerned, she can't have protection, but she is protected through the folly of those nations who insist upon a gold standard. Do you think the Japanese are going to purchase any luxury when for every dollar they have to pay two of their lawful coin?

"Japan can sell to China, India, Australia and charge half price and make a fair profit. That is the reason why, when our factories stood idle, those of Japan paid all the way from 12 to 28 per cent in dividends. It is no wonder, then, that every American who feels interested in the welfare of this country should be for silver and hope that the coming elections will prove a victory for this cause? Read Consul General T. R. Jernigan's report in the consular reports of last year. From 1893 to 1894 our importations of cotton into China fell from 39,000,000 pounds to 29,000,000 pounds, and the fall has been much heavier since. Mr. Jernigan is, of course, in touch with the administration on the financial question, but notwithstanding this, his report is one cry of anguish for silver."

Silver, if present indications count for anything, will make the St. Louis nominee a back number — a hopeless goddle-woddle.

Cleveland and Carlisle Reviewed by Fishback.

A Masterly Letter Exposing the Folly of the Administration's Financial Policy.

I have received a great many communications concerning my open letter to Mr. Cleveland from all portions of the West and South, most of them in commendation, but very few in condemnation.

From St. Louis came two letters from men who are evidently "business men," men of affairs and educated men, but who must as evidently, like too many others, allow Messrs. Cleveland and Carlisle to do both their investigating and their thinking for them on this financial question.

True, Mr. Carlisle was for about twenty years a member of Congress, was for several years Speaker of the House, was by every obligation, as well of interest as of honor, bound to investigate this important question thoroughly that he might safely counsel his constituents and his country, and during all these years of ripe manhood and assumed investigation and study, he constantly advised both his constituents and his country that the destruction of one-half of the metallic money by the conspiracy of 1873 was the "most gigantic crime of this or any other age"—the new light never breaking in upon his mind until he ceased to represent his constituents and began to represent Mr. Cleveland, and after he had a position where he could issue millions of bonds.

True, also, we are bound to assume one of two things, either that during all these riper years of his life he was an utterly unfit and unsafe counselor or that he is a false counselor now.

True, too, that the only prediction (for he and his class revel in predictions—the sealed future offering such a fine field for false controversy) that he has ever made concerning this question, which has been fulfilled, is the prediction he made that the destruction of one-half of the metallic standard would "entail a greater loss of property than all the wars, pestilences and famines the world ever saw." This the census reports of assessed values, referred to in my open letter, show to have been fulfilled with startling precision.

Yet, notwithstanding all this is true these "business men," one of whom I suspect to be a banker, like a young bird which opens its mouth and takes in with absolute confidence whatever kind of worm its mother drops, open their minds and take in whatever Messrs. Carlisle and Cleveland tell them with an unquestioning and childlike simplicity which is only equaled by the childish logic with which they undertake to reason in defense of their position.

For an illustration, one of these men, whom I rather think to be a banker, exclaims: "What, four hundred millions of silver in the various treasuries of the world, the banks full of it and yet it isn't enough for you? There is a loss by depreciation of 40 per cent on that silver now. Is there any on gold?"

Here is evidently an educated man, and one who, I have no doubt, manages his private affairs with sense and success, yet who has not given this great burning question enough investigation and

thought to know that this very "loss by depreciation on silver" and the corresponding rise of gold constitute the very essence of the crime of which right-minded, patriotic people complain and which Mr. Carlisle so vehemently denounced during all the years he represented his constituents instead of Mr. Cleveland. And so completely has he been hypnotized by Messrs. Cleveland and Carlisle he conscientiously believes every man a fool who does not accept his ill-digested, uninformed reasoning as complete and conclusive proof.

Nor has he any more conception of why this "loss by depreciation on silver" and rise of gold, as is evident from another sentence in his letter in which he asks: "When silver is produced to a much larger extent than is required, how are you going to make it worth more? Can you make cotton worth more by law?"

If we concede this banker's honesty, as we must of course, what must we think of his good sense or rather his information upon any aspect of this subject about which he talks with all the confidence of profound ignorance.

As he has done me the honor to read my open letter, I hope, for his own sake, he will read this, and if he have a 10-year old son, I will undertake to make it so plain that even he, if not his hypnotized father, can understand not only how silver has been made worth less by law and how it can be made worth more by law, but how also cotton, corn, wheat or any other article of commerce could be made worth more or less.

I once heard a jolly Jew say that Moses got up the first corner on beef of which history gives an account. He bought up all the beef cattle and then passed a law forbidding the people to use swine's flesh and made millions out of the rise in beef.

Whatever we may think of this Jew's profanity we must all admit that he had a pretty clear conception of how articles of commerce may be made worth more or less by law. He knew what this banker does not know, or pretends not to know, that by virtue of such a law beef would go up and bacon would go down.

Nor is there a manufacturer in the land, from Carnegie to Niedringhans, clamoring for a protective tariff law who does not sufficiently understand how goods may be made worth more by law to contribute freely of fat to the McKinley boom, that they may grow fatter by law.

Now, I will assume that this 10-year-old son of my banker friend has been to school long enough to learn that demand and supply regulate the exchange value of every article of commerce, whether money or commodity. It is all important that he keep this fundamental truth in mind, not so long only as it suits his preconceived ideas, but all the time.

The people of the United States use two kinds of grain for food in about equal quantities—corn and wheat. Suppose every State in the Union were to impose such a heavy tax on wheat as virtually to forbid its use as a food, does not this 10-year-old boy see how, by thus destroying the larger portion of the demand for wheat, its price would go down and the price of corn go up? And that the decrease in the worth of one and the increase in that of the other would both be the result of laws affecting demand and supply?

The Confederate States during the late civil war imposed a tax of $20 per bale on cotton to discourage its culture and to encourage the culture of corn. This destruction of supply, and by law, sent the price of cotton up to 50 cents per pound in gold.

Prior to 1873 the commercial world had for untold ages used two metals for standard money as well as for redemption, in about equal quantities (in coin value)—one was silver and one was gold. In 1873 and 1874 all the greatest nations destroyed, and by law, silver as a redemption money, thus destroying the demand for it for this purpose and throwing all the demand on gold. Is it, can it be necessary to tell this 10-year-old boy that these laws sent the price of exchange value of silver down and that of gold up?

Is it not almost beyond the comprehension of men of ordinary intellect that such men as my banker friend cannot see why so much more silver is produced than is required when his friends Cleveland, Carlisle and others insist upon destroying the requirements for silver?

May I venture to suggest to my banker

riend that if he will do a little independ-nt thinking for himself he will under-tand that the reason, and the only reason, why this "loss by depreciation of 40 per ent on silver" is the law of 1873, which destroyed the demand for silver, for re-demption or real money, and that if gold ad been demonetized instead of silver ts "loss by depreciation" would have been still greater, because it has not the ntrinsic value to fall back upon that ilver has.

But Mr. Carlisle has told my friend (I nust call him my friend notwithstanding he rudeness of his letter), that it is the ncreased production of silver which has essened its price, and he takes it in with bsolute confidence, notwithstanding Mr. Carlisle's official department, through is Director of the Mint, and in his official report of Oct. 17, 1893, page 95, ells him that during the 100 years from 1792 to 1892 there has been nearly $556,-000,000 more of gold produced than of ilver in the world, and in his report of June 30, 1894, page 52, he tells him that during the twenty years from 1873 to 1893 there were upwards of $296,000,000 more of gold produced in the world than of silver, and on page 53 of the same report that during the years 1891, 1892 and 1893 there were $95,000,-000 more of gold coined in the world than of silver. But as all the de-mand for redemption money has been thrown upon gold there is not enough, can never be enough, to meet the require-ments of the increasing business of man-kind, until silver has been restored to its corruptly lost monetary functions.

And Mr. Carlisle has told him, too, that the remonetization of silver would lessen the value by nearly one-half of every bond and mortgage and other credit in the civil-ized world, and in the very same breath told him also that the demonetization of silver has not increased the value of these things at all, and he accepts this nconsistent nonsense as Gospel truth. And I have no doubt that if it were to his nterest to believe it, he would accept with equal confidence the equally sensible statement if Mr. Carlisle were to tell him that it is 1,000 miles from St. Louis to Washington, but only 900 miles from Washington to St. Louis.

I cannot consent to close this letter without assuring my banker friend that if he will do a little independent investiga-tion for himself he will find that history, as far back as we have any reliable statis-tics, shows that no matter what the rela-tive increase or decrease in the supply of either metal, while both were in demand for redemption money, so inexhaustible is the demand for money, the relative values or ratio had never varied more than 3 per cent. Sometimes there were from two to three times as much silver produced as of gold; sometimes from two to four times as much gold produced as of silver. Yet the ratio kept steadily within 3 per cent of a fixed point.

If he had not shown such ignorance of every aspect of this question I would not insult the supposed intelligence of a banker by telling him why. But under the circumstances I must.

Whenever either metal began to get cheaper than ther other by reason of in-creased supply, people who needed money for the payment of debts, for embarking in new enterprises and for any other of the thousand and one uses for which men need money, would naturally seek out for the cheapest and therefore the most easily obtained. This at once began to increase the demand for that money and to lessen the demand for the other. Thus by the simple law of demand and supply the value of one was increased and of the other lessened until an equi-librium had settled about the fixed ratio. This, too, is the reason why a double standard is more stable than any single standard can be. For if the standard be composed of only one metal and that metal's supply increase or decrease out of proportion to demand it has no partner to help it regulate demand and supply, but disastrous variations in values are the necessary result.

Another one of Mr. Cleveland's apt and unquestioning scholars, who is also evidently a "business man," asks with a confidence that is positively sublime: "Do you suppose, sir, that the United States by itself could maintain a double standard at 16 to 1 or any other ratio?"

Overlooking the rudeness of his letter, I will, for the sake of many others who

are honest but hypnotized, answer him with a respect he does not deserve.

Let him keep constantly in mind that demand and supply regulate the exchange value of silver as well as of gold, and that demand for money depends largely, indeed for the most part, upon the amount of business to be carried on.

Mr. Carroll D. Wright of the Census Bureau wrote me not long ago that in 1889 — the last year for which he had any statistics of the subject — we manufac-tured in the United States nine thousand three hundred and eighty millions worth of goods. This, according to Mulhall, England's great statistician, was nearly as much as was manufactured by Great Britain, France and Germany, the three other great nations, all combined.

The mint reports show us that there are in the world about seven thousand five hundred millions worth of gold and silver used as money and bullion. So, if every nation on the globe were to rake up every single piece of gold and silver money and bullion and give it all to the United States there would not be enough to pay cash for one single year's output of our factories even seven years ago, by nearly two thousand million dollars.

Nor is this all. According to Chauncey Depew, the United States, if he is quoted correctly, transports on its railroads every year sixty million tons more of freight than all the balance of the world's combined transports by rail and water both. Nor is this yet all. The agricul-tural products of the United States are eight hundred millions more than those of any other country on the globe. Now, when you add to our manufactures our transportation business by land and water, our agricultural products, our mineral products, other than gold and silver, our real estate transfers and all of our other varied and ramified and rapidly increasing business, if every other nation on earth were to give up to the United States every ounce and penny of its gold and silver money and bullion, it would not enable us to transact one-tenth part of our enormous business on a cash basis, payable in gold and silver. Any share of these metals we are likely ever to really have will not enable us to trans-act 2 per cent of our business on a cash basis, payable in gold and silver.

Yet France, only a second rate power, with less than one-half as many manu-factories as Great Britian, and less than one-fourth of ours, a nation which could be carved out of the single State of Texas and then have territory enough to make nearly eight States as large as Massachu-setts, this comparatively little France for seventy years from 1803 to 1873, controlled the price of silver all over the world by simply giving a little more of it at her mints than the United States did. Every man in the world who had silver refused to take less for it than 15 1-2 to 1 minus expense of transport because he could take it to France and get this for it. And this too, while the two great-est powers of the world, the United States and Great Britain, had monetary systems differing from that of France. France had a ratio of 15½ to 1, the United States 16 to 1, and for most of the time Great Britain had silver demonetized. Notwithstanding this the mint value of France controlled the price or value in silver in both countries.

Yet my "business" friend is frightened out of all his business sense because Mr. Carlisle has told him it would ruin this great country if she were to undertake what little France accomplished so suc-cessfully and for so long.

But after all, from the character of the two letters of my "friends" I am led to suspect that neither really believes what he says; that they are neither fools nor ignor-amuses, but that they are simply selfish and are willing to insist upon a policy which robs other people for their benefit, just as the nobility of Europe and the Orient insist upon policies and defend policies which impose upon the masses of people all the labor while they them-selves enjoy all the benefits of their labor. For these bankers surely have read the reports of Bradstreet and Dunn, which only a few days ago show that the aver-age price of commodities has fallen 2 per cent since the first of this month. This means that gold has gone up in value 2 per cent in less than one month. This means that all other kinds of money based on gold has gone up 2 per cent in less than a month. This means that it pays a

man having money better to hoard it or invest in good easily convertible Government bonds than to let it out in business enterprises however profitable. This means the stagnation of all kinds of business (except the bond-issuing business) we now see growing worse and worse as the days go by. Does anybody suppose these bankers do not know this?

Very truly yours
W. M. FISHBACK.

SENATOR VEST DEFINES HIS POSITION.

From Speech in Senate, May 7.

I have stated, under much criticism in Missouri, that I was a Democrat under all conditions; that I intended to abide by the action of my party; that I was too old to hunt for a new political home; that I should die, as I have lived, in the party of Jefferson, devoted to his teachings and principles. But I serve notice now that if this convention at Chicago is to be made up of Federal office-holders, brought there to overawe and override the wishes of the honest majority of the Democratic party throughout the United States, it is no Democratic convention with me. I shall abide the will of a majority of my party, honestly assembled and honestly expressed. I make no threat, but I want no misunderstanding. The Democratic party is a party of honest expression and not of Federal patronage."

What I saw and heard in Europe satisfied me that all hope for bimetallism rested with the United States. Mr. Gladstone correctly stated the position of England when he declared that the world owed that country ten billions of dollars, and it must be paid in gold. The nobility and bankers control Europe, and whatever may be the opinions and hopes of the masses, their clamors are hushed by the tramp of armed men. English influence dominates the capitalists of the world, and gold allied with government insolently defies the people.

Senator Vest's conclusion must be that of every man whose mind is open to conviction. A trip to Europe should be sufficient to convince the most hardened gold standard advocate that gold monometallism is inimical to the interests of the plain people, and that the hope of an international agreement, brought about by persuasion, is as the New York Post calls it, "a will o' the wisp."

One of the leading bankers of New York, on his return from Europe, told a friend that what he saw and heard in Europe had converted him from gold monometallism to bimetallism. He was convinced that a continuation of the former meant commercial disaster and misery for the people.

The United States cannot save the people of Europe from the oppression of their masters. But they can save the people of America from it. They can set a good example and help the people of Europe.

THE FRENCH WAY.

There are neither gold nor silver mines in France, while the mines of the United States produce over $36,000,000 worth of gold and $77,000,000 worth of silver. When France has a balance of trade against her, it reduces her stock of gold. But for many years past the annual output of precious metals in the United States has not been drained away by any unfavorable balance of trade. If it has gone abroad it was to pay interest to foreign holders of American securities. Yet the bank of France, which does the banking for the French Government, keeps nearly $700,000,000 of depreciated legal tender silver at par by simply exercising its discretion to redeem its notes either with gold, or with 5 per cent in gold and the rest in silver.

Why, then, with a mining output ample to meet all demands on this country for gold, and with $627,000,000 of gold money and only about $550,000,000 of legal tender silver money in the country, is our Treasury unable to maintain the latter at par, without buying gold with bonds every two or three months?

The obvious reason is that our Government ignores its own laws making its notes redeemable in full legal tender silver, and, instead of exercising its discretion to redeem said notes in either coin,

treats all Treasury notes as gold notes and even the silver dollars themselves as a government obligation redeemable on demand in gold.

This gives bond speculators about $800,000,000 of the Treasury obligations with which to pull gold out of the Treasury as fast as it is bought and thus to keep the bond issues continually on tap.

The French method of maintaining parity is a success. Our method seems to be a most ingenious device for destroying parity and impairing the credit of a Government whose resources and solvency are infinitely superior to those of debt-burdened France.

FAVOR SILVER.

The German Will Try and Rehabilitate the White Metal.

BERLIN, Feb. 16.— The reichstag to-day adopted the resolution submitted yesterday instructing the Federal Governments to issue invitations for an international monetary conference to take action for the rehabilitation of silver as a circulating medium. Prior to the adoption of the resolution Count Von Posadowski Wegner Secretary of State for the Imperial Treasury, on behalf of the government, declared their sympathy with the object aimed at by the resolution.

BERLIN, Feb. 16.—A resolution inviting the federated governments of Germany to issue invitations to an international monetary conference to consider measures for the rehabilitation of silver as a currency medium was introduced in the Reichstag yesterday by the German Conservative leader, Count von Mirbach. Mirbach said that the moment had now arrived for Germany to take the initiative in settling this question, which was one of the greatest importance. It was one of life or death for husbandry, as well as for the export industry. Bimetallism would cause the rise of all prices in England, where gold was the currency. Agriculture would be ruined if the present system was maintained. America would either absorb Germany's gold or adopt a pure silver standard, and capture the whole Eastern trade.

Dr. Theodore Barth, German Radical Unionist, said the Brussels conference had proved a fiasco, and the conference held in Germany in 1894 was fruitless. There was little or no connection between the depression in husbandry and the introduction of the gold standard.

Count Herbert Bismarck said the failure of the Brussels conference was partly due to the absence of an entente between the powers which took part in it. The Berlin Congress of 1878 arrived at a result, because Great Britain and Russia had previously reached a basis for an agreement. An international entente upon the currency question would be arrived at in the course of time, and in the case of Great Britain the feeling was growing in favor of bimetallism. In conclusion, Count Herbert said:

"It gives me great pleasure to show how warmly my friend Balfour has taken up the cause in that country."

Other supporters of the resolution said simply that they regarded an international agreement as desirable.

Dr. Lieber of the Center party said the Centrists willingly supported the measure, because they saw in the proposed conference an attempt to remove the difficulties in regard to the monetary standard — a question which was of paramount importance to commerce.

Chancellor von Hoehenlohe declared that he was inclined to favorably consider a proposal for an interchange of views on the subject with those States which were concerned in the silver question. The debate was then adjourned.

BRUSSELS, April 25.— Before adjourning the Bimetallist Congress adopted the following resolution, submitted by L. Beernaert, President of the Belgian Chamber of Deputies:

Resolved, That this International Monetary Congress is of the opinion that the greatest service which can be rendered the world by virtue of the development of public prosperity and international relations, would consist in the establishment of a fixed relation in the respective monetary value of gold and silver; that by

reason of the great consumption of these precious metals which their coinage demands, this result can be obtained by a general monetary agreement of the civilized nations, or even of the greater part of them; that the urgency of such agreement results, not only from the suffering which the present state of affairs entails, but from the logical necessities which constrain monometallists to much aggravate the present situation by provoking demonetization at the great loss of considerable quantities of silver which are in circulation with full liberative force, and to the confusion of a regime of varying standard which nothing justifies: that an international monetary convention can only be prepared by incessant propaganda, and only brought about by the good will of all; that in view of this great result it is necessary to extol all measures tending to progressively raise the value of silver and to aid to their realization; that in the present state of opinion it is specially on the good disposition of the British and German Governments that it is necessary to be able to count; that the Congress applauds the vote given in the British Parliament on March 17 last, and by the Belgium Chamber of Representatives on March 13 last, and expresses the hope that the resolution of March 17 will induce Great Britain to take the initiative in the international pour-parlers, that other parliaments will follow the example of the Belgian and British Parliaments by adopting analogous resolutions; that a preliminary and immediate agreement could result from the re-establishment of bimetallism by the United States by reopening of the India mints, by the free coinage of silver, as well as from the constitution in silver of a part of the metallic reserve of the Bank of England, and by the adoption by other European States of measures for assuring a sufficient consumption of silver metal, in order that it may not be thrown back from the European colonies and countries to the mints of the United States; and that this Congress decides to constitute itself in a state of permanent reunion for the centralizing and combining of the efforts of its members in view of the great object which it is so desirable to attain.

THE FLAW IN THE LOGIC.

Comptroller Eckels uttered a great truth in his speech at the Detroit Chamber of Commerce when he said, "The commercial world has with unvarying precision drawn the true distinction which exists between the true value in the nation's currency and the sign of value affixed to it, and standing upon that line of demarcation, it has been as indifferent to the laws of great nations as of small."

It is apparent to any intelligent man who reads this axiom that Mr. Eckels reasons falsely when he says it follows that every country must adapt its currency to the demands of international commerce or to the wishes of other nations. If "commerce is indifferent to the laws of great nations as well as small" it follows that the money of any country and its currency laws have little or no effect on its international trade.

As a matter of fact international trade is not carried on in the currencies of trading nations, but is pure barter on a commodity basis. When money metal is used in the settlement of balances it is measured by weight and goes for its market value and not by the coin value stamped on its face. It is used only when it is the cheapest medium of exchange; that is to say, when the rate of export is less than the rate of exchange. To have a metal money with a fixed value at the mints of the trading nations merely simplifies the exchange, but offers no real advantage to either.

Mr. Eckels, therefore promulgates a fallacy, proved so by his own axiom and by experience, when he says no nation can be independent in the matter of currency. The United States, England, Germany and other gold standard countries trade to mutual advantage with countries having every form of currency from gold to inconvertible paper. Mexico's standard is silver monometallism, yet even the gold organ must admit her progress and prosperity and the anxiety of every gold nation to trade with her.

If there is any form of independence that a nation can assert it is in her money laws and standards, and if we are dependent on other nations for ours we are guilty of committing great folly and greater injustice at the demand of the money power, which wants not the best medium of exchange, but the highest measure of debt value.

COL. MORRISON'S FALLACY.

In a recent interview in the Boston Herald concerning his experience as a "forty-niner" Chairman Morrison of the Interstate Commerce Commission says he got his first lesson in "sound money" when he found that his gold dust was accepted everywhere in and out of this country for its full value.

This was a sly argument in favor of gold monometallism slipped into the interview after an ostentatious avoidance of an expression of opinion on the money issue now before the people. The evident intent of Col. Morrison was to suggest that gold has an intrinsic value apart from its coin value not possessed by silver, which makes it superior to silver as a money metal.

But if Col. Morrison had thought of the conditions existing at or near the time the incidents he tells of occurred he would have seen how fallacious his conclusion was. If Col. Morrison had possessed silver instead of gold about that time he could have sold it for more than it would bring at the mint. The commercial ratio of silver to gold was higher than that established at the mints and large profits were made by purchasing silver coin and selling it as bullion. At no time up to 1873, when the white metal was demonetized, was the bullion value of silver less than its coin value.

As a matter of fact, therefore, gold had no more intrinsic or commercial value than silver when both were freely admitted to the mints for coinage. That silver has lost much of its commercial value relative to gold since 1873 is solely because the mints are open to gold and closed to silver.

Cockrell on Democracy's Financial Principle.

"The whole record of our party from its organization shows clearly that bimetallism has been, and is, one of its cardinal principles."

"Search the world's records from the day when Adam and Eve were driven from the Garden of Eden, and you will not find a nation that has had more gold and silver, or either, than it could profitably use."

"When the gold standard is permanently established, then every dollar of redeemable money coined or issued will enhance the value and increase the purchasing power of gold by increasing the demand for it as the only money of final redemption."

"The efforts already made to maintain the gold standard have burdened the people with $100,000,000 of 10-year 5-per-cent coin bonds, and $62,400,000 30-year-4-per-cent coin bonds, issued in time of profound peace."

"The annual interest and the principal of these bonds must be paid by the people, and when paid up to the maturity of the respective bonds will amount to $287,280,000, principal and interest, which amount will be the actual cost to the people of maintaining the gold standard thus far."

"Had gold been demonetized instead of silver, it would have fallen in commercial value as silver has."

"No nation on earth, nor all the nations, can maintain the parity, the equal commercial value, of gold and silver, coined into money at any rates whatever, when they give to gold free and unlimited coinage and deny such coinage to silver."

"There is no possible danger that we shall have too much irredeemable money of final payment and redemption."

(The following masterly paper has been prepared by United States Senator F. M. Cockrell of Missouri expressly for the Sunday Post-Dispatch. It treats of the financial principle of the Democratic party; it will be read with deepest interest; great care has been exercised in its preparation, and it contains many important monetary statistics not heretofore published.)

When we see leading Democrats abandon the financial principles they have advocated for nearly a lifetime and now advocate directly opposite principles, it certainly justifies examining the records of the past to ascertain clearly the financial principles of the Democratic party.

Our party has maintained an unbroken organization for a century, and is the only party that has survived all the political storms and upheavals. It has so survived because it has faithfully adhered to and been guided by certain cardinal principles, which have been its pillar of cloud by day and pillar of fire by night—its monumental landmarks and beacon lights.

These principles are plainly derived from our written constitution. Our party has always opposed the assumption of doubtful powers, which never fails to produce suspicion and distrust, and has advocated a wise and energetic exercise of these incontestable and clearly defined powers, which inevitably inspires respect and confidence.

The record of our party in the past clearly shows that bimetallism is one of its cardinal principles, and is the unlimited coinage of both gold and silver at the ratio prescribed by Congress upon equal terms into money with full legal tender in all payments, the coined money of each the equal of the other, and neither redeemable in the other, each absolute, irredeemable money. Our party has adhered to this cardinal principle because it is clearly defined in our constitution as the financial principles of our Government.

Our constitution says: "The Congress shall have power to coin money, regulate the value thereof and of foreign coins, and fix the standard of weights and measures," and that "no State * * * shall coin money * * * or make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts." The only power given is to coin money—that is, to coin gold and silver metals into money, and then to regulate the value of such coined money—that is, to declare the legal tender value; the debt paying value of such money and of foreign coins. Gold and silver metals are not money and can only become money when coined by authority of a law of Congress. This money, coined from both gold and silver at the ratio fixed by Congress, is the money of our constitution, is honest, sound, irredeemable, absolute money—the end of the law in the payment and satisfaction of all money obligations—the only legal standard measure of the values of all property. And is inherently, intrinsically and honestly of the exact value stamped upon its face—its legal tender power in all payments. Each State clearly has the right to make this money—both the gold and silver coins—a lawful tender in payment of debts, but cannot deny to either coin such legal tender.

Congress cannot take from any State this right.

No power is given to Congress to regulate or fix the commercial value of gold and silver as metal or to declare that our coins of gold and silver, or either, shall not be money or to demonetize either gold or silver.

Daniel Webster said: "I am clearly of the opinion that gold and silver at rates fixed by Congress constitute the legal standard of value in this country, and that neither Congress nor any State has authority to establish any other standard or to displace this standard. The legal tender, therefore, the constitutional standard of value, is established and cannot be overthrown. To overthrow it would shake the whole system." When we demand that Congress shall at a fixed ratio coin both gold and silver into money upon equal terms and with equal rights, we demand only obedience to our constitution and no more. Congress in pursuance of the Constitution enacted the law of April 2, 1792, and thereby declared "that the money account of the United States shall be expressed in dollars or units and cents" and all accounts kept accordingly.

This, our first monetary law, established the true bimetallic system by authorizing the free and unlimited coinage of both gold and silver into money with full legal tender at the ratio of 16 to 1 in weight of pure gold or silver; the gold to be coined into "eagles, each to be of the value of ten dollars or units; * * * ; half eagles of the value of five dollars; * * * quarter eagles, of the value of two dollars, and a half dollar." And the silver to be coined into "dollars or units, and to contain 371¼ grains of pure or 416 grains of standard silver, and into half dollars, quarter dollars, dimes and half dimes.

This law made the silver dollar the unit of value, and the eagle to be of the value of so many silver dollars or units, and made the standard for gold eleven parts pure or fine to one part alloy, and for silver 1,485 parts fine to 179 parts alloy.

By this law the quantity of gold to the dollar in the coins was 27 grains standard and 24 75-100 grains fine, and, by the laws of June 28, 1834, and January 18, 1837, was reduced to 25 8-10 grains standard and 23 22-100 grains pure, and the standard changed for both gold and silver coins to 9 parts fine to 1 part alloy, which reduced the weight of the silver dollar to 412½ grains standard, but left the 371 ¼ grains pure silver in the dollar, which never has been changed. All the silver coins remained a full legal tender for all sums up to February 21, 1853, when the standard silver in the half dollar was reduced to 192 grains and in the smaller coins correspondingly, and their legal tender limited to $5, and their coinage only authorized on Government account.

By the law of February 9, 1793, and subsequent laws, certain gold and silver coins of foreign countries were declared to be a full legal tender at the rates prescribed, and so continued up to February 21, 1857, when the laws were repealed and their legal tender taken away. Up to this last date the Spanish milled dollar, the dollars of Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, Chili, Central America and the 5-franc pieces of France were legal tenders in all payments, and were largely used throughout the country, and no recoinage was necessary or could increase their value. By the coinage law of February 12, 1873, the standard silver dollar was stricken down, authority to coin taken away, all silver coins limited in legal tender to $5 and the gold dollar declared to be the unit of value, and bimetallism destroyed. This law was enacted by the Forty-second Congress with a two-thirds Republican majority in the House and Senate and was approved by a Republican President.

From March 4, 1861, to March 4, 1861, the Democratic party and its principles dominated and had controlling influence in the enactment and administration of laws and Government.

During this period our bimetallic system—the unlimited coinage, upon equal terms with equal rights, of both gold and silver into our honest, sound and constitutional money at the ratio fixed by Congress, first at 15 to 1, and then by the laws of 1834 and 1837 changed by reducing the gold to the dollar, to 15 988-1000 to 1, usually called 16 to 1—was maintained in full force and continued up to 1873, when the gold standard was established.

RESTORATION OF BIMETALLISM.

Review of the Democratic Party's Record of Work in This Direction.

What has the Democratic party through its representatives in Congress done to restore bimetallism?

The record, concisely stated, shows that, in the Forty-fourth Congress, the first with a Democratic majority in the House, 110 Democrats voted to restore the silver dollar to 16 against it, and 123 Democrats voted for and passed a free coinage bill to 17 against it.

In the Forty-fifth Congress Bland's free coinage bill was passed by 97 Democrats, including Hon. John G. Carlisle, voting yea to only 10 nays.

In the Republican Senate free coinage was stricken out and a substitute agreed to for purchasing not less than two nor more than four millions of dollars of silver per month, and thus amended was passed and vetoed by President Hayes and passed over his veto by 118 Democrats, including Mr. Carlisle, for to 22 against it in the House, and by 25 Democrats in the Senate to 9 against, and became the law of February 28, 1878.

In the same Congress the concurrent resolution offered by Senator Matthews—afterwards Justice of the Supreme Court—was passed in the Senate by 23 Democrats for to 7 against it and in the House by 116 Democrats, including Mr. Carlisle, for to 23 against it. This resolution declared that "all United States bonds issued under the refunding and redemption acts of July 14, 1870, and January 14, 1875, respectively, could be paid at the option of the Government in standard silver dollars of 412½ grains without violation of public faith or in derogation of the rights of public creditors."

In the Forty-sixth Congress in the House 100 Democrats, including Mr. Carlisle, voted for free and unlimited coinage to 9 against it, and 107 Democrats, including Mr. Carlisle, voted for to only 4 against an amendment requiring and directing the Secretary of the Treasury to pay out standard silver coin the same as gold in payment of all coin obligations of the Government.

In the Forty-seventh Congress the President and Congress were Republican, and in the Forty-eighth Congress the President and Senate were Republican, and nothing done to restore the silver dollar to its old place prior to 1873.

In the Forty-ninth Congress 96 Democrats voted for to 70 against free coinage.

In the Fiftieth Congress the tariff monopolized attention. During these two Congresses it was well known that the President was strongly against any free coinage measure, which had decided influence.

In the Fifty-first Congress 101 Democrats in the House voted for to only 12 against Bland's motion to recommit the silver purchasing bill with instructions to report a free coinage bill, and in the Senate Plumb's free and unlimited coinage substitute was passed by 27 Democrats, including Mr. Carlisle, for to 3 Democrats only against it, and in the House 113 Democrats voted for to 22 against this free coinage substitute. Every Democrat in both House and Senate voted against the conference committee report, which became the Sherman law of July 14, 1890. In the Senate in January, 1891, 24 Democrats voted for to 1 against free coinage.

In the Fifty-second Congress in the Senate 30 Democrats voted for to 9 against free coinage, and in the House to consider the Senate free coinage bill 118 Democrats voted yea to 94 nays.

In the Fifty-third Congress in the House 101 Democrats voted for to 116 Democrats against a free coinage amendment to the bill for repeal of the Sherman law, and in the Senate 18 for to 18 against such amendment. In the House in March, 1894, Bland's bill requiring the immediate coinage into standard dollars of the profit or seigniorage in the bullion purchased under the law of July 14, 1890, amounting to $56,156,680, and then the coinage of the remainder of the bullion into such dollars to be used to redeem and cancel the Treasury notes issued in its purchase, then outstanding to the amount of $152,951,280, was passed by 136 Democrats for to 50 against, and in the Senate by 30 Democrats for to only 10 against it.

The bill was vetoed by the President, and in the House 118 Democrats voted for to 55 against passing it over the veto, and the veto prevailed, although over two-thirds of the Democrats voting in the House voted to pass it over the veto and three-fourths of the Democrats in the Senate voted yea when the bill was passed.

This brief summary of the record of the Democratic Representatives in Congress from 1873 to date shows clearly that they have used their best efforts to restore the standard dollar to its old place and reestablish bimetallism, and have by decisive majorities so voted every time it was presented, except only in the last Fifty-third Congress, when it was proposed as an amendment to the bill for repeal of the Sherman law.

During all these Congresses every President and Secretary of the Treasury have strongly opposed restoring the silver dollar to its place prior to 1873. Having briefly set the record of Democratic representatives in Congress since 1875, let us consider the record of our party in our national platforms.

Our party has held national conventions every four years, beginning in 1832, and adopted platforms beginning in 1840. No reference to the coinage of gold and silver was made in either of the ten platforms, 1840-1876 inclusive. Why this silence? Simply because bimetallism, the coinage of both gold and silver into money upon equal terms and equal rights, was conceded to be our constitutional Democratic system.

The efforts of our party in Congress to restore it from 1875 to 1880 made it a living vital issue.

In our platform of 1880 we declared for "honest money consisting of gold and silver and paper convertible into coin on demand." In our platform of 1884 we declared: "We believe in honest money, the gold and silver coinage of the constitution and a circulating medium convertible into such money without loss." In our platform of 1888 we declared: "The Democratic party of the United States in national convention assembled renews the pledge of its fidelity to Democratic faith and reaffirms the platform adopted by its representatives at the convention of 1884, thus reaffirming 'we believe in honest money, the gold and silver coinage of the Constitution.'" In our platform of 1892 we declared: "We hold to both gold and silver as the standard money of the country and to the coinage of both gold and silver without discrimination against either metal or charge for mintage, but the dollar unit of coinage of both metals must be of equal intrinsic and exchangeable value or be adjusted through international agreement or by such safeguards of legislation as shall insure the maintenance of the parity of the two metals, and the equal power of every dollar at all times in the markets and in payment of debts, and we demand that all paper currency shall be kept at par with and redeemable in such coin."

The language of our platforms of 1880, 1884 and 1888 is plain and not susceptible of misconstruction. They declare unequivocally for true bimetallism, the gold and silver coinage of the Constitution, not of one nor of the other, but of both the gold and silver coinage. The platform of 1892 has been variously construed.

The law of November 1, 1893, repealing the purchasing clause of the Sherman law was voted for by all the gold advocates in Senate and House and was approved by the President and construes the platform in these words: "And it is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to continue the use of both gold and silver as standard money, and to coin both gold and silver into money of equal intrinsic and exchangeable value, such equality to be secured through international agreement or by such safeguards of legislation as will insure the maintenance of the parity in value of the coins of the two metals, and the equal power of every dollar at all times in the markets and in the payment of debts. And it is hereby further declared that the efforts of the Government should be steadily directed to the establishment of such a safe system of bimetallism as will maintain at all times the equal power of every dollar coined or issued by the United States in the markets and in the payment of debts."

This legal construction of that platform places it in harmony with our three platforms of 1880, 1884 and 1888, and makes it equally with them an unequivocal declaration in favor of our Democratic bimetallic system, the use of both gold and silver equally as standard money, money of final payment, the coinage of both gold and silver into money of equal intrinsic and exchangeable value, that is the coined money, not the metals, to be of equal intrinsic and exchangeable value, that is of equal legal tender power, such equality to be secured through international agreement or by such safeguards of legislation as will insure the maintenance of the parity in value of the coins of the two metals—not of the two metals, but of the coined dollars, the money, and the

equal power of every dollar, not of the metals in the dollar—in the markets and in the payment of debts. Now, all we ask is that the Government shall establish such a safe system of bimetallism as will maintain at all times the equal power of every dollar coined or issued by the United States, in the markets and in the payment of debts.

This, we say, can be done by restoring the standard dollar by law to the old place it had by law prior to 1873 and then use and pay it out by the Government the same as gold in discharge of our coin bonds and interest and in redeeming the Treasury notes and greenbacks. We can only legislate for our people and make our coins of gold and silver money within our limits and maintain their parity, equal value as coined money in our own markets, and in payment of debts enforceable in our own courts.

When our coined money leaves our country, whether gold or silver, it becomes a mere metal dependent wholly for value upon the laws of the country to which it is taken.

The whole record of our party from its organization shows clearly that bimetallism has been and is one of its cardinal principles, and that since its destruction by the coinage law of 1873, our party has demanded and labored for its re-establishment. The law of November 1, 1893, unconditionally repealing the Sherman law, left the coinage law of 1873 in full force, and today we have no authority of law to coin a single dollar, except the bullion now in the Treasury, purchased under the Sherman law, amounting to about $208,000,000. Silver is denied any coinage or any monetary function and our coined silver dollars are denied equality with gold in paying our coin obligations, and in redeeming the Treasury notes and greenbacks, and gold has free and unlimited coinage and is used as the only money of final payment and redemption. Both by law and usage we have the single standard of gold. Now what is the issue—the vital question? It is simply whether this gold standard shall be maintained and perpetuated or our Democratic bimetallic system prescribed in the constitution shall be re-established by restoring the silver dollar by law to its old place in our laws prior to 1873.

Every possible effort will be made to conceal, mystify and complicate this vital issue.

Let us be not deceived nor misled.

THE GOLD STANDARD.

Europe Favored Bimetallism Until Misled by American Gold Bugs.

The maintenance and perpetuation of the gold standard means that gold coin alone shall be irredeemable, absolute money of final payment and redemption—the only measure of the value of all properties and that all other kinds of currency or mediums of exchange, whether of silver or paper, shall be redeemable in gold or limited in legal tender value to a small sum—$5, $10 or $25—so that they cannot be used or tendered in payment of any bonds or debts of our nation, States, municipalities, corporations or individuals, or in redemption of Treasury or greenback notes. What caused this contest for the single standard of gold? It was caused by highly colored and exaggerated representations of our Government officials and representatives in reports made in 1862 and up to 1868 and laid before the International Statistical Congress in Berlin in September, 1863, and repeated in the Paris Monetary Conference of 1867, that our country would produce from $200,000,000 to $400,000,000 of gold and silver for years to come.

They were believed to be true and had the same effect as if true, and created a world wide belief and fear that the world would be speedily deluged—flooded with gold and silver in quantities greater than could be consumed for monetary uses, without a marked depreciation or fall in their purchasing power, and a marked increase or rise in the selling price of all products and properties. This started a movement for a single metallic money standard throughout the world, which was adroitly managed so as to favor gold only. The result was, that in the Paris Conference of 1867, our Government by its representatives demanded the single standard of gold and that conference declared against a single standard of silver and in favor of the single standard of gold.

In proof of this, Senator Sherman, then chairman of the Finance Committee, on June 8, 1868, reported a bill to reduce the weight of our gold coins about 3½ cents to the dollar, to prohibit the coinage of the standard silver dollar, and limit the legal tender value of our other silver coins to $10, and in referring to the Paris Conference said: "The single standard of gold is an American idea, yielded to reluctantly by France and other countries where silver is the chief standard of value. * * * France, whose standard is adopted, makes a new coin similar to our half eagles. She yields to our demand for the sole standard of gold."

The gold advocates, strengthened by the actions of our officials and using the exaggerated statements of our $200,000,000 to $400,000,000 of gold and silver production, pressed for the establishment by law of the gold standard and finally succeeded in securing in our country the coinage law of 1873 and of similar laws in Germany and some other countries.

The representations, these prophecies of a flood of gold and silver were without any foundation in fact, as all their predictions have proved. In the thirty-two years, 1862 to 1893 inclusive, the United States produced an annual average of only $77,640,595 of both gold and silver, gold being 50.5 per cent and silver 49.5 per cent.

In these thirty-two years the whole world produced an annual average of only $297,845,599 of both gold and silver.

The gold advocates are still prophesying about overproduction—a flood of silver—and now that they have practically the gold standard established, they say, why not continue it? Why agitate the money question? It will retard the returning prosperity and the growth of confidence. An abundant crop will bring prosperity and the silver craze will die out.

They have forced the issue by refusing to use our silver dollar money as the equal of gold, or to coin the $208,000,000 in silver bullion stored in the Treasury like so much pig iron or lead, and have caused the bill passed by an overwhelming majority of Democrats in Congress requiring its coinage into dollars to be used in retiring and cancelling the Treasury notes issued in payment for it to be vetoed. They are practically declaring that, although our laws make our silver dollars absolute irredeemable money, a full legal tender at their face or nominal value for all debts and dues public and private, except where otherwise expressly stated in the contract, yet these silver dollars, honest, constitutional money, are dishonest 50 cent dollars, not fit for paying public debts, and must be redeemable in gold to maintain their standard. They are marshaling under the guidance of the Rothschilds and Belmonts and their associates in Europe and America to destroy silver as a money of final payment or the equal of gold. We are simply meeting the forced issue. Our only weapons for the contest are facts and figures, reason and common sense. Why do we oppose the continuance of the gold standard? We oppose it because it is not the financial system prescribed in our constitution, and Congress has no power or right either to demonetize silver or to deny it equality with gold, or to take away from the States their right to make both gold and silver coins a legal tender in payment of debts.

We oppose it because it is contrary to the cardinal Democratic principles of bimetallism, authorized in our constitution and maintained and preserved by the Democratic party during its ascendancy from 1801 to 1861, and is neither honest, nor sound, nor constitutional money as clearly defined in our Democratic national platforms, and is in direct conflict with the entire record of our party.

We oppose it because there is not a sufficient quantity of gold in the world and being annually produced to supply the demands for both monetary and industrial uses, and to constitute the only standard money of final payment and redemption the only measure of the values of all other property in the world.

All the value of any kind which gold or silver has is due to two, and only two, sources or uses: First, the demand for use as money a measure of value, and second, the demand for use for industrial purposes. These are the only uses for gold or silver, and the demands for them for these uses give them all their value, inherent, intrinsic or otherwise. Dr. Soetbeer, a gold advocate of Germany, and the ablest statistician of the world, after a most searching inquiry and thorough investigation for years, estimated the consumption for industrial uses of gold at 65 per cent of the world's annual product, and of silver at 21 per cent.

The director of our mint, in his report for 1894, estimates the consumption for industrial uses of the gold and silver produced in the United States in the years 1880 to 1893 inclusive, at a fraction over 44 per cent of the total gold product and 12½ per cent of the silver. It is clear then the demand for gold for industrial uses is at least 50 per cent or more of the total annual product in the world. This leaves 50 per cent—one-half—of the total annual product of gold to supply the demand for monetary use. The director of our mint, a gold advocate, estimates the total production of gold in the world from 1493 to 1893 inclusive, 400 years, at $8,399,101,000, and the population of

the world at 1,264,700,000. If all this gold were in existence to-day as money it would give $6.64 per capita of the world's population, a wholly inadequate amount of money of final payment and redemption for the transaction of the world's hundreds of billions of dollars of business and for the payment of the world's forty billions of dollars of debts. Our mint director estimates that of this total gold production in the last 400 years there remains in existence as money in the world only $3,905,900,000, about 47.2 per cent of the total product, which shows that 52.8 per cent has been used for industrial purposes. This remaining stock of gold in money in the world is only $3.13½ per capita.

Certainly no reasonable man will pretend that this $3,13½ per capita is a sufficient amount of money of final payment and redemption. Even if there were in existence to-day a sufficient amount of gold in the world for present uses, it could not be maintained because the annual production is not sufficient to make good the amount of the unavoidable annual losses by abrasion and otherwise and to supply the ever increasing demand of the increase of population and business. In the five years, 1889 to 1893 inclusive, the total production of gold in the world was only $676,514,000, or an annual average of only $135,302,800, which, if all used for money, would only give 10.7 cents per capita in the world. Deduct the 50 per cent of such production, which we know has been used for industrial purposes, and there is left only 5.3 cents per capita to make good the annual losses and supply the increase of population and business, which is totally inadequate.

The gold advocates say: "Do not agitate the money question. It will destroy confidence now returning." This is a practical confession that the gold standard is a mistake, an error, and rests upon confidence as its main support. No nation can maintain a sound or stable monetary system, resting mainly or largely upon confidence. Jefferson proclaimed the truth when he said, "Error is not dangerous when reason is left free to combat it." If the gold standard cannot stand the ordeal of the fullest discussion and severest criticism, and sustain itself in the fullest confidence of the people, it is only because there is not sufficient gold in the world and being annually produced to supply all the demands for its use as the only money of final payment and redemption.

EXPENSIVE FAVORITISM

What It Has Cost This Country to Maintain the Gold Standard.

We oppose the gold standard because of the efforts made and the measures and cost to the people considered necessary by its friends to sustain it as the only standard money.

In our country the people are the only sovereigns, and have a right to know, discuss, approve or disapprove any measure proposed by their servants and representatives in every branch of our Government. After the repeal of the Sherman law on November 1, 1893, our executive administration, following the policy of its predecessor, to maintain the gold standard in full confidence, considered it necessary to use only gold coin and no silver dollars, in the payment of our coin obligations, and the interest, and in redeeming the greenback and Treasury notes, although the law required if redeemed in gold they should be reissued in circulation to prevent contraction, but if the Treasury notes of July 14, 1890, were redeemed in silver dollars they should be canceled and destroyed and the silver dollars take their place, dollar for dollar. Knowing this policy of redemption in gold whenever demanded, the shylocks and speculators in gold gathered up these notes, and presenting them for redemption, demanded gold, which was promptly given, and the Treasury gold rapidly decreased.

To get back gold in the Treasury and maintain the standard $50,000,000 in ten year 5 per cent coin bonds were issued and sold in January, 1894, for $58,000,000 in gold, being $116 for every $100 in bonds.

The speculators again gathered up such notes, and presenting them, demanded gold, which was kindly paid, and the Treasury gold rapidly decreased again.

Another $50,000,000 in ten year 5 per cent coin bonds were issued and sold in November, 1894, for something over $58,000,000 of gold to maintain the gold standard. United States bonds are the best in the world and in great demand for permanent investments at home and abroad. The notes were again presented and gold demanded, which was graciously paid, and the Treasury gold again disappeared rapidly.

The President, by his message of January 28, 1895, appealed to Congress, stating the conditions and the

relief desired, and said: "The real trouble which confronts us consists in a lack of confidence, widespread and constantly increasing, in the continuing ability or disposition of the Government to pay its obligations in gold.". * * * "We have outstanding about five hundred millions of currency notes of the Government, for which gold may be demanded, and curiously enough, the law requires that when presented and in fact redeemed and paid in gold, they shall be reissued. Thus the same notes may do duty many times in drawing gold from the Treasury, nor can the process be arrested as long as private parties for profit or otherwise see an advantage in repeating the operation. More than $300,000,000 in these notes have already been redeemed in gold, and notwithstanding such redemption are still outstanding. Besides these Treasury notes, which certainly should be paid in gold, amounting to nearly $500,000,000, there will fall due in 1904 one hundred million of bonds, issued during the last year, for which we have received gold, and in 1907, nearly six hundred millions of 4 per cent bonds, issued in 1877. Shall the payment of these obligations in gold be repudiated?"

He then states the policy, the remedy, proposed in these words: "In my opinion the Secretary of the Treasury should be authorized to issue bonds of the Government for the purpose of procuring and maintaining a sufficient gold reserve and the redemption and cancellation of the United States legal tender notes and the Treasury notes issued for the purchase of silver bullion under the law of July 14, 1890. * * * The principal and interest of these bonds should be payable on their face in gold, because they should be sold only for gold or its representative, and bear interest at a rate not exceeding 3 per cent per annum. I do not see why they should not be payable fifty years from their date. The Secretary of the Treasury might well be permitted at his discretion to receive on the sale of the bonds legal tender and Treasury notes to be retired, and, of course, when they are retired or redeemed in gold, they should be canceled. These bonds, under existing laws, could be deposited by national banks as security for circulation, and such banks should be allowed to issue circulation up to the face value of these or any other bonds so deposited, except bonds outstanding bearing only 2 per cent interest and which sell in the market at less than par." He then recommends that all national bank notes under $10 be retired and notes of $10 and over issued, and that all silver certificates of $10 and over be retired and replaced by certificates under $10, and that for maintaining a reasonable supply of gold in the Treasury duties on imports should be paid in gold, other duties to be paid in any other form of money, and suggested that the provisions recommended "need not interfere with any currency scheme providing for the increase of the circulating medium through national or State banks that may commend itself to Congress, since they can easily be adjusted to such a scheme."

This is the first time the gold advocates have openly declared their policy, their measures for maintaining their gold standard. Analyzed, it is simply to issue $500,000,000 in 50 year 3 per cent gold bonds, and either to exchange them dollar for dollar for the non-interest bearing legal tender greenback and Treasury notes, or to sell the bonds for gold and with the gold to redeem these notes, and in either case to cancel and destroy such notes, thus simply substituting the bonds for the notes and contracting the currency about $500,000,000 and authorizing the national banks to deposit these gold bonds in the Treasury and receive dollar for dollar in bank notes and draw interest on these bonds and also interest on their bank notes loaned to the people for fifty years and have absolute control of our paper currency, which could not be made a legal tender in paying debts and would only be a promise to pay gold.

Their policy, their measures for maintaining their standard, seem expensive, and, if enacted into legislation, the people would pay $15,000,000 in gold annually for fifty years, making $750,000,000, and then the principal of these bonds, $500,000,000, making $1,250,000,000 in gold. In addition the national banks would have a monopoly of the paper currency, all the greenbacks and Treasury notes being retired, and would certainly issue as much as $350,000,000 of bank notes and loan them to the people at 6 per cent for the fifty years, and the people borrowing such notes would pay annually in interest $21,000,000, making $1,050,000,000 during the 50 years Add this to the bonds and interest and the amount is $2,300,000,000 which it would cost the people to maintain the gold standard by the enactment of the legislation recommended. To sustain the gold standard you must either continue the process of redeeming the greenbacks and Treasury notes with gold paid out in one hand and

with the other hand issue and deliver coin bonds to get the gold back, or you must retire and cancel the greenbacks and Treasury notes either by issuing bonds in their stead dollar for dollar or sell the bonds for gold and with it retire and cancel such notes. As long as the Treasury will pay such notes in gold they will be used to withdraw gold from the Treasury. In addition we have $100,000,000 of bonds issued last year, $62,400,000 issued the present year and about $600,000,000 issued in 1877, the first lot maturing in 1904, the last in 1907 and the second in 1925. They too, must be redeemed in gold.

Congress hesitated to enact this legislation so recommended, and the President sent another message to Congress on February 8, 1895, stating that he had made arrangements from abroad. The legislation recommended to issue and sell thirty-year 4 per cent coin bonds under the resumption act "to the amount of a little less than $62,400,000 and for the purchase of gold coin amounting to a sum slightly in excess of $65,000,000, at least one-half of the gold to be shipped from abroad." The legislation recommended failed, and the bonds were issued and sold for gold at the rate of $104.50 for $100 bonds, a premium of only $4.50, while the two previous sales of ten-year 5 per cent bonds were made at a premium of $16 on the $100 bonds.

These thirty-year bonds are now selling in open market at a premium of $23.75 on the $100, a net increase of $19.25 on every $100, a handsome profit, justifying a liberal expenditure for perpetuating the gold standard.

This bond sale was made under a written contract dated Feb. 8, 1895, between Secretary Carlisle of the first part and August Belmont & Co. on behalf of Messrs. N. M. Rothschild & Sons of London and themselves and J. P. Morgan & Co. on behalf of Messrs. J. S. Morgan & Co. of London and themselves of the second part, and was witnessed by E. W. Curtis and Francis Lynde Stetson. I will read the fifth section:

"Fifth—In consideration of the purchase of such coin, the parties of the second part and their associates hereunder assume and will bear all the expense and inevitable loss of bringing gold from Europe hereunder; and as far as lies in their power will exert all financial influence and will make all legitimate efforts to protect the Treasury of the United States against withdrawals of gold pending the complete performance of this contract." I now read from the President's message of February 8, 1895:

"Therfore the discrimination in the judgment of investors between our bond obligations, payable in coin, and those specifically made payable in gold is very significant. It is hardly necessary to suggest that whatever may be our views on the subject, the sentiments or preferences of those with whom we must negotiate in disposing of our bonds for gold are not subject to our dictation." Is it possible that the United States of America with its forty-four independent States, many of them empires in themselves, with 70,000,000 of popualtiou aud over $70,000,000,000 of wealth, the greatest and most powerful nation on earth in all the elements of greatness, power and wealth, must, in order to maintain the gold standard, bargain and traffic with four banking firms, two foreign and two American, and sell them bonds upon the most profitable and remunerative terms of their own dictation, to secure their financial influence and efforts to protect our Treasury from withdrawals of gold for a short time? There is the contract. There is the message. To this humiliating condition the efforts of the gold advocates to maintain their standard have brought us and will hold us fast. They demonstrate that there is not gold enough in the world and being annually produced to supply the demands for its use as the only standard money of final payment and redemption, and that the Rothschilds, the Belmonts and their associates have practical control of what there is—a corner—and can dictate their own terms for it when demanded in a large amount, and can demand and receive not only a high price for the gold they sell, but also a high price for their financial influence, in protecting the gold from withdrawals. Scarcely one-half of the people of the world are now using gold as the only money of final payment and redemption, and in addition there is among the nations the sum of $2,570,900,000 of uncovered, irredeemable paper currency, circulating and used as money without any coin reserve either of gold or silver for its redemption.

If we continue the gold standard the nations not now using it, as well as the nations having the irredeemable paper currency, will be forced to the gold standard and to grab for gold to establish a gold basis and to use for redemption of the paper currency. The inevitable result will be an enormously increased demand for gold for money use. And gold will become scarcer and scarcer, and more costly and difficult to secure in any large amount, and will continue to increase

higher and higher in its purchasing power. And the commercial value of silver will fall lower and lower, and the selling price, the debt paying power of property will fall lower and lower, and our country and people will share the results as well as other nations. If we continue the gold standard, our legal tender greenback and Treasury notes will be refired and destroyed, and national bank notes or State bank notes, or some such notes will become our only paper currency, supplied in quantity to suit the interests of the banks issuing it. It cannot be made a legal tender and must be redeemable in gold, and witl thus create an additional demand for gold. When the gold standard is permanently established, then every dollar of redeemable money, coiued or issued, will enhance the value and increase the purchasing power of gold by increasing the demand for it as the only money of final redemption.

The efforts already made to maintain the gold standard have burdened the people with $100,000,000 of ten-year 5 per cent coin bonds and $62,400,000 thirty-year 4 per cent coin bonds, issued in time of profound peace. The annual interest and the principal of these bonds must be paid by the people, and when gold up to the maturity of the respective bonds, will amount to $287,280,000—principal and interest—which amount will be the actual cost to the people of maintaining the gold standard thus far, and the end is not yet. Contrast what would have been the cost if the principles of our Democratic bimetallic system had been enforced.

The $208,000,000 in silver bullion in the Treasury would have been coined into our standard dollars, as the law now authorizes, and the treasury notes issued in its purchase redeemed in such dollars and destroyed, as the law requires when redeemed in silver dollars, and such dollars or certificates would have taken the place of such notes, and the seigniorage, over $55,000,000 would have been added to the very small balance in the Treasury, and $208,000,000 of absolute irredeemable money of final payment and redemption would have been added to our standard money, all without any cost to the people.

When greenbacks were presented the Government would have exercised its clear right—option of redeeming them in standard dollars, which would have stopped their presentation, because the speculators could have made nothing, and the greenbacks would have continued in circulation as they did from January 1, 1879, and not a dollar of bonds would have been issued or necessary.

The gold certificates alone call for gold coin. All other Government obligations, whether bonds, greenbacks or Treasury notes, can be paid just as honestly and legally in silver dollars as in gold coin. What do the gold advocates propose to do with the $208,000,000 in silver bullion stored in the Treasury? They have thus far remained silent on their purpose. The existing law gives the Secretary of the Treasurer full authority to coin it all into standard dollars, and to use such dollars the same as gold. The present Secretary refuses to coin it and use the dollars to retire and cancel the Treasury notes, and thus prevent their use in withdrawing gold, simply because of the wrong of his predecessor, Secretary Foster, in beginning in October, 1891, to redeem these notes in gold on the demand of the gold speculators for gold, and uses the first wrong as a justification for continuing it.

The gold standard has been tried, weighed in the balance, and found wanting, costly and disastrous.

Why not try and test our Demothe silver dollar by law to its old place in our laws prior to 1873? It certainly cannot prove worse than the gold standard.

A CARDINAL PRINCIPAL.

Bimetallism Maintained by Democrats, Opposed by Republicans.

Our gold standard Democrats say, Do not agitate the silver question. It will divide the Democratic party. No, no, my friends. The advocacy of a cardinal principle of Democratic faith, clearly outlined in and sustained by our constitution maintained and revered by our party until it was destroyed by the Republican party in 1873, and ever since then demanded restoration by our party representatives in Congress, and proclaimed in our national platforms in 1880, 1884, 1888 and 1892, cannot surely now divide or disrupt our party. On the contrary, such advocacy will maintain our fidelity to Democratic faith, and will aid in preserving and strengthening our party.

Some of our party friends may leave it, as others have done in the past but the party will survive, as it has done in the past. No one man, no dozen men, no one hundred men, however exalted or revered, constitute the Dem-

ocratic party, nor can they destroy it either by advocating undemocratic policies or by leaving it.

The gold advocates say that the restoration of the silver dollar to its old place would cause a contraction of the currency by driviug out the gold we have, and that it would take our mints more than fifteen years to coin an equal amount of silver dollars. This is simply farcical—ridiculous. With a few hundred thousand dollars which Congress would promptly appropriate the capacity of our mints can be quickly increased so as to coin many millions of dollars annually.

They assert prophetically that with the silver dollar restored our stock of gold, which they estimated at $625,000,000—a large overestimate in my opinion—will be driven out of circulation as money either to be hoarded or sent abroad. This has been the standing prophecy since we first attempted to restore the silver dollar in 1878, and was not fulfilled then, as the record shows that in the five years 1873-1877 inclusive, we exported over 127,000,000 of dollars of gold more than we imported, while in the seventeen years 1878-1894 inclusive, we imported over $9,500,000 more gold than we exported.

This prophetic objection is a double-edged sword. The only tenable ground to support the gold standard is the sufficiency of gold in the world for all monetary uses. If this be correct, then gold will not be hoarded uor leave our country. If it be not correct, then the gold standard is a failure.

The gold in our country is not in circulation among the people as money. It is already hoarded or is a reserve in our banking, trust, insurance, savings and safe deposit companies. If hoarded it is simply because its constantly increasing purchasing power is considered greater than the interest or profit it could earn either loaned or invested.

If the gold held as a reserve is shipped abroad its amount and place as a reserve must be supplied with some other money of final payment and redemption, and silver dollars will be that only money—equal by law to gold. The shipment of our gold abroad will most certainly very largely increase the supply there, decrease its purchasing power and commercial value and largely increase the demand here for silver for money use and increase its comuercial value here and elsewhere in the world, and cause an approximation of the commercial value of the two metals. Then when gold ceases to rise in its purchasing power it will leave its hoarding places and be used in business to earn something. The holders of gold in this country will most certainly not give it away here or in foreign countries, nor throw it into the ocean.

If they part with it it will only be in exchange or payment for something they consider more valuable than their gold, and that something more valuable than their gold they will still have in this country. The country will lose no value, no wealth, and still remain as rich if not richer than before.

They say that the restoration of the silver dollar would derange our foreign trade. From 1861 to 1878 we practically had no gold uor silver in circulation as money, and transacted our business with a paper currency, and carried on a large commerce in exports to and imports from foreign countries without serious inconvenience, trouble or derangement. With a bimetallic systeu we could certainly do better than we did with only a paper currency. Each natiou has its own money, with money power in its own limits, but not beyond them.

The gold advocates argue that the restoration of silver would stop the investments of foreign money in this country and cause all our American securities, bonds, etc., held abroad to be returned to this country, and really seem seriously alarmed. What greater blessing could be bestowed upon this country than the giving to our nation and people a sufficient amount of sound irredeemable gold and silver coined money of our constitution to enable our people to transact all their business, develop all our resources and pay first and once all the obligations and debts of every kind of our Government, States, municipalities and corporations, and receive the interest and enjoy perfect financial independence of all nations and all gold syndicates? Suppose the bonds and securities are returned here, the holders will certainly not give them to us. All they can do is to bring them and sell them to us, at such prices as we are willing to pay. Shall we forever remain dependent for money upon the Rothschilds and associates? How can our people earn and secure our own money unless our Government by law authorizes its coinage? When the Government authorizes by law the coinage of gold and silver into our money then the people by industry and frugality will secure it and not till then. The gold advocates prophetically assert that the restoration of our silver dollar by our law to its old place prior to 1873 will cause

our country to be flooded—deluged with the silver of the whole world. This is a mere prediction without facts or figures to sustain it. The silver of the world exists, in plate, ornaments and other articles of manufacture, in bullion, in money and in the earth yet to be produced. The plate, ornaments and other articles in which silver has been used in whole or part are more valuable than the silver in them would be for coinage after deducting the cost of separating and refining.

Such silver would not come to our mints.

All well informed persons admit and know that there is no considerable quantity of silver bullion anywhere in the world, and that the annual product has been consumed and used. There can be no deluge from such source. The stock of silver money in the world is estimated at $3,435,800,000 full legal tender and $619,900,000 limited legal tender; total, $4,055,700,000. These limited legal tender coins contain from 5 to 10 cents less silver in the dollar than in our dollar, and would, if coined in our mints, suffer a loss of 5 to 10 cents on the dollar. They are in their own countries money with legal tender for sums from $5 to $10, and for such sums are equal to gold and constitute the money of the great masses of the people in all their transactions. And they cannot do without them, but by reason of abrasion and losses require them to be added to yearly by coinage of silver.

They most certainly will never come here nor cause any flood.

The report of the directors of our mint shows that of the full legal tender silver money in the world one-half is in India and China, where it has been going for ages, and whence it has never returned in the past ages. The silver in India is in the rupee, coined at the ratio of 15 to 1, with 6.2 cents less silver in the dollar than in our dollar, amounts to only $3.20 per capita, is the equal of gold in payments of debts and purchases, and is in the hands of the masses of the people, used in all their daily transactions. They cannot do without it and must replenish it year by year.

The silver in China is all in the hands of the people, is their only money except coins of the baser metals of small value and amounts to only $2.08 per capita. The Chinese people cannot do without it and must replenish it from year to year. A gold advocate would have a delightful time in roaming through the Celistial Empire buying from the Chinese their silver money and carrying with him something valuable enough to induce the Chinese to exchange their silver money for it.

Certainly no silver money can come to us from either of these countries.

The full legal tender silver coins in the other countries are the equals of gold in paying debts and purchasing property, dollar for dollar, all the money of the masses of the people in daily use in all their transactions and contain 3 cents less in the dollar than in our dollar. They will not flood us. Japan with a per capita of $2.15 in silver, coined at 16.18 to 1, and Mexico with a per capita of $4.13 in silver, coined at 16½ to 1, are the only two countries which put more silver to the dollar than we do.

If all the silver produced in the world in the four hundred years from 1493 to 1893, inclusive, estimated by our mint director at $9,960,041,000, were in existence to-day as money, it would only be $7.83 per capita of the world, and if all coined into our dollars at once would only be $141.55 per capita of our country.

If all the silver that can now be found in the whole world used as money, including all in our country, were at once coined into our dollars, we would have only $55.62 per capita, and deducting what silver we have we would only have $46.69 per capita. If all the nations of the earth, except our own, could gather up all the silver money in their limits and have it recoined in our mints in one day it would only make $46.69 per capita for our people.

All the silver money in the world now is only $3.20 per capita. Does any gold advocate really believe that it is possible for the silver money of the world to be gathered and brought to our mints for coinage in one, five, ten or fifty years, or even ever? If so, please explain who will search through the various nations with their diverse languages and money coins, some with less and others more silver in them, some new and many worn and abraded, find them, buy them, carrying along the gold or something sufficiently valuable to pay for them, pay the costs of transportation to our mints and have them coined into our dollars. The mere suggestion shows the ridiculous absurdity of such a prophecy as the flooding of this country with the silver of the world. For argument's sake, suppose all the silver of the world should be brought at once to our mints and coined into our dollars in one day, amounting to $46.69

per capita, what would the owners of the silver coined into our dollars and delivered back to them, do with these silver dollars in our money? They would not give them to us. They would necessarily have to buy in this country and such things as we have and are willing to sell for such dollars at the prices we are willing to sell for such dollars at the prices we are willing to take. We have an abundance of things to sell at a fair price for standard silver dollars, and the more we can sell the better for us and our country. But the gold advocates insist that the world's current production of silver would flood us. This is another prophecy without foundation. In the five years 1889 to 1893 inclusive the world's product of silver was $902,718,000. Deduct the consumption in industrial uses 20 per cent and the coinage of foreign nations $597,074,942 and we have left $125,000,757, being only $1.79 per capita of our population in the five years, or an annual average of only 36 cents per capita.

Take the world's silver product of 1893 and deduct the consumption for industrial uses and the coinage of foreign nations and we have for our country a per capita of 58 cents, and if the foreign coinage be added to us we would have a per capita of only $2.39.

In these statements I do not deduct the annual losses by abrasion, estimated at $2,000,000, nor the other large losses by accidents and unavoidable disasters. The flood, the deluge of silver will never come to our country. The gold advocates harp about the restoration of the silver dollar only benefiting the mine owners. We ask no favors for either gold or silver mine owners. Our country produces more silver than any other. It is one of our exports. In the seventeen years 1887 to 1894 we exported over $205,000,000 of silver more than we imported. About three-fourths of the silver of the world is produced in the three Americas—North, Central and South—under republican governments, while the gold mines and their products are largely owned or controlled by the Rothschilds and European capitalists. The continuance of the gold standard will enrich the gold mine owners and impoverish the people. The restoration of silver will enhance the value of our silver product at home and abroad, equalize the profits of both gold and silver mine owners, immensely lighten the burdens of the people and restore in the end permanent prosperity. The gold advocates flippantly charge that we, who favor restoring by law the standard dollar to the place it held by law for eighty years under the ascendency of Democratic principles, want a dishonest, cheap 50-cent dollar, and that they want "sound money," which they have never dared to define.

SECRETARY CARLISLE QUOTED,

Prophetic and Truthful Words Uttered by Him in Congress.

They call it a 50-cent dollar because they say the commercial value of the silver metal in the dollar is only 50 cents. If so, then that is the exact measure of the rise in the purchasing power of gold and the fall in the commercial value of silver, caused by its demonetization by the law of 1873, known ever since February 21, 1878, as the crime of 1873, by reason of the prophetic and truthful language of Hon. John G. Carlisle, then a faithful representative of the people in the House, uttered in these exact words: "I know that the world's stock of the precious metals is none too large, and I see no reason to apprehend that it will ever become so. Mankind will be fortunate indeed if the annual production of gold and silver shall keep pace with the annual increase of population, commerce and industry. According to my view of the subject, the conspiracy which seems to have been formed here and in Europe to destroy by legislation from three-sevenths to one-half the metalic money of the world is the most gigantic crime of this or any other age. The consummation of such a scheme would ultimately entail more misery upon the human race than all the wars, pestilence and famine that ever occurred in the history of the world. The absolute and instantaneous destruction of half the entire moveable property of the world, including houses, ships, railroads and all other appliances for carrying on commerce, while it would be felt more sensibly at the moment, would not produce anything like the prolonged distress and disorganization of society that must inevitably result from the permanent annihilation of one-half the metalic money in the world.

"With an ample currency, an industrious and frugal people will speedily rebuild their works of internal improvement and repair losses of property, but no amount of industry or economy on the part of the people can create money. When the Government creates or authorizes it the citizen may acquire it, but he can do nothing more."

We want no cheap dollar, we seek to undo that most gigantic crime of this or any other age, by simply restoring the silver dollar to the exact place from which that crime drove it. We seek to prevent the consummation of the scheme to perpetuate the gold standard by permanently annihilating silver"—one-half the metalic money in the world, which would entail untimately more misery upon the human race than all the wars, pestilence and famine that ever occurred in the history of the world. We seek to prevent the prolonged distress and disorganization of society that must inevitably result from such annihilation of silver as an equal standard money, with gold. We seek to give by authority of law to the people of our country an ample amount of sound irredeemable standard money of final payment and redemption, composed of both the gold and silver coinage of our constitution, that they may repair their losses and restore permanent prosperity. We know that our people, by the most laborious industry and rigid economy, can not create money, and can only acquire it, when the Government creates or authorizes it. Without law there can be no money. Aristotle said 2,000 years ago: "Money exists not by nature, but by law."

Without law gold and silver are not money, but are metals simply and are only exchangeable for other things at whatever amount may be agreed upon, and would not be a legal tender in payment of debts. Our money of account is expressed in dollars and cents. When our Government authorizes by law the coinage of gold and silver into our dollars of money it stamps upon the faces of the coined money the year of the coinage, the words "United States of America" and the value of the coin; if silver "One Dollar," and if gold, "Ten Dollars," "Five Dollars," and declares the legal tender value to be the nominal or stamped value. The coined dollars are then money, absolute, irredeemable and without price and inherently and intrinsically of the exact value stamped upon their faces, and can not be of less value as long as within the limits of the law. Our standard dollars are to-day as absolutely and intrinsically of the valne of one dollar, one hundred cents, as the gold coins are of the value stamped on them. If this be not so, and they are only 50-cent, cheap dollars, I want some friends of silver who have business with gold advocates, when the gold advocate offers to pay them a silver dollar for a dollar to insist on two silver 50-cent dollars instead of one and thus test the question. If the gold advocates will in all such cases pay for one dollar's valne two standard silver dollars, then I will admit our silver dollars are cheap, 50-cent dollars, but not till then.

There can be no such thing as cheap money. Money is without price and is itself the measure of values. We must remember that paper currency is redeemable, although a legal tender for debts and is not money of final redemption and may depreciate much below its legal tender and even become utterly valueless, and depends for its value upon the solvency of the nation using it and the ability to redeem it in money of final redemption. What we seek to secure and what the people need is absolute, irredeemable money of final payment and redemption coined from both gold and silver upon equal terms, with equal rights, and not redeemable paper currency nor limited legal tender coined dollars.

The gold advocates declare that laws cannot increase the value of silver. If this be true, then laws can neither increase nor decrease the value of either gold or silver. Whence come their value?

Gold and silver have both been used so long for both money and for industrial purposes, that it is now impossible to determine whether the demand for their monetary use or for their industrial use gives the greater valne. Beyond question the demands for them for these two uses or purposes give them all the value they have. If all the nations of the world were by their laws to prohibit their coinage and their use as money and utterly destroy this demand, their commercial valne in the open markets would depend alone upon the single demand for their industrial use, a limited demand, and would be immensely reduced below what it now is, as the supply would be immensely increased. When the laws of one or more great commercial nations give them free and unlimited coinage into full legal tender irredeemable money, they at once create an unlimited demand for them for monetary uses and practically endow the metals with monetary rights or functions and immensely increase their commercial value in such nations and elsewhere. On the contrary, when the laws of any such nation or nations take from either gold or silver

such coinage into money, they necessarily destroy the unlimited demand for monetary use, and at the same time increase the demand for the other for monetary use. The necessary, the inevitable result is an increase, a rise in the purchasing power and also in the commercial value of the favored metal, and a decrease, a fall in the commercial value of the rejected metal and also in the selling price of properties real and personal by the reduction of the amount of the standard money—the only measure of values.

If the discriminating legislation of 1873 had demonetized gold instead of silver, the commercial value of gold would certainly have fallen as much below silver as silver has fallen below gold.

The friends of bimetallism as early as 1868, and continually thereafter, pointed out and gave warning of the inevitable results of demonetizing silver by any leading nation then using it with free and unlimited coinage. Their warnings were unheeded and scorned by the gold advocates, who refused to see the pitfall before them, and madly and blindly rushed toward the phantom light of the gold standard just as they are doing now. To prove the results of the demonetizing of silver, I will present the testimony of the leader of the gold advocates, Senator Sherman, who, on July 11, 1876, in the Senate, referring to the law of Germany, said: "The enormous effect of the law in Germany, and as a consequence the partial demonetization of silver coins I suppose is felt by every man, woman and child who buys or sells anything. A struggle for the possession of gold at once arose between the great nations, because anybody could see that if $3,200,000,000 of silver coin were demonetized and $3,500,000,000 of gold coin made the sole standard, it would enormously add to the value of gold, and the Bank of France, the Bank of England and the Imperial Bank of Germany at once commenced grasping for gold in whatever form. Therefore, what we have observed recently is not so much a fall of silver as it is a rise of gold, the inevitable effect of a fear of the demonetization of silver."

Senator Sherman in his letter of July 15, 1878, to Mr. Groesbeck, one of our delegates to the Paris monetary conference in 1878, said:

"During the monetary conference in Paris when silver in our country was excluded from circulation by being undervalued, I was strongly in favor of a single standard of gold. At that time the wisest among us did not anticipate the sudden fall of silver or the rise of gold that has occurred. This uncertainty of the relation between the two metals is one of the chief arguments in favor of a monometallic system, but other arguments showing the dangerous effect upon industry by dropping one of the precious metals from the standard of value outweigh in my mind all theoretical objections to the bimetallic system." He then expressed his belief that the leading nations could fix by agreement an arbitrary relation between gold and silver which would be of the greatest good to all nations and hoped the conference would do it.

Robert Giffen, recognized as one of the best authorities in England, said in 1888:

"If events are the touchstones of prophecies, no prophecy was ever more certain than the increased dearness of gold. That the fall of prices to an extent so general as we are at present experiencing is to be referred to an increase in the purchasing power of gold is generally and, I might say, almost universally conceded."

Certainly then the result of laws demonetizing silver has been a fall in the commercial value of silver and a rise in the purchasing power and commercial value of gold and a fall in the debt paying power —the selling price of all property, real and personal.

Had gold been demonetized instead of silver it would have fallen in commercial value as silver has, and bimetallists would be most strongly urging the restoration of gold to its old place, and our gold advocates would be silver advocates, and calling gold the cheap, dishonest, unsound 50-cent money.

Some Significant Statistics

Figures Showing the Relative Proportion of Gold and Silver.

Secretary Carlisle and the gold advocates assert that the fall in the price of silver was not due to the legislation complained of, but to an enormous overproduction. Mr. Carlisle compares the annual average production of five years preceding 1873, with the one year 1893, knowing, as he does, that the product of any one year has no perceptible effect upon the entire existing stock of such metal. It takes the products of a series of years to produce any perceptible effect. Let us test the question of overproduction by the official records: From 1687 to 1872, 185 years, the ratio of silver to gold was about 15½ to 1, beginning with 14.94 to 1 and ending in 1872 with 15.63 to 1. The two greatest divergences were 14.14 to 1 in 1860 and 16.25 to 1 in 1813. In 1873 it was 15.92 to 1; in 1880, 18.05 to 1; 1885, 19.41 to 1; in 1889, 22.10 to 1; in 1890, 19.76 to 1; 1891, 20.92 to 1; 1892, 23.72 to 1; 1893, 26.49 to 1; and 1894, 32.56 to 1.

These figures show a remarkable stability in the ratios or their relative values from 1687 to 1872 and very great divergencies since. Beginning in 1873 there was a steadily increasing divergence, silver falling in value and rising in the quantity to equal gold and gold rising in value and decreasing in the quantity to equal silver up to 1890, when there was a marked change in favor of silver. This gradually disappeared up to 1893, when there was a great change, and a remarkable jump in 1894. Every one must see and know that the Sherman law of July 14, 1890, caused the sudden advance in silver; and the laws of India closing her mints to silver and our unconditional repeal law of November 1, 1893, caused its sudden depreciation—fall in commercial value.

In the 401 years, 1493 to 1893, the relative value of the world's production of gold to silver was 45.90 dollars of gold to 54.10 dollars of silver or 45.9 per cent to 54.1 per cent.

In the 108 years, 1493 to 1600, gold was 35 per cent to 65 per cent silver.

In the 100 years, 1600 to 1700, gold was 28 per cent to 72 per cent silver.

In the 100 years, 1701 to 1800, gold was 35 per cent to 65 per cent silver.

In the 93 years, 1801 to 1893, gold was 54.45 per cent to 45.55 per cent silver.

In the 50 years, 1801 to 1850, gold was 36.7 per cent to 63.3 per cent silver.

In the 43 years, 1851 to 1893, gold was 58.8 per cent to 41.2 per cent silver.

In the 20 years, 1874 to 1893, gold was 47.40 per cent to 52.60 per cent silver.

In the 10 years, 1831 to 1840, gold was 35.23 per cent to 64.77 per cent silver.

In the 10 years, 1881 to 1890, gold was 44.93 per cent to 55.07 per cent silver.

They tell us that Jefferson in 1805 stopped coining our standard dollars then at the legal ratio, 15 to 1, because the commercial value of the 371¼ grains of silver was greater than its coined value, and that in 1834 and 1837 the quantity of gold in the dollar was reduced and we were practically on a gold standard. Yet the record shows that in the fifty years, 1801 to 1853, of every 100 dollars of both gold and silver, 63.30 dollars was silver, while in the forty-three years, 1861 to 1893, of every 100 dollars of both gold and silver only 41.20 dollars was silver. They call the last overproduction of silver.

Of every 100 dollars of both gold and silver in the 10 years 1831-1840, 64.77 dollars were silver, while in the 10 years 1881-1890 only 55.07 dollars were silver, and yet they call it overproductiou of silver.

From 1687 to 1872 the production of silver to gold varied greatly, being 75.90 per cent to 24.10 per cent during 1801-1810, but only 21.7 per cent to 78.3 per cent of gold during 1851-1855, and yet in these 185 years the ratio of silver to gold was above 16 to 1 only in three years, 1808, 1812 and 1813, and in those years product of silver was 75 per cent to 25 per cent gold. This record proves conclusively that there was no overproduction of silver and such alleged overproduction did not cause the fall in its commercial rating. Just as soon as the mints of India were closed against silver by the laws of that country an immediate and very great fall in the commercial value of silver occurred throughout the world, which can not possibly be attributed to overproduction.

Ever since the recoinage of silver dollars began in 1878 every President and Secretary of the Treasury have proscribed and discriminated against them. They have refused to treat or use them equally with gold in paying interest or principal of our coin bonds or even in redeeming greenback or Treasury notes, although every bond issued since July 14, 1870, has upon its face these words, "redeemable in coin of the standard value of the United States on said July 14, 1870." Germany, although with a gold standard, has $105,000,000 of full legal tender money, coined at the ratio of 15½ to 1, with 3 cents less silver than in our dollars. They use them equally with gold and do not call them cheap, dishonest 50-cent dollars.

France has over $400,000,000 of silver money at ratio of 15½ to 1, with 3 cents less silver than in our dollar. They use them equally with gold and never call them cheap 50-cent dollars. When gold is demanded in redemption of their millions of redeemable paper currency in any considerable amount, if it be for export, it has to be paid for above its coin value, and if

not for export, then silver or gold or both is paid, just as may suit the bank.

We are the only nation on earth with full legal tender silver coins and gold coins, which discriminates against its own silver coins and practically invites the shylocks and money traffickers of the world to present our paper currency and take gold, if they choose, and when they take gold, then sells them coin interest-bearing bonds to get the gold back again. Notwithstanding this treatment the people have never lost confidence in our standard silver dollars.

In the 14 years 1880-1893 over $167,000,000 in gold coin and paper redeemable in gold were presented to our Treasury and exchanged for silver dollars and certificates. Shortly before August 17, 1893, gold coin was presented to our Treasury officials and silver dollars asked in exchange and refused, for the reason, as stated by Secretary Carlisle, "that all the silver dollars in the Treasury at the time were required under the provisions of the laws relating to the currency to be held in the Treasury to cover the outsanding silver certificates and the Treasury notes issues under the act of July 14, 1890." The Secretary refuses to give silver dollars in exchange for gold because he must hold the silver dollars to redeem the Treasury notes, and then when the Treasury notes are presented, he chooses to hold on to the silver dollars and to pay the notes in gold.

No nation on earth, nor all the nations, can maintain the parity, the equal commercial value of gold and silver, coined into money at any ratio whatever, when they give to gold free and unlimited coinage, and deny such coinage to silver, and refuse to recognize and treat the silver money as the equal of the gold money or to use it equally with gold in paying coin obligations.

With equal propriety and assurance you might expect parents having two daughters to maintain them in equal standing, honor and virtue, when they recognize and treat one only as honest and virtuous and refuse to recognize or treat the other as her equal or to introduce her into society, and merely give her lodging-room and proclaim her to the world as dishouest, immoral and lascivious.

International Bimetallism

This Country Must Lead the March Toward It.

The gold advocates insist that we cannot restore silver and maintain our bimetallic system without international agreement. It is a myth, a delusion and a snare. We might just as reasonably expect the nations to agree upon a common religion, a common language or uniform laws regulating marriage and divorce or the descent and distribution of property. It is undemocratic and contrary to that cardinal principle of our faith, "commerce and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none." Again, on December 23, 1865, France, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland and Greece formed an international monetary system, called the Latin Union, for the free and unlimited coinage of full legal tender gold and silver coins at the ratio of 15½ to 1, and invited our nation to the Paris conference of 1867 and urged us to join the union. In the conference we spurned this friendly and voluntary offer and demanded the single standard of gold, as shown by Senator Sherman, whose words I have already quoted. This act of refusal of international bimetallism has been a stumbling block in our way ever since and will so remain until we first act alone.

No two nations are alike in their individual wealth, resources and expenditures or would be affected alike by an international agreement. Each nation has its own financial system of coinage and currency, and creates, authorizes by its laws the money for its citizens. Every nation considers itself capable of managing its own affairs, exacting its own laws and establishing its financial system best for its citizens, their interests and advantages, and acts accordingly; just as each of our citizens pursues his business for his own interest and advantage and not for the special interest of advantage of his rivals in business.

With our Democratic bimetallic system restablished here by the restoration by law of the silver dollar to the place it had in our law prior to 1873, then and not till then will other nations attempt to modify or change then systems accordingly.

We have been beggars for international bimetallism, without first re-establishing it by our laws for ourselves, ever since 1877, and have had

the monetary conferences in Paris in 1878 and 1881 and at Brussels in 1892 without any success.

Why shall we, the greatest of all the nations, longer kneel as beggars at the foot of the monarchical thrones of England, of Europe, for assistance in establishing our own monetary system for our own citizens.

We should either establish by our own laws our conetary system in our interest and for our own advantage, and then maintain it by the many effective and amply sufficient means we possess, just as every other independent, self-respecting nation does, or else we should surrender back to old England, whose power we have twice defied and triumphantly repulsed, our independence, confess our incapacity for self-government and place ourselves under her selfish and avaricious guardianship and protection and cry aloud "Long live the Queen!"

As a nation we are abundantly able to re-establish our Democratic bimetallic system by restoring the silver dollar to the place it held in our laws prior to 1873—by our own laws, independently of any and all nations, and then to maintain it, and the parity, the equal debt-paying and purchasing power of every dollar of silver and gold. Demonetized as silver now is, if its commercial value were equal to gold, and then free and unlimited coinage given to silver, thus largely increasing the demand for it for money, its commercial value would inevitably rise above its coinage value and above gold. First give silver a chance, a trial, by its restoration to equality by law with gold. We need more irredeemable money of final payment and redemption. Our laws alone can authorize it. We must so authorize it by our laws before the people can even have a chance to earn and acquire it by industry and frugality. The people need two yard sticks, one of silver and one of gold, made by our laws of exactly equal length, so that they can use the one or the other as may be most convenient in transacting their business. They need such money, authorized by the laws of our nation, for the transaction of their many billions of dollars of domestic home business, which is 95 per cent of all their transactions, domestic and foreign. Then they can easily provide for transacting the 5 per cent of foreign business.

If the prophecies of a deluge of silver from any and all sources should perchance occur, we have ample and sufficient means of safe protection by mint charges on imported silver and otherwise. To sustain our position, that we can safely act independently of all nations, re-establish our bimetallic system, we have the historic record of the past. If the total production of both gold and silver in the world during the 400 years, 1493 to 1893 were in existence today as money it would only be $14.47 per capita of the world, a wholly insufficient amount for the only money of final payment and redemption and the only measure of value. Search the world today and all the gold and silver money which can be found is only $6.34 per capita, a wholly inadequate amount for the transaction of the world's business. We have in the world today $2,570,900,000 of uncovered paper currency, irredeemable for lack of gold and silver money. The nations having it are struggling to get gold and silver for its redemption and will continue the struggle. In the five years, 1889 to 1893, the world coined $165,976,893 of gold more than was produced, showing the fearful struggle for coinage of gold and its shifting from nation to nation, and being recoined, and of the total silver product foreign nations alone coined over 66 per cent. They can not do without silver coins, cannot part with what they have, and must continue to coin in the future as in the past, regardless of our action. Year by year the coined money disappears forever in numberless ways, known and unknown. The annual production does not keep pace with the increase of population, commerce and industry, and the increasing demands for coined money.

Gold and silver are the most suitable metals for use as money and a measure of values, and have been so used from time immemorial and are more stable in their values than any other two metals. They have never been produced in unlimited quantities, like iron, lead, copper, zinc and most other metals. Hence, no people have ever been flooded with gold and silver or either. Linked together as equals in money use for 185 years prior to 1872, they maintained a most remarkably stable ratio during great changes in relative productions, sometimes 75 per cent of silver to 25 per cent gold and then 75 per cent gold to 25 per cent silver. Link them together again by our laws, as yoke-fellows and balances to each other, as we had them prior to 1873, and try them again. If they prove unequally yoked or too unevenly balanced we can readjust their relative positions. There is no possible danger that we shall ever have too much irredeem-

able money of final payment and redemption, either of both gold and silver or of silver or gold. Infinite wisdom and power has so distributed these precious metals in the earth that all the people combined cannot find them or either of them in unlimited quantities or in greater quantities than they can use for money. Search the world's records from the day when Adam and Eve were driven from the Garden of Eden and you will not find a nation that has had more gold and silver, or either, than it could profitably use.

Thus give us back our Democratic bimetallic system by restoring by our laws the silver dollar to the old place it had in our laws prior to 1873.

(Signed) F. M. COCKRELL.

Every American citizen with silver in his hair is old enough to know that his country has suffered enough from the gold standard folly.

"What Washington would not have and Grant could not get" is exactly what Grover Cleveland wants.

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TITLE